J. V. DAVIDSON-HOUSTON

RUSSIA AND CHINA

FROM THE HUNS TO MAO TSE-TUN

THIS IS A PICTURE ON A VAST CANVAS; the first attempt to portray for the general reader the past, present and future relations between the last of the great despotisms, China and Russia. Most people in the West have failed to comprehend that these two nations knew one another long before the nations of the West had contact with either; and that during the last two thousand years both have been subject to successive overlords from the same Asiatic steppes. Hunnish, Turkish and Mongol nomads swept in giant pulsations across the Eurasian continent. They imposed similar forms of government and ways of life upon Russian and Chinese alike until, under Genghiz Khan, they became fellow subjects.

J. V. Davidson-Houston, as soldier and diplomat, has travelled widely in both China and Russia, as well as in the Central Asian cradle of the Steppes Empire. With an uncommon knowledge of the Russian and Chinese languages he has not only done research into the histories of both countries, but has himself witnessed many of the critical events, such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, which have affected their relations in modern times. He vividly describes the rise and fall of the successive steppe dynasties and their impact on the growth of the Muscovite and Han nations. He then shows why they have been able to regulate their relations, even when unfriendly, through a mutual understanding lacking in their dealings with the West.

Finally, he is able to deduce the probable course of their present alliance, a phenomenon bound to have profound effects on the world's future.

By the same author

CHINESE AND ENGLISH MODERN MILITARY DICTIONARY
(*with R. V. Dewar-Durie*)

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

Heirs to Asia

RUSSIA AND CHINA

From the Huns to Mao Tse-tung

by

J. V. DAVIDSON-HOUSTON, M.B.E., F.R.G.S.

ILLUSTRATED

London
ROBERT HALE LIMITED
63 Old Brompton Road S.W.7

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First published in Great Britain 1960

TO

MY MOTHER

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY EBENEZER BAYLIS AND SON, LTD.,
THE TRINITY PRESS, WORCESTER, AND LONDON

Contents

	Foreword	11
I.	The Community of Northern Asia	17
II.	China and the Steppe	27
III.	Russia and the Steppe	43
IV.	Early Contacts	67
V.	The Break-up of China	78
VI.	The Chinese and Russian Revolutions	93
VII.	The First Communist Attempt	108
VIII.	The Impact of Japan	122
IX.	The Triangular War	139
X.	Communist China	149
XI.	The Moscow–Peking Axis	162
XII.	The Future	175
	Index	185

List of Maps

1. Northern Eurasia ... ... *pages* 8 *and* 9
2. Forest and Steppe Zones 19
3. The Chinese Principalities, 350 B.C. 29
4. The Three Kingdoms, A.D. 220–280 33
5. The Slavs and their neighbours up to the first century A.D 43
6. The Slavs and their neighbours, second to seventh centuries 45
7. The Khazar Khanate, seventh to ninth centuries ... 47
8. Rus and its neighbours, ninth to eleventh centuries ... 49
9. The Russian Principalities, eleventh century 51
10. Asia in 1141 53
11. The Mongol Empire, 1290 55
12. Eurasia in 1415 57
13. The Growth of Muscovy, 1300–1584 61
14. The Russian State, 1598 63
15. Growth of the Russian and Soviet Empires, 1533–1944 94
16. Soviet–Chinese Frontier, 1949 163



1. *Northern Eurasia*

Foreword

THE association, for the first time in history, of two of the world's most populous empires in an alliance harnessed to militant Communism, is but one act in that "great and impassioned drama" which has for centuries been enacted on the vast stage of the Eurasian steppes and forests.

The relations between Russia and China are today, however, of such significance to all of us, whether actors or spectators, that it is time a comprehensive narrative were compiled on the subject As no contemporary writer has yet attempted it, and several friends have suggested my taking on the task, I have ventured to approach this formidable but fascinating subject in the hope that it may help to enlighten the general reader and perhaps encourage writers of greater scholarship to pursue it more fully.

My own qualifications for this exercise are simply a long acquaintance, in the diplomatic and military fields, with both China and Russia, and a passable knowledge of their languages and histories. When dealing with the modern period, moreover, I have been greatly aided by my personal experiences with the various Chinese armies, and as Military Observer during the Sino-Japanese operations in Manchuria and China proper. I have also had the advantage of sojourning in the lesser-known territories of Mongolia and Central Asia and of meeting many of the principal actors in the events of recent times. Having travelled from China through the Soviet Union in 1938 and in the reverse direction in 1957, I found myself in the fortunate position of being able to make a personal assessment of the changes in that period.

Nevertheless this book can by no means usurp the place of the many erudite histories of the Chinese and Russian peoples, or of contemporary treatises on Communist activities. Nor does it seek to supplant such sources as Baddeley's monumental work *Russia, Mongolia and China,* compiled before the First World War: its object is to present in a single compact volume the interwoven story of the two nations in such a way that the ordinary reader receives a clear picture shorn of all unnecessary detail and requiring no previous acquaintance with the subject. A bibliography is appended so that those interested in a particular aspect can explore it in greater detail.

The scope of this short study is thus limited to the interrelated episodes of Russian and Chinese histories; such as the early influence of the Steppe Empires on their cultures and principles of government, their many frontier contacts, friendly and unfriendly, and political intercourse between them. It would have been undesirable, and indeed impracticable, to attempt a complete description of each nation's story. Thus the early Chinese dynasties are referred to only in so far as they concern relations with the Tartars and other peoples also connected with Russian history; Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great stalk across its pages only as sponsors of Russia's march to the east; the Mongol conquests are described to the extent of their impact upon the Russian and Chinese nations. In the same way other international relations here find place only when they fit into this picture. For example, China's long acquaintance with Tibet, Korea and Japan is mentioned when these countries became involved in Sino-Russian rivalry, just as Peter the Great's wars with Sweden are touched on solely when they affect Russia's ability to confront China.

Coming to more recent times, a single chapter is devoted to the two revolutions, occurring within a few years of each other, which swept the Manchus and the Romanovs from their respective thrones; but here again I have limited myself to discussing the similarities between them and the effects of the one upon the other. The convulsions within the Russian upheaval itself, and the confused changes during China's "warlord" period are alike passed over except where some event is relevant to our main theme. During this period I have also drawn upon my personal experiences and observations, both to render the descriptions more vivid and to act as a corrective to the biased or otherwise misleading accounts of partial sources.

In rounding off the story, it is inevitable that I should be called upon to forecast the future, or at any rate to appreciate the probable courses of Russo-Chinese relations. In undertaking this unenviable task I have drawn attention to the fact that there are two intertwining strands to be unravelled; that of the constant geographical and historical factors shaping the destinies of these two neighbours, and that of the Communist alliance which depends so much on personalities and the degree of whose ultimate success or failure it is as yet too early to foretell with certainty. In attempting the role of minor prophet I have therefore contented myself with outlining the problems facing the two chief actors in our story, and with venturing some opinions about the likely long-term developments. Things are moving too fast for any worthwhile

prediction of day-to-day events, and any attempt to make one would risk rendering the last chapter out-of-date before it was published.

In deciding upon the method of compilation I was confronted by two alternatives; either to follow the usual method of historians and to treat each facet of the subject separately, or to describe the whole as a single narrative, all aspects being dealt with, so to speak, in parallel. I have decided on the latter course for the sake of clarity. In a detailed historical study of Sino-Russian relations it would be desirable to devote sections of the book respectively to Manchuria, Mongolia, Central Asia and so forth, each one covering an entire period. But in order to present a clear, concise picture of this immense subject I have judged it best to carry everything along as a consecutive story. Thus the reader will be able to survey the whole vast stage at once; the Crimean War, the Russian advance to Vladivostok, and the Muslim rebellion in Turkestan, for instance, all being reviewed as interlocking actions whose significance might otherwise be lost sight of in isolation.

In order to keep the narrative within reasonable compass and to avoid confusing the reader with a mass of detail, it has also been necessary to treat certain events with brutal brevity. No attempt has been made, for example, to set down the complete texts of treaties or other agreements, but *précis* are given which indicate all the points of substance: details of negotiations leading up to the signature of such instruments have also been omitted unless they throw some light on the motives and character of the authorities concerned. Similarly figures and statistics have been reduced to a minimum, for nothing is more apt to confuse and bore the general reader than the recitation of numbers. Moreover, as many of our sources are biased or otherwise suspect, I have thought it prudent to deal in approximations, often adopting a mean between discrepant estimates. For the same reason, care has been taken to consult opposing accounts of an event before recording it, and if necessary to refer to both versions in the text.

The reader will doubtless turn to the last chapter (he may indeed have skipped the preceding ones) for the answers to the urgent questions of our time; and for this reason I have here felt myself to be on difficult and dangerous ground, for the role of prophet is apt to be a thankless one and the present situation is constantly changing, so that much may happen between the completion of the manuscript and the date of publication. As already adumbrated, therefore, I have limited myself to setting out the questions remaining to be answered at the time of writing, and

then marshalling the relevant factors so that the probabilities can be appreciated, in the light both of what has happened in the past and the observable trends at the present day.

As already explained, the historical and geographical factors shaping the relations between Russia and China have in recent times been complicated by a third ingredient, Soviet Communism. Neither space nor the reader's patience will admit of a full examination of the histories of the Russian and Chinese Communist parties, but it is of course essential that their interaction should be studied, and for this reason the developments of both organizations are followed so far as they affect one another.

A seeming departure from the strict path of consistency and brevity will be observed in the inclusion of certain picturesque details such as the ceremonies at Nerchinsk in 1689 and Stalin's embracing of the Japanese ambassador in 1941. Although these may add spice to the story their main purpose is to enable the reader to understand something of the psychological processes and reactions of peoples remote from him in background and mentality.

Just as lists of figures have been as far as possible eliminated, so the number of names has been reduced to a minimum. To the English reader Russian names are largely unpronounceable and Chinese ones indistinguishable, so that individuals are here mentioned only when they are already well known or when their personalities are of particular interest or importance. Together with the avoidance of figures I have used as few dates as possible, both because they tend to make a story unreadable and because in many cases an approximate indication of the period is all that is necessary. Exact dates are of course less necessary when dealing with the distant past, apart from the fact that one cannot be sure of their accuracy; the varied sources of information, Chinese, Persian, Russian and West European, frequently disagree by as much as a year, and in addition discrepancies are also caused by the use of Julian, Gregorian, Muslim, lunar and other calendars by various authorities. In the more modern periods exact dates are given where these have a vital significance, as when the Russian declaration of war on Japan is related to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Not the least of my difficulties have been with nomenclature and spelling. In a narrative of this extent, both in space and time, persons and places often own many names. Genghiz (or Chinggis) Khan was born Temujin, and Prince Demchukdongrob is Teh to the Chinese; while ancient cities often suffer from a bewildering

variety of appellations to mention only Byzantium, Constantinople, Tsargrad and Istanbul, or Mukden, Fengtian, Liaoning and Shenyang. Perhaps the designation of nomad peoples, used by the settled nations with whom they came in contact, causes the greatest confusion: the Djungars, Kalmyks and Torguts were all manifestations of the same West Mongol race, while the Kipchaks or Cumans are the Polovtsi of Russian history. I have attempted to smooth this path by using the name most familiar to English readers, as I have employed the term "Outer Mongolia" in preference to the more precise "Khalkha". Where more than one version is in common use, or where a change of name has an historical significance, this fact is made clear in the text.

Spelling is a bog for pedants to wallow in, and here again I have made use of the most familiar or intelligible versions, regardless of standard systems of transliteration known only to the specialist. Thus I have hesitated to use the official spelling *Baykal* when referring to Lake Baikal; and while relying on the Wade system for the less familiar Chinese names I have eschewed writing T'ien-ching or Hsi-an when I mean Tientsin and Sian. I have endeavoured to make common sense my guide in this respect. A comparatively minor difficulty arises with Mongol and Turkic names, many of which have come to us through Persian or Arabic, with a consequent uncertainty about the vowel sounds. Thus we find Sabutai and Subotei, Ogotai and Ogedei, while the guttural nature of the Tartar languages gives rise to alternative renderings such as Qara-khitai, Karakitai; Khutukhtu, Hutuktu and so forth. Here again I have picked on the most familiar or less tongue-twisting, and stuck to it.

I have thought it necessary, for the sake of clarity, to include a considerable number of maps; I have made these as simple as possible, most of them consisting of outlines on which is marked only the information relevant to a particular section of the book, e.g., the principalities into which China and Russia were anciently divided, and the extensions of the latter's boundaries during its period of expansion. These have not been drawn with any pretension to scientific accuracy, and the student of topographical detail should refer to a large-scale atlas.

The annexed bibliography indicates the authorities on which, in addition to my own experience and studies, I have relied for much of the factual material. In addition my thanks are due to Doctor E. J. Lindgren-Utsi of Cambridge University, Mr. C. C. Parrott and Miss Violet Connolly of the Foreign Office, for their valuable advice on the relevant literature; to my cousin Mrs. Basil

Seager for helping so ably with the maps; and to Mrs. Barbara Harbord for her work on the manuscripts.

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CHAPTER I

The Community of Northern Asia

MEN and nations shape History, but Geography shapes nations. And while blood may be thicker than water, land is thicker than either.

Thus, as the character of the individual, whatever his origins, is moulded by his environment, so a people's temper and destiny are formed by the nature of its surroundings rather than by its racial make-up, which is seldom homogeneous. Whether its home is a great land-mass or a small island, tropical jungle or arid mountains; whether swept by sea-winds or dust-storms, whither the rivers lead, influence its national life and culture more than ties of blood or cephalic structure. The bitterest struggles are internecine or doctrinal, and the great rivalries of modern history have been between the closely related peoples of Europe and America.

It is no accident that religion and culture distribute themselves geographically. Christianity, arising in the Levant, travelled on the vehicles of Mediterranean and European expansion; Islam, born in the deserts of the Middle East, was carried to the limits of Arab conquest and trade; Buddha is enshrined in the temples of eastern Asia. There are neither physical nor cultural barriers between eastern Europe and northern Asia. The German plain virtually extends from the shores of the North Sea into the depths of the Russian forests, while the Urals ceased to be a true continental frontier when the Cossack adventurers crossed this insignificant range to win Siberia for the Tsar.

The Russians, Great, Little and White, are basically Slavs related to the other white-skinned peoples of Europe; their language belongs to the Indo-European group. Contacts with their western neighbours, however, have been almost uniformly hostile, partly owing to the inevitability of quarrels with the Swedes and Germans over territorial limits, and partly to religious and cultural differences which early divided the Eastern from the Western Slavs. The civilizing influence of Christianity came to the forest-dwellers of Russia not from Rome but from Byzantium; they were thus divided from Western Christendom by the differences between the Orthodox and Roman churches, and of course isolated

from the influences of the Reformation. Even the name of God (*Bog*), adopted by the Russians long before the advent of the Christian faith, has nothing in common with Occidental terminology, and we have to look to Persia or Mongolia to find a common root. Although geography treats of "European Russia" when referring to the territory west of the Urals, the Russians have never thought of themselves as Europeans, considering themselves as a "peculiar people" belonging to no one continent.

While the early Russians were thus cut off from normal contact with Western civilization, in other directions conditions were very different. In the north, Scandinavian and Finnish tribes, as unorganized as the Russians, soon amalgamated with them to form an important element of the developing nation, but were absorbed before the name Russia appeared on any map. From the south-east, however, stronger winds blew out of Asia, which were to have a decisive influence upon the development of the Eastern Slavs. Even before the beginning of the Christian Era, a succession of nomad empires arose in the vast steppe-lands of the north Asian continent, each one displacing its predecessor by force of arms and setting in motion a kind of westward drift into the more populous areas of the Indo-European world. The primitive Slavs had themselves been driven from some early Asiatic habitat into south-eastern Europe and subsequently into the forests of the upper Dnieper, but were to be submerged time and again by the mounted hordes in search of slaves and plunder. This experience, common to all Russian States from the earliest times until the fifteenth century, had, as we shall see, a permanent effect upon their culture and political thinking. The Russian branch, organized into a number of weak and often rival principalities, found themselves for centuries under various forms of nomad yoke, all transitory. Some were subject to the direct rule of the Khans, others retained their identity as tributary states, waging as occasion offered a desultory warfare against the people of the Steppe. During this period the influences were Eastern, politically and culturally, and it was only the timely introduction of Byzantine Christianity that kept alive the idea of Russian nationality.

The climax came in the thirteenth century, when the greatest nomad of all, Genghiz Khan, established an organized dominion which reached from the Pacific to the borders of Germany, engulfing both Russia and China within it, and linking them with the civilizations of Persia, India, and Central Asia.

The geography of the Eurasian plain, and particularly the configuration of the river systems, made it impossible for two empires



2. *Forest and Steppe Zones*

to share it peaceably. There could be only one master. In the earlier centuries this had involved a constant struggle between the nomads and the rulers of North China; when at length Russia had appeared as a *tertium gaudens,* the smaller steppe populations found themselves squeezed between two greater powers. The age of the Steppe Empires was thus virtually terminated in the seventeenth century by the simultaneous emergence of China and Russia as claimants to their territories. In the case of the former, this was a re-emergence, for the ancient Chinese nation had in previous centuries often succeeded in dominating the Steppe; but the Manchu Dynasty was the first to end for ever the nomad menace in the north. At almost the same moment the Russians, rallying round the Moscow Principality, broke the Tartar yoke in the west, and the wide spaces of northern Asia lay waiting for the next conqueror.

It is commonly believed that contact between Chinese and Russian ways of thought and life began with the period of their common subjection to the Mongol dominion and administration, and did not fully develop until the Russian advanced guards met the Manchu outposts on the banks of the Amur in the seventeenth century. A closer examination reveals, however, that both North China and Russia have been, during the greater part of their histories, subjects of the same Steppe powers, from the Hsiung-nü (Huns) of the early Middle Ages to the Mongols of the thirteenth

century; and both nations had to do with the remnants of the nomad empires right up to modern times. From the heart of that great land mass which extends over a quarter of the globe came a force which has largely shaped the character of both these multi-racial empires; each has inherited much from the Steppe.

Climate, that prime annealer of peoples, has laid the same harsh grip, in greater or less degree, upon all the inhabitants of the Eurasian sub-continent. The winter, with temperatures down to – 50° Fahrenheit in Central Russia, becomes more intense until it sinks to eighty degrees below zero at the Siberian Cold Pole, while in Manchuria –40° F. is common and in Peking – 10° F. It is a dry cold, the snow supplying moisture for the fields in spring, while biting winds induce a physical insensitivity and hardness common to Russians and northern Chinese alike. It is not surprising that the winters are spent largely indoors in sleep and copulation, and in preparation for the burst of activity necessary to meet the onrush of summer. In north Asia there is little spring: the late thaw is swallowed up in the sudden warmth of June; and two or three hot months follow, during which strenuous efforts are required to sow the late crops, harvest winter wheat, and at last gather the millet, barley or other grains before the frosts set in once more.

In these territories of vast distances and primitive communications, failure meant famine, and famine meant death on a large scale. Stoicism and fatalism were added to the quality of bodily endurance.

Before the days of railways and surfaced roads communications depended on navigable rivers, and these continued to be the arteries of Russian and of Chinese life until the last century. In contrast to the great waterways of Europe, or to the ancient Nile, these eastern rivers originally contributed little to international relations or commerce. In Russia's case they led northwards to the Arctic, frozen for nine months in the year, or southward to the Black Sea and Caspian. Although for a brief period a current of Byzantine civilization made headway up the Dnieper, both these seas were during the greater part of Russia's history in the hands of hostile Asiatic powers. The great rivers themselves lay iced up half the year, but in summer their many tributaries afforded inland means of communication in an east–west direction.

In speaking of China's rivers we are concerned mainly with those north of the Yangtze-Kiang, for the focus of China's imperial power has nearly always been in the north, and generally controlled by non-Chinese races such as the Turks, Mongols and

Tungus who had little experience of water in any form. The mighty Yellow River, "China's Sorrow", is not normally navigable and its function has been alternately to fertilize and inundate a great part of the country; while the Grand Canal was constructed for the internal movement of rice and other commodities between Central and Northern China. Peking is one of the few capitals that do not stand upon the banks of a river. In either case, therefore, the rivers were adapted to internal rather than to external movement and it was late in the history of both empires that waterways became a medium of intercourse with the outer world: between Russia and China water never afforded a link.

To the greater part of their populations the sea was a remote and dimly figured thing, the element of pirates and marauding barbarians such as the Varangian Norsemen, the Japanese and the nineteenth-century Europeans. The hearts of both nations were long established in the midst of vast inland plains; their frontiers, unmarked by well-recognized features, expanded with the population and the extent of its military power.

The Chinese, for their part, were long isolated from the outer world by two main causes: first, the barriers of sea, desert and mountain which lay between them and comparable civilizations such as that of India; and second, the ability to extend their own peculiar culture into lesser neighbours such as Japan, Korea and south-east Asia. When, in due course, Japan began to emerge as a military island empire, the basic differences between the two nations asserted themselves in defiance of any affinities between the racial and cultural elements composing them.

The Chinese and Russian peoples developed from two distinct embryos at either extremity of the great womb of Asia. The Chinese, however, grew into a nation many centuries before the Muscovites, for by the third century of our era the dragon flags of the Han Dynasty fluttered beside the Caspian, while beyond the Scythian Steppes the ancestors of the Eastern Slavs were living in primitive tribal communities in the forests between the Elbe and Dnieper. By the time that these had grown into independent principalities the nomad hordes had spread across the Asian continent and, as they crystallized into settled kingdoms, established channels for the exchange both of ideas and of merchandise between China, India, Persia, Russia and the Arab world. The theatre, for example, which exercises so strong a fascination upon both the Chinese and the Russians, owes its development in the former case to the encouragement given by Kubilai's successors of the Yuan Dynasty. Having regard to the disparity in time and in ethnic

origins, it is therefore interesting to note some of the similarities between the two peoples as regards their ways of life and behaviour.

Both countries produced enormous peasant populations which, owing to recurrent famines and poor communications, were often under-nourished and accustomed to death and suffering on a large scale. Their standards of living were among the lowest in the world, and induced qualities both of stubborn endurance and of callousness. Human suffering and death came to be looked upon with comparative indifference, and the individual counted for little. As these hardy populations increased and spread out in search of more land, they grew into large nations with long but nebulous land frontiers and, as already mentioned, with little interest in the sea. Eventually, after long-drawn-out struggles with the Steppe peoples, they founded the two greatest land empires in the world.

Although there were wide variations in their internal political and social organizations owing to China's much longer independent development, an important principle of government was common to both. With the nomads and the Chinese all authority stemmed from an autocrat who was not only free of restraint by any secular power but himself the representative of God on earth. In China the Emperor was styled Son of Heaven and credited with divine attributes; his power was all-embracing and his decrees had moral as well as political sanction. It was inevitable that some holders of the imperial office, for reasons of age or incapacity, were unequal to supporting this dual character, but as there were no constitutional arrangements for changing an undesirable government; this was brought about by palace revolutions or by war.

The first "Tsar of all the Russias", Ivan III of Muscovy, married the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor and, adopting the two-headed eagle of the Eastern Roman Empire, initiated the conception of Moscow as the Third Rome. The Tsars thus became priest-kings, heads of the Church as well as autocrats of the State, and with no constitutional checks, either religious or secular. Despite the influence of Christianity they were the political heirs of the nomad Khans of whom they had formerly been vassals.

Thus the autocracies of neither country were disturbed by anything in the nature of a Pope–Emperor struggle, by a Reformation, or by any large-scale inner strife save those for undivided power. The Nonconformist conscience was in neither case part of the national make-up.

The history of both nations has thus been punctuated by violent changes of regime much more radical than those known to Europe, and generally accompanied by slaughter on a horrifying scale. The changes have also been marked by arbitrary alterations of dress, customs and place-names which are often bewildering to Europeans. Each Chinese dynasty is characterized by some peculiarity in costume while the capital itself has been known under the names of Yen, Khan-balig, Peking and Peiping: pigtails were prescribed during the Manchu period and compulsorily removed by the revolutionaries. Peter the Great caused the Russian *boyars* to cut off their beards and to exchange their robes for Western dress, and his capital has been called St. Petersburg, Petrograd and Leningrad: Perm has been renamed Molotov and again Perm in the course of less than forty years. Thus the attitude to the executive has in both countries been submissive and uncritical, so that whoever has been able to gain supreme power could count upon the universal acquiescence which took the place of public opinion.

The wholesale deportation of tribes and sections of the population, with scant regard for humanity, has been a feature of both empires. From the earliest recorded times the Chinese would people empty spaces with criminals or by transferring subject nations from their original homes; the Russians have long been colonizing Siberia by similar methods and in our own day have deported whole races such as the Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans.

This is not to say that the individual characters or psychologies of the two peoples are similar or sympathetic. Indeed, in many ways they are widely different and antagonistic. But by reason of a largely common background they are less strange and incomprehensible to one another than in many respects they are to the maritime powers of the Occident. Lagging, with the rest of the Eastern world, behind the West in industrial and political development, the ordinary man in either country would encounter features of life familiar to him. To this day the Russian and the Northern Chinese wear sheepskin caps and quilted garments against the winter cold, and huddle together on beds above stoves which burn throughout the night. Although Chinese civilization has developed a cuisine far more sophisticated than the Russian, the masses of both countries depend mainly on a high proportion of bread, meat being a relatively luxurious addition. Enforced frugality has introduced into their diets items such as melon and sunflower seeds, the husks of which would be unfamiliar on a European floor, while tea, first reaching the Muscovites overland from

China, is drunk constantly and without milk by all classes. It is more than a coincidence that the words for tea in Russia (*chai*), India (*cha*) and the Arabic world (*shai*) are derived from those used by the Mongols (*chai*) or Northern Chinese (*ch'a*); while Occidentals (from Hungary westwards) pronounce it *tea* or *tay* after the dialect of the Foochow ports. Thus we can distinguish between those countries whose links with China were originally by land or water.

A common feature in the eating habits of the Russians and Chinese is the absence of any sharp differentiation between one meal and another. The first and last meals in the Chinaman's day could be identical in composition, while tea or hot wine might be served at either. Similarly the Muscovite may consume gruel and fish soup at eight in the morning or in mid-afternoon, washing it down with vodka or tea. In neither case are there any exact times for meals.

Illiteracy was characteristic of both China and Russia until recent times, and even now the normal means of calculation used by cashiers in shops and restaurants is the abacus, on which numbers are recorded by flicking wooden beads from one end of a wire to the other.

The attitudes of both peoples to other Eastern races also differ markedly from those of the Europeans. The latter, since they became organized nations, have been sharply differentiated from Asiatics by blood, culture and religion, and largely cut off by geographical barriers from close intercourse with them. Centuries of Greek, Roman and Christian culture gave a character to the Europeans far more distinctive than those of colour or physical structure. The nations living around the Mediterranean coast, for example, have through centuries of intercourse inherited much common blood; they are divided into "Europeans" and "Orientals", however, by their established ways of life and thought, even though many Greeks and Turks, Arabs and Sicilians, may have had the same ancestors. Since Marathon and Cannae history records victories of the West over the East and vice versa; and until modern times we do not find any permanent adjustment of this situation.

Russia, alone among the greater nations, could be described as "marginal". Sprawling across regions partly European and partly Asiatic, looking sometimes west and sometimes east, she cannot be assigned entirely to one continent or the other. But one major result of her experience has been the blurring of distinctions between the peoples who have met upon her territory. The Rus-

sian subject could be a Slav, a Tartar, a Georgian or an Armenian; he might be of Nordic, Persian or Mongol stock; but as individuals all were alike servants of the Tsar, all lived in approximately the same way and might intermarry without any objections other than religious. The colour bar, as such, never existed in the Russian Empire, nor was the Great Russian social system maintained as exclusive and superior. Their empire was acquired, like that of the United States, by dominance of numbers instead of, as with the British, French and Dutch colonies, the efforts of numerically inferior forces.

Similarly the Chinese, forgetting their remote Central Asian past to emerge into history as cultivators along the Yellow River, absorbed by conquest and culture many varied and once hostile races such as the nomads of the north, the primitive inhabitants of the south-east coast, the Manchus from the north-east, and hill aborigines of Shan and Miao origin. To accept the Chinese language and way of life was to become Chinese. The sea and the deserts were the only barriers to intercourse: and beyond them were the only true aliens; the character *yang*, for example, signifying both "ocean" and "foreigner". Both China and Russia regarded themselves as World-States, as representing a Universal Order. This conception was derived from the nomads, where the ruler was held to be of divine origin and his potential conquests limitless. Genghiz Khan was styled Emperor of All Men and World Conqueror; the Chinese Empire was "Celestial" and subject to the Son of Heaven, all foreign nations being barbarians and expected to offer tribute. Holy Russia inherited a similar idea from both Byzantine and Tartar polities, and her subjects regarded themselves as a peculiar people; under the Communist regime the doctrine of a world order has its continued appeal to them. There could be only one master of a world consisting of unbroken plain and enclosed river systems.

In speaking of the capacity of the Chinese to absorb their conquerors, it is most important to our study to realize the extent to which invaders have in their turn influenced the character and development of both China and Russia. Seven hundred years before the Christian Era, peoples of Turkic stock were established along the northern borders of what we now know as China, and for centuries the northern half of that country was alternately controlled by nomads and Chinese. In fact the dynasties ruling China have been non-Chinese more often than native, while the border people would change from the nomadic to the agricultural way of life and vice versa. Warfare, commerce and intermarriage

led to mutual understanding and the adoption of many of the same usages of thought and behaviour. To cite examples; anyone who has had dealings with either people will be struck by their habit of completing arrangements at the very last moment. In both countries an official or social invitation will often be issued or accepted on the very day of the function, while in the diplomatic sphere a Chinese or Russian representative will usually not reveal his real intentions until negotiations are about to break down: threats are made by the delegates which are not intended to be fully carried out.

Thus, although the first direct political contacts between the Chinese and Russian Empires were not made until the seventeenth century, the two peoples had since the beginning of history been subject to similar influences. They are both, willingly or unwillingly, heirs to the Steppe Empires.

CHAPTER II

China and the Steppe

FEW races have made such an impact on both Europe and Asia as those spoken of collectively as "The Tartars". In the West they have left an impression of savage hordes of horsemen, with black hair and Mephistophelian faces, descending like locusts to strip a country bare and leave nothing but smoke and skulls in their wake. There is difficulty in finding an acceptable designation under which to group the nomadic mongoloid nations who dominated the steppes of Eurasia and played a leading part in the histories of China and Russia. Successive waves of similar stock have appeared under different names in the writings of European, Persian and Chinese chroniclers: Huns, Turks, Djungars, Mongols and so forth. The appellation *Tatar*, like that of *Turk* and *Mongol*, originally belonged to a single tribe which asserted hegemony over its neighbours and at length for a period embraced the whole nomad movement. To Europeans, who associated them with *Tartarus*, they became best known as *Tartars*, and under that name it will be convenient to describe the steppe peoples throughout our story.

The successive Nomad Empires had many features in common. They arose suddenly in the east, directed by some outstanding leader, inflicted crushing defeats upon their neighbours, and when themselves defeated broke up and gravitated to the west, displacing their predecessors. They evolved no civilization of their own and their adoption of a settled mode of life led inevitably to their decay. Northern Asia being sparsely inhabited these empires at first had no defined limits, the southern frontier depending on the political and military strength of China and the northern being the habitable bounds imposed by geography and climate. As an indication of the latter, it was recorded in very early times that nomad tribes were living in the neighbourhood of Lakes Baikal and Balkhash.

We are dependent upon Chinese historians for the earliest accounts of their activities, and by these they are described as the Hsiung-nü (Savage Slaves). Subsequent historical, archæological and ethnological researches have established that the Hsiung-nü and the Huns were one and the same people; certainly their

languages, habit of life and systems of government as described respectively by European and Chinese writers were closely akin. The Chinese chronicles also tell us that from 700 to 200 B.C. the territory now known as North China consisted of a number of kingdoms nominally subject to a Chinese Emperor but many of them ruled by "barbarian" (Tartar) princes.

Although the Chinese referred to their nomad neighbours as "barbarians", in the same way as the Hellenes described those who did not speak Greek, there was constant intermarriage between the races, particularly the bartering of princesses in order to cement alliances. Thus Hsiung-nü rulers, on the strength of their family connections, often succeeded in occupying the Imperial throne: in such cases they would adopt Chinese names and style and would rule over both the steppe and the sown. Moreover, the two ways of life, although antagonistic, were paradoxically complementary. From the steppe came horses for the Chinese armies and animal products such as hides and wool, while China's industry and art supplied the nomads with most of their manufactured goods, their ornaments and the silk floss which was in great demand for quilted winter garments. A series of Great Walls, winding over the hills from the shore of the Gulf of Chihli, three thousand miles into the deserts of the north-west, remain to this day to mark the shifting frontier between the two civilizations. In the days of Tartar ascendancy they traced defensive lines for the Chinese Empire, until in modern times the tide turned and the settled people flowed over and far beyond this ancient march.

When considering as a whole the influence of the Steppe upon China it should be borne in mind that the Han (206 B.C. – A.D. 220) and T'ang (A.D. 626–900) were the only purely Chinese dynasties which held North China for any length of time; while the Ming (1368–1643), although nominally rulers of the whole country, suffered from constant raiding by the Mongols and had to be content with a much shrunken dominion.

The Chinese Empire, as known to modern history, may be said to date from the third century before Christ, when the Ch'in kingdom in the north-west gained the ascendancy over its neighbours and established the dynasty from which the name China is derived. It produced but a single strong ruler, Ch'in Shih, who is remembered chiefly for his building of the mightiest of the Great Walls and the burning of all books written prior to his own reign; the former an expedient for dividing the nomadic from the settled peoples, and the latter a means of suppressing all philosophies save that of the Emperor's totalitarian doctrine.



3. The Chinese Principalities, 350 B.C.

It was not surprising that such an extreme dictatorship disintegrated after the death of Ch'in Shih, and was succeeded by the Hsiung-nü Empire of Baghdur which conquered not only North China but the north-western borderlands towards Central Asia and Tibet. During this period many practices originated common to both the nomad and Chinese systems, notably the use of the title "Son of Heaven" which was applied both to Tartar and to Chinese emperors. Moreover, the Chinese calendar was taken into use throughout the whole vast area as far west as Turkestan, for the nomads had nothing of their own to compare with it.

In this epoch we first begin to hear of another important division of the nomads, the Tungus or Eastern Tartars, who inhabited Manchuria and the Amur-Lena region. They were distinguished by their fish-eating, pig-breeding and exceptionally squalid manner of living. In the time of Baghdur they were not organized into a nation and part of them fell under the Hsiung-nü dominion, being settled in what is now eastern Mongolia. In 120 B.C., how-

ever, the Chinese under the Han Dynasty scored a notable victory over the Hsiung-nü and drove them back to the Gobi; their Tungus vassals were then made to trek westward in a body to the Kalgan–Dolon Nor–Jehol–Mukden area to act as a buffer between the two powers.

By 50 B.C., while Julius Caesar's expeditionary force was occupying Britain, the Hsiung-nü Empire was breaking up, partly under the stress of internal dissensions and partly under the influence of the more settled and stable civilization of the Chinese. The latter, at this time, devised a system strikingly similar to that which in later ages was adopted by the Russian Empire—the settlement of frontiersmen. Foreshadowing the Cossacks, these consisted of Chinese communities with a local military organization who were prepared to live in the wild border country and keep back the nomads. Like the Cossacks, however, they were inevitably influenced by the nomad's way of living, and to that extent developed a distinctive and unruly character. Another type of settler was the criminal, who was allowed to work out his sentence in the wilds, the Russian counterpart being of course found in the modern development of Siberia.

Such communities were marginal in more senses than one, for during periods of Tartar ascendancy they were apt to be absorbed, at least temporarily, by the northern conquerors. Chinese renegades would also take service with the Tartars. This development caused the Chinese Emperors to make it illegal for any subject to cross the frontier without permission, a prohibition which became so deeply rooted in Chinese polity that it survived into modern times: such a system will also be found to have persisted throughout Russian history, under both the Imperial and Soviet regimes.

The Hans pursued the defeated Hsiung-nü as far as the River Oxus and the Sea of Aral in Central Asia, where they and the Parthians proceeded to divide the former Hellenic kingdom of Bactria. At that time what is today called Chinese Turkestan, or Sinkiang, was divided by the Tien Shan Mountains into two countries. Originally inhabited by people of Indo-European stock, the northern part was overrun by the nomads then under pressure from the Chinese; while the southern, comprising thirty-six petty kingdoms whose subjects were also largely Indo-European, were annexed by the Han Emperor.

During the second century A.D. the Hans consolidated their empire, settling the greater part of what is now Kansu in the north-west, and gaining knowledge of Turkestan, Afghanistan, the Pamirs and Northern India, although access was periodically

blocked by the Hsiung-nü who now dominated the western approaches. It was during this period that Buddhism, originating in India, found its way by means of travelling monks over the mountains into Tibet, Turkestan and China. The Kansu corridor thereafter continually changed hands until it was finally incorporated into China in the eighteenth century.

Not content with these successes the Hans drove the Hsiung-nü remnants out of the border country south of the Gobi Desert and settled the Alashan (Kalmyk) lands west of the Yellow River loop. It was at this period that political "face" appeared to have developed its importance. The Tartar chiefs, in their relations with the Chinese, would deal only at the highest level, just as today no decision of any substance can be taken by any Chinese or Russian official save the senior concerned with the particular problem. The Han Dynasty was one of Imperial greatness, when China's dominions eventually stretched from Korea in the north-east, through a wide sweep including not only the Yangtze and Yellow River valleys but the Tartar lands south of the Gobi, and westwards as far as Turkestan. To this day the name *Han* means Chinese as opposed to Mongols, Tibetans and other constituents of the empire.

The Han emperors found themselves dealing with four fairly distinct nations: the settled and mainly agricultural people of China; the partly nomadic, partly forest-dwelling Tungus in what are now termed Korea and Manchuria; the Hsiung-nü along the northern border; and the then largely non-Tartar peoples of Turkestan in the far west. These were restless neighbours, their loyalties and mutual relationships changing constantly with the personalities of their chiefs and the strength of the Imperial dynasty. As the Han power decayed there developed a kaleidoscopic series of alliances and wars, accompanied by raids and counter-raids, until in the third century A.D. the Chinese Empire broke up into three separate kingdoms: Wei, in the north; Wu, in the south-centre; and the so-called Western or Lesser Han. Only two of these were properly Chinese, for Wei was termed a "barbarian" state and ruled by a family of Tartar descent. The fate of the Hsiung-nü power was even more disastrous, for their nomad empire disintegrated entirely, and by A.D. 200 they had vanished from Chinese ken for ever. Henceforth central Asia and the near east were to bear the brunt of their westward displacement.

With the decline of the Hsiung-nü a new Tartar power sprang up. A branch of the unorganized Tungus, known to the Chinese as Hsien-pi, gradually extended its power from the north-east until

it had entirely replaced the Hsiung-nü as China's northern neighbour, and had penetrated as far west as Kuldja (Ili) in Turkestan. Like their predecessors they periodically encroached upon the Chinese lands, and as frequently exchanged princesses. The first recorded use of the word *Khan* as a royal title, later to be made famous by Genghiz and Kubilai, was among the Hsien-pi. The extent to which China became dominated by the nomads at this time may be gauged from the fact that by the fourth century the Empire had disintegrated into a number of warring kingdoms, many of them ruled by Tartars. In A.D. 317, for instance, the Eastern Chin dynasty was forced by barbarian pressure to move its capital as far south as Nanking on the Yangtze, abandoning the northern provinces to the Hsien-pi chief who assumed the title of Prince of Yen. To the west, where are now the provinces of Kansu and Kokonor, the Tanguts, a Tibetan people, had organized a state known by the Chinese name of Ch'in*. By A.D. 367 the Hsien-pi had captured Loyang (Honanfu) on the Yellow River, so that now virtually all North China was divided up into Tartar or quasi-Tartar states. South of these emerged a purely Chinese dynasty named Sung, but in this epoch the extreme south and south-west of China were still occupied by aboriginal tribes largely of Shan (Thai) race.

Outstanding among the Hsien-pi clans were the Tobas, and under their leadership the nomads raided as far south as the Yangtze River. The Tobas, finding themselves in possession of settled lands, gradually assimilated Chinese habits and dress, setting the fashion for subsequent invaders down to the Manchus of the seventeenth century. From this time the Chinese, more astute if less warlike than the nomads, managed by skilful diplomacy to ally themselves with one barbarian against another, thus achieving a balance of power. The rise and fall of the various states was usually accompanied by the massacre of the ruling family and all possible heirs, a habit common to both Chinese and Tartars and communicated in later ages to their pupils, the Russians.

In the fourth century the name Turk appeared in history for the first time. A group of the broken Hsiung-nü, living in the north-western territories now called Kansu, are said to have adopted this appellation from the similarity of a local hill to a helmet, called *Türk* in their language. By the sixth century these Turks, taking the place of their kinsmen, had established a new empire north of the Great Wall; extending north to Lake Baikal, stretching eastward beyond the Liao River in Manchuria, and

*Not to be confused with the Chin or Golden Dynasty.

4. *The Three Kingdoms, A.D. 220–280*

westward to Issyk Kul in Turkestan. The Chinese Sui Empire was then in one of its recurring periods of disintegration, and the Turks were thus able to levy tribute from the various Tartar and Han states into which it was divided. Moreover, many Chinese fled from the weak Sui dynasty and submitted themselves to the Turkish Emperor. By these and other means the Buddhist faith, which had already been established in China, was carried among the Turks and was partly responsible for undermining their war-

like national character, just as nine centuries later the Mongol Yuan Dynasty failed from the same causes.

Chinese fortunes reached their lowest ebb in A.D. 626 when the barbarians approached Sian, their capital on the Yellow River; but here a turning point was reached. A new commander, founder of the great house of T'ang, checked the invaders outside the city, stabilized the situation, and began the traditional Chinese operation of intriguing with the Turkish feudal chiefs, bringing the border states one by one under his influence and so undermining the more warlike but less skilful northerners. This process was assisted by divisions among the Turks themselves (a chronic phenomenon of the Steppe Empires), for in A.D. 628 the Western Turks, comprising the Uighurs, Kirghiz and other related tribes in Turkestan, revolted against their own emperor. By A.D. 658 the T'ang Dynasty had succeeded in breaking up that empire and ushering in a Chinese Golden Age which lasted over two hundred years. The Turkish power was pushed back north of the Great Wall, while a Chinese Commissioner was established at Urumchi to represent the T'ang Emperor in Turkestan itself. South China was also brought firmly into the Empire. As is inevitable, however, when a frontier is neither a clear geographical nor ethnic divide, border warfare continued between the T'ang troops and restive factions of the former Turkish power.

The dividing line between China and the Steppe continued to be blurred by frequent intermarriage of the two peoples, including the exchange of princesses to cement alliances between the various rulers. It was still not uncommon for a nomad prince to adopt a Chinese name from the family into which he had married (although the reverse did not occur), and the Tartar courts tended to adopt the manners and trappings of Chinese civilization. Chinese renegades often took service under Tartar princes, some of them eventually succeeding to nomad thrones and even returning to conquer territories south of the Wall.

As already mentioned, a constant feature of Steppe history is the westering movement of nations under pressure from victorious usurpers. Thus in the sixth century the Western Turks, whom T'ang had driven into the country between the Altai Mountains and the Caspian Sea, pressed upon the Persian Empire, and the last Sassanid ruler took refuge in China. The Turks captured Tashkent, but the long hand of the T'ang Emperor eventually reached them even here, so that in this era the Dragon flags of the Chinese Empire stood virtually upon the Caspian shore, the most westerly frontier ever claimed by the Celestial Empire. It was

during this great epoch that Chinese tea and other products were first exchanged with the Turks, giving rise to the caravan routes which were to open up central Asia.

The eighth century witnessed the rise of the Uighurs, a Turkish sub-division whose descendants still live in present-day Turkestan, and their armies raided into China as far as the Yellow River. Their dominion was short-lived, however, and began to break up about the year 830, after which some residual Uighur principalities maintained friendly relations for some years with the emergent Sung Empire to the south of them.

At the beginning of the ninth century a steppe chieftain named Apaoki welded eight tribes into a coherent state and established an imperial line. He appreciated the degree to which the nomads could learn from Chinese civilization, and encouraged intercourse between them. In so doing his empire absorbed some Chinese territory lying south of the Great Wall, a sign that the prestige of T'ang was beginning to crumble. And so in its turn the House of T'ang declined and fell; but about A.D. 900 a Western Turk general in the Chinese service founded the so-called After T'ang Dynasty which succeeded in holding that part of China north of the Yangtze-Kiang. South China broke up into many small states, while a rising power, that of the Tungus Kitans in Manchuria, established itself as a new state upon the northern frontier.

In 947 these Tartars, adopting the Chinese dynasty-name of Liao, moved towards the Yellow River and captured Kaifeng, the capital of the buffer state of Chin. The area of present-day Peking (Yen) was in dispute between the Sung, Chin and Kitan kingdoms, the last-named adopting the Chinese technique of employing criminals and renegades in scouting or raiding expeditions. By 960, however, the Sungs, a native Chinese dynasty, succeeded in uniting central and southern China, and once more the nomads and the Chinese found themselves lined up along the cultural frontier.

By A.D. 1000 the Kitan Empire embraced large portions of present-day Mongolia, Manchuria and north-east China, and thereafter spread over the former Hsiung-nü domains as far west as Bukhara in central Asia. These Kitans were, as already stated, of Tungus origin and believed to be descendants of the Hsien-pi: to them we owe the name *Kitai* (Cathay), by which China is known to the Russians and Mongols. The Turks dislodged by these newcomers continued their westward displacement, coming into contact with further Indo-European races such as the Sarts and Persians and thus gradually losing their exclusively Tartar com-

plexion. Conversely, the Indo-European nations of central Asia underwent a transformation, Iranian, Turkish and Mongol characteristics mingling in varying proportions to produce the Turkmen, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Kazakhs and others.

The year 1067 saw the Kitans making raids into south Shansi, where they came in contact with a third force, that of the Tanguts (Hsia). This people, related to the Tibetans and thus Sinitic rather than Tartar, ranged from the borders of the Tibetan plateau to the Ordos bend on the Yellow River; and although they never aspired to world conquest as did the Tartars, they remained for centuries a powerful threat on the flank of the northern nomads.

In 1120 another Tungus tribe, the Nüchens, rebelled against the Kitan Emperor, overran the Great Wall as far as the Peking–Tientsin area of today, and set up the Chin (Golden) Dynasty. Five years later they had mastered the whole Kitan realm including the Pacific coast where Vladivostok now stands. Sweeping on to Kaifeng they drove the Sung armies from the North China plain and forced them to withdraw south of the Yangtze-Kiang. This was the first appearance of the future Manchu Dynasty.

By this time the mightiest deluge of all was approaching. In the steppe-lands between the Gobi and the Altai Mountains was born Temujin, the son of a petty Mongol chief. At this period the Mongols, a small nomadic sub-division, were under the rule of the Kitans, although these were already showing signs of decay. As the result of a family dispute, Temujin, still in his teens, had to fight for his patrimony and soon acquired such a reputation in his tribe that other nomads, in search of a warlike leader, began to flock to his banner. By 1200 the nomad peoples, adopting the clan name of Mongol, had arrayed themselves under his leadership and with the style of Genghiz (Chinggis), he was enthroned as Great Khan at Karakorum in the year 1206.

Some years earlier, however, there had been signs that the Steppe was waiting for a leader in order to release and canalize that strange explosive force with which nations have from time to time been charged. Between 1124 and 1213 the Kara-Kitai, a western offshoot of the Liao Empire, were threatening the Muslim Empire of Khorezm centred on the Oxus cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, but reports began to reach the Sultan that these were but a screen of dust behind which a more fearsome foe was advancing. These reports were right. The highly trained and disciplined cavalry armies of the "World Conqueror", as contemporary writers described him, galloped irresistibly across the medieval world,

subduing within his lifetime not only the steppes but the territories of China, Central Asia, Persia and Russia. The first great conquest was that of North China, where in Yenking, near present-day Peking, the last Chin Emperor sat upon the Dragon Throne, and the country was quickly overrun down to the Yellow River.

By 1220 the Mongol hordes had crossed the Oxus and captured Bukhara and Samarkand from Muhammad, the Turkish Sultan of Khorezm. The devastation of this empire carried them up to the Caspian shores, while the southern prong of the invasion penetrated the Khorezmian provinces of Khorasan, Balkh and Peshawar, and came to a halt only on the banks of the Indus (1221). Here sickness and the unfamiliar climate of India put a limit to the Tartar incursion, and the armies turned back. Now the Volga was crossed and the Caspian Sea encircled. The last major campaign undertaken by Genghiz was the subjugation of Tangut (Hsia) after which he died in 1227.

The Great Khan's son, Ogodai, succeeded to the greatest land empire which the world has known, and proceeded to mop up any pockets of rebellion or independence left by his father's lightning conquests. Thus he defeated and killed the last Chin Emperor, Ai-tsung, and captured the city of Kai-feng on the Yellow River.

Ogodai died in 1241 and was succeeded by his son, Güyük, who may be said to have effected the transition of the empire from an active-service to a peace-time basis. The Danube was crossed, and a succession of expeditions as far afield as South China, Mosul, the Caucasus and the marches of the Byzantine domains, extended the Mongol frontiers and established civil governments under a variety of local authorities. Some of these were in the hands of the Great Khan's relatives, others were entrusted to submissive Sultans and Amirs in whom the conquerors had confidence.

A paradoxical characteristic of the Mongols was their unspeakable savagery in war and their remarkable broadmindedness in peace. Originally pagans, they tolerated the religions of those they had vanquished and were eager to learn from nations more civilized than they. Thus Chinese, Persian and Arab scholars were made welcome in the Khan's civil service, while the Muslim and Buddhist faiths made many converts: both had at various times already entered China from Central Asia through the Kansu corridor.

Through subduing the Karaits and Uighurs in Turkestan, who had been under Nestorian Christian influence, Genghiz had early made contact with foreign culture and appreciated the value of employing the skills in which he and his warrior people were

deficient. Outside the iron discipline demanded in the military and administrative spheres, the Mongol code was remarkably tolerant.

"Get drunk but three times a month. It is better not to drink at all, but who can abstain altogether?"

And although their normal method of disposing of the populations of captured cities was the simple one of slaughtering men, women and children on the spot, craftsmen were generally spared and despatched to where they would be most useful (compare the technicians of Germany in 1945). Thus many Muslims from Khorezm were deported to Eastern Asia, taking the Faith to Tangut and China: Byzantine, Alan (Ossetian) and Russian missionaries were also received by the Great Khan and his princes. It was in China, however, that the Mongols were most impressed by the arts and crafts of settled civilization, and great numbers of Chinese were recruited for all branches of the economy and administration. Thus China and the Steppe diffused a mutual influence.

Güyük died in 1248 and by agreement among the princes was followed by his cousin Mengü, whose father Toli was another son of Genghiz. On his accession in 1252 the new Khan entrusted his brother Kubilai with the government of North and South China, Tangut and North Korea, and put the western part of the Empire under his other brother, Hülegü.

Kubilai succeeded as Great Khan in 1259 and in 1264 was proclaimed the first Emperor of the dynasty known in China as Yüan, and after the break-up of the Mongol Empire fifty years after the death of Genghiz, his descendants reigned in Khan-baligh (Peking) until the fifteenth century. Marco Polo describes the Empire in its heyday, full of admiration for its wealth, wisdom and organization, and for the intelligent use made of foreigners from every quarter.

During the Yüan period the Lamaist form of Buddhism reached the Mongols from Tibet, gradually bringing about a profound change in their national philosophy, and in due course the dynasty suffered the fate of its nomadic predecessors. Gradually adapting themselves to the softer manners and living of a settled civilization, the Mongols in China were shorn, like Samson, of the secret of their success and in 1368 were easily expelled by a Chinese nationalist movement led by Chu Yuan-Cheng, an ex-priest from the central provinces, which drove out the effete Yüan and established the Ming Dynasty with its capital at Nanking. After the death of its founder the second Emperor, realizing that the centre of gravity of the Empire must always be in the more warlike north,

moved his seat of government to the site of Khan-baligh, now named Peking or "Northern Capital".

After this the Mongol Empire split into a number of parts, each ruled by one of Genghiz Khan's descendants. Mongolia itself was divided between the Khalkha federation on the east and the Kalmyks (also called Olöt and Djungar) on the west. Beyond these the Kipchaks (Golden Horde) still lorded it over the Russians. At first the Kalmyks were the dominant element, sprawling over the south-west Gobi, Kokonor, North Tibet, Turkestan and as far as the Astrakhan steppe by the Volga. With the collapse of the central Yûan authority these elements drifted apart and themselves broke up into independent states. Thereafter the Mongols were never again entirely independent.

The Ming Empire, being purely Chinese, lost most of its multiracial character; and much of the marginal country, from Turkestan to Manchuria, reverted to native regimes. During the course of the dynasty, however, the South Khalkha tribes nearest the frontier were brought under a loose form of control, and their territory became known as Inner Mongolia. From this time the Inner Mongols became subjects of China, whereas Outer Mongolia clung jealously to its autonomy and in our day broke completely away from the Empire. In 1470 there was a brief revival of Mongol power, when Dayan Khan again united the tribes, but his dominion suffered the fate of his greater predecessors when it was divided among his eleven sons after his death, and at once fell apart.

By the sixteenth century the Kalmyks, under the Altyn (Golden) Khan, had extended their dominions as far as the borders of Tibet, and the close contacts maintained with that country led to a strengthening of Lamaist (Yellow Hat) influence throughout the Mongol lands. In Northern Turkestan they founded the Djungarian Kingdom which was shortly to present a serious menace to China and to their own kinsmen, the Khalkha Mongols.

By the seventeenth century the nomad menace had once again appeared on the northern horizon. The Tungus Nüchens from South Manchuria, which had welded the people north-east of the Wall into a Manchu Kingdom, but had been subdued for a time by the Mongols, began to encroach upon the played-out Ming regime, and by 1636 had established its suzerainty over the Inner Mongols. Treachery in the Ming camp opened the gates in the Great Wall, and in 1644 the Manchu armies marched into Peking, the last Chinese Emperor hanging himself from a convenient tree. Thus was founded the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty which was to rule

China until the revolution of 1911. The fact that they were originally of nomad origin facilitated their building up once more the typical multi-national empire of which the Chinese have normally formed the major part.

The north-western portion of Manchuria, known as Barga or Hulunbuir, was inhabited by Mongols who looked to the Khalkha federation in Outer Mongolia, but the southern part was settled with Manchu troops and their families. This was a prelude to the Manchu subjugation of Mongolia itself: the steppeland north and south of the Gobi, all that now remained of Genghiz Khan's dominions, was, as already explained, inhabited by two groups, the Khalkha on the east bordering Manchuria and the Kalmyks extending westward as far as Djungaria.

The Chahar Khalkhas of Inner Mongolia, bordering the Great Wall, had previously fallen under the domination of the Ming, and had subsequently thrown in their lot with the new conquerors; the Manchus now brought them under closer control by organizing the tribes into forty-nine Banners grouped into six Leagues, the princes of which were granted internal autonomy. All external relations, however, were guided by the Imperial authorities, and Chinese immigration was discouraged.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century the Outer Mongolian Khalkha, who had joined the Manchus as allies in their conquest of China, found themselves in a most uncomfortable position, being pressed by the Kalmyk-Djungarian empire on the west and by Russian expansion in the north; in 1691, therefore, an influential number of princes assembled at the Congress of Dolon Nor and decided to put themselves under the protection of the Emperor K'ang Hsi. The Manchu rulers, having defeated the Kalmyks and become suzerains of Outer Mongolia, at once sought to ensure that these people should never again be a menace to China, and insisted on changes being made in their traditional organization. The Khalkha had been divided into a number of Leagues, each comprising several *hoshuns*, or Banners: the Manchus decreed that these Leagues should now be split up into a greater number of smaller Banners, a system which persisted until after the Soviet intervention in 1921.

At this period the Mongols had completely embraced Lamaist Buddhism and lived under a dyarchy consisting of the Khan or temporal ruler, and the Hutukhtu or Living Buddha. The Manchus, observing how the increase of Buddhist influence, with its humanitarian teaching and numerous priesthood, had sapped the warlike qualities of the Mongols, did all in their power to prevent

a combination of church and state, and to support the authority of the Hutukhtu while undermining that of the Khan. The prestige of the Yellow Church thus increased, so that many members of princely and noble families adopted the monastic life; it is estimated that about a quarter of the population eventually became lamas and another quarter were employed as serfs by the church, so that a high proportion of the country's wealth in land and cattle came into ecclesiastical hands. The lamaist authorities of Tibet also encouraged princely families to send their second sons to be trained there as priests, resulting in a considerable degree of Tibetan influence over the Mongols.

In 1719 the Emperor considered his hold over the Mongols strong enough to issue decrees curtailing the judicial authority of the princes and forbidding them to have independent dealings with foreign powers (this last aimed at Russia). By the middle of the century a Chinese Amban or Resident was appointed to Urga to supervise temporal affairs, while the Living Buddha was left in charge of spiritual matters.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century the Emperor decided to rid his western frontiers of the Djungar–Kalmyk menace, and himself led three expeditions against them, which resulted in the incorporation into the Empire of the vast territories of Djungaria (about one-third the area of China proper) on the northern side of the T'ien Shan. The Muslim territories south of the range were added in the first half of the nineteenth century, the whole region then being named Sinkiang, "The New Dominion". Administrative power came into the hands of the Chinese officials and recent settlers, amounting to some 20 per cent of the population, who were faced by chronic disturbances created by earlier Chinese immigrants, the Muslim Tungans, forming another 20 per cent. This conquest was followed by the planting of Manchu military colonies, some of which were found as far west as Ili, on the Siberian border. The country was thereafter claimed as an integral part of China, although the majority of the population were Muslim Uighurs, with a warlike Tungan minority already described.

In addition the Torgut division of Kalmyks, which had fled to the Volga but resented the Russian attempts to settle them on the land, were allowed to return to Sinkiang where they have remained as a Mongol minority. The heterogeneous province was to prove a serious source of trouble between China and Russia.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the pressure of China's expanding and land-hungry population, coupled with the chronic

desire of the Chinese administration to "push back the steppe", resulted in the gradual encroachment of cultivation on to the Inner Mongolian plateau north of Kalgan and the Great Wall. Colonization of Outer Mongolia, however, was forbidden, largely out of anxiety not to invite complications with Russia, but in spite of this many Chinese traders found their way to Urga, Kobdo and other centres, and gained an increasing hold over the economy of the country. They were more than a match for their Russian competitors until political interference turned the scale.

The day of the Steppe Empires was now past, and in their place had arisen a power which had thrown off the same yoke and was to join in a struggle for the borderlands that is not yet ended.

Russia and the Steppe

It is often held, particularly by Russians when desirous of stressing their community with Europe, that Tartar influence in Russia was limited to the two centuries of Mongol occupation beginning with Genghiz Khan and ending with Tamerlane. Archæological research, however, and the writings of classical Chinese and Persian historians, show that the contribution of the steppe to the building of the Russian nation is at least comparable with its part in the formation of the Chinese Empire, and almost as ancient.

Just as north-eastern Asia was divided into steppe and sown, so the lands which came to be called Russia were shared between the steppe and the forest. In both cases the steppe was the home of the nomad conquerors, while in Russia the forest was the refuge of the more static and less warlike tribes which ultimately emerged as



5. *The Slavs and their neighbours up to the first century A.D.*

the settled inhabitants of the land. The Russian people are no more pure Slavs than the British are pure Anglo-Saxon or pure Celt, and we must bring together the histories of many tribes and races before we can discern the true origins of the nation, just as most great rivers take their rise from many diverse sources.

Considering first the Slavs, as the most important element in the make-up of the Russian people, we know that from 700 B.C. to A.D. 200 the lands lying between the Indian frontier and the plains of Hungary were, broadly speaking, under Scythian and Sarmatian domination, and among the subject peoples were both Slavs and Alans, the latter being ancestors of the Caucasian Ossetes. The name *Rus* is found in the Black Sea area about 200 B.C., and later became applied to the first Russian state which arose centuries afterwards round the city of Kiev. History records the Slavs in the fifth century A.D. as subjects of the Huns, settled along the Vistula and in the northern Carpathians: in common with the Goths and other Indo-Europeans, however, they had in prehistoric times been driven westward from the lands between the Altai and Caucasus by the pressure of the more warlike horse-riding nomads.

It is interesting to find that this mighty chain-reaction was set in motion by the Chinese. In the heyday of the Roman Empire the Han dynasty was trading in silk with the West by the caravan route through Kashgar, Ferghana, the Oxus and Persia: and as early as 104 B.C. a punitive expedition was sent to Ferghana to avenge the murder of some Chinese envoys. In the following century the Hans enjoyed relations with Parthia, and Chinese missions reached the borders of Syria and the shores of the Persian Gulf. Following the conquest of Parthia by the expanding Persian state, the combined pressures of these two great empires caused the nomads in Central Asia to move into the wastes beyond the Caspian. Thus the Huns, displaced westward, in the fourth and fifth centuries, swept through present-day Russia into Europe, while their kinsmen the Bolgars settled on the lower Volga and along the Don. The Slavs and Alans, some submerged by the flood and others swept before it, were either incorporated in the Hunnish Empire or found refuge in the forest zones. In this way the nomads of Central Asia became unwittingly the vehicle of commerce, thought and culture between the Far East and the south-eastern marches of Europe.

What were these early Slavs like? They were mostly agriculturists, living in forest clearings, but from early times a proportion raised cattle and others lived by fishing. Primitive Slav culture exhibits close affinities, not only with that of the Caucasian Alans



6. *The Slavs and their neighbours, second to seventh centuries*

(another Indo-European people which at one time ruled over the Eastern Slavs) but also with that of the nomad Turks; while Slav embroidery *motifs* show Scythian and Sarmatian origins. A study of Slav customs reveals the close association with nomad and other Asiatic peoples at an early date: the organization of military units in multiples of ten, for example, was common to the Persian, Turkish and Eastern Slav armies; while as late as the thirteenth century both the Muscovite and Mongol armies were organized in Right and Left Wings, with the former in each case under the senior commander. The ancient Russians, like the Turks, buried a deceased prince's horses with him, while there is much common ground in the folklore of the Turks, Mongols and Persians: the swan, for example, is a familiar feature of both Turkish and Russian fables, and the Three Bogatyrs in Russian popular literature were closely related to the *Bagaturs* and *Bahadurs* of Asian epics.

The religion of the pagan Slavs, moreover, exhibits close affinities both with Mithraic sun-worship and with the animistic beliefs of Shamanism, the former being a cult of the Persians and the latter of the Mongols and Turks. The mythical progenitor of the

Rus tribes was the son of the Sun deity, and there is evidence that the Slav name-ending *mir* is derived from the god Mithra. The Slav word for God, *Bog*, has no root in the languages of the West, but is plainly derived from the same source as the Persian *Boga* and the Mongol *Bogdo*.

The relations of the Slavs with their nomad conquerors bear a striking resemblance to those of the Chinese. While the conquered naturally received the impress of their vanquishers, the latter, incapable of developing their own civilization, learned the arts of peace from the subject peoples. After the first blind massacres, which often, however, spared craftsmen such as smiths, masons and cultivators, the Tartars began to adopt the habits and culture of the people they ruled, thereby losing their warlike characteristics and falling victims to the next wave of barbarians. Such was the almost unvarying sequence from the earliest recorded times to the era of Genghiz Khan. Since these nomadic empires were also interested in foreign trade, the Slavs became involved at an early date in commerce between the East and the West. In the sixth century, for example, both China and Byzantium had relations with the Il-Khan of the Huns, at whose court the envoys and merchants of Europe and Asia met and exchanged ideas.

The Huns, conquering and then disintegrating after the manner of their kind, were followed by the Avars who from then until the seventh century established an empire stretching from the Don to the Adriatic, and including the Caucasus and Crimea. In 679 the Bolgars, fleeing before them, found sanctuary in what is now called Bulgaria, while many of the Slavs escaped to the forest country between the Don and Dnieper rivers. The State of Great Bulgaria, which thus comprised Tartar, Alan and Slav elements, became an early link between the Slavs and neighbouring Byzantium which was to influence profoundly the development of Russia.

The next series of moves was started by the Arabs who, under the spur of Islam, overthrew the Persian Empire in the seventh century. The Turks, adopting their religion and proselytizing zeal, wrested from the Il-Khan of the Huns his residual territories of Khorezm, Ferghana and the Central Asian lands as far as the Heavenly Mountains (T'ien Shan) in Chinese Turkestan. About the same time, the Khazars from the Altai displaced the Avars between the Urals and the Dnieper and set up a more progressive and less savage state than any the nomads had yet achieved in the West. In their turn the defeated Avars moved round the Black Sea and occupied the middle Danube.



7. *The Khazar Khanate, seventh to ninth centuries*

The Khazar capital was set up at Itil on the lower Volga, which became a trading centre with both the north and the east and a new meeting place of Western and Asiatic cultures. Russian merchants appeared in the bazaars of Baghdad and some of the Khazar Khans, formerly pagan, are said to have embraced Judaism as a result of contact with Hebrew traders. During this period the Eastern Slavs were beginning to crystallize into a distinct nation. The Dnieper river system, running through the forest zone and connecting Novgorod in the north with Kiev on the edge of the steppeland, became the heart of a cluster of small principalities of which those in the south were accessible to the nomad invasions and soon became subject to the Khazars.

In 737, however, the Khazars, emasculated by civilization, suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the Muslims, and their Slav subjects grew restive. At this juncture two new elements intruded themselves. One was the Varangi, Scandinavian freebooters of the Viking type who were prepared to lend their swords in return for the chance of booty or alternatively to wield those swords in their own interests. The other was the rising power of the northern Slav state of Novgorod.

Novgorod, "The New City", had been founded in the fourth century of our era and had become the centre of a state which bore more resemblance to Western merchant republics than to the autocracies of the south. Power resided in a body of burgesses, the

Prince being their chosen representative rather than their liege-lord: the villages were organized as communes, a way of living which in one form or another has survived in Russia down to modern times. By the middle of the ninth century, Novgorod had assumed the leading role among the principalities of North Russia. About the year 860 the government of the city, whose trade with its sister principalities had been interrupted by the Khazars' Magyar–Hun vassals settled along the Dnieper, called in the Varangi to clear the river route south to Kiev. Already in 838 the prince of that state had assumed the title of *Kagan* (Khan), a challenge to his Khazar suzerain, and had begun to extend his domains by dominating the surrounding Slav communities. He had also, at the request of the Byzantine Emperor, launched an attack on the Khazar possessions in the Crimea, foreshadowing the future interest of the Russians in that peninsula.

The Norse chieftain, Oleg, with a mixed force of Scandinavians, Finns and Northern Slavs, accordingly fought his way south along the Dnieper, defeated the Magyars and occupied the city-state of Kiev. Here Oleg founded the dynasty of Rurik, which was to rule the Russians until the coming of the Romanovs, and here arose the first capital of Rus. The Kiev state now found itself the foremost power among the Eastern Slavs and Finns, extending its authority into the forests of the north and southwards into the steppes and Black Sea region. With the eclipse of the Khazar power the Eastern Slavs, now adopting the name *russki* or Russian, achieved for a time contacts through the Baltic with north-eastern Europe and even with England.

Owing to the rival pull of Novgorod in the north, Kiev never became, like Moscow, the capital of all Russia, and was at first mainly a trading centre with the East, importing the produce of Asia and exporting slaves obtained in local wars. Her merchants, travelling down the Volga and across the Caspian to Persia, continued to trade with Baghdad and Central Asia. In the latter part of the ninth century the Prince of Kiev felt himself strong enough to venture a raid on the dazzling city of Byzantium itself, Tsargrad (The Emperor's City) as it was known to the people of Rus. This attack was repulsed, but its unintended consequence was the salvation of Russian culture and national identity through the subsequent introduction of Christianity. As a result of the visit of Kievan delegations to Constantinople many of the leading men of Rus adopted the Orthodox faith and by the end of the tenth century the Byzantine doctrine of the Emperor-Patriarch became part of the Russian state system and remained so until the time of

8. *Rus and its neighbours, ninth to eleventh centuries*

Peter the Great. In the Caucasus the Alans and Georgians had earlier received Christianity from their Hellenic contacts along the Black Sea coasts, but militant Islam was now the religion of the steppes and the struggle between Cross and Crescent was yet to be resolved.

In 943 the men of Kievan Rus, fortified by the influx of northern blood, ventured to raid the territories of Muslim princes around the Caspian shore, and developed a formidable military dictatorship over many of the Slav and Finnish tribes in both north and south. In this respect their government resembled those of the

Hunnic, Avar and Khazar regimes which had preceded them. This expansion of Kiev into the steppe introduced a further characteristic of the nomads; it made the Russians horse-minded. The troops of the Eastern Slavs had hitherto consisted mainly of infantry: now they included large bodies of cavalry organized on the Tartar pattern.

In this way originated the differences between the Great (northern) and Little (Ukrainian) Russians. In the forest zone the Slavs intermingled with the Finnish tribes and were in closer contact with the Scandinavians, while the southerners bore the full weight of the spasmodic Tartar waves and assimilated many of the ways of the Steppe. Kiev in this epoch was never more than two days' march from the nomad camps, and it was this constant menace that started the drift of the Russian population northward into the safer forest zone, causing Russia's centre of gravity to shift to the area Moscow–Vladimir–Suzdal.

In 972 a fresh threat came to Kiev from the east in the shape of the savage Pechenegs, who killed Prince Sviatoslav and subjected his state to a more oppressive suzerainty than that of the Khazars, although this did not check the gradual growth of a Christian and distinctively Russian culture within the Kievan domains. In 988 the Rurik Prince Vladimir, after receiving missionaries of the Christian, Muslim and other faiths, decided to adopt the Greek Orthodox Church for his State, himself continuing as the religious head of Rus just as he had been when a pagan. An important consequence of Vladimir's conversion was his marriage to Anna, sister of the Byzantine Emperor Basil. It is important to observe, however, that although the princes and nobles embraced Christianity at this date, and cathedrals were built in the cities, it was not until the sixteenth century that parish churches became general and that church weddings were made obligatory. To this day there are two words for a village in Russian, *selo* signifying one with a church, and *derevnya* one without.

In 1037 further changes took place in the Near East which were to have their effect upon the State of Rus. The Seljuk Turks, following upon the Pechenegs, set up an empire which began to possess itself of the territories hitherto subject to the Arab Caliphs in Baghdad. The Russians' eastern neighbours were now a federation of relatively civilized sultanates of Turkish, Persian or Arab origin, some converted to Islam but others still following the ancient Tartar beliefs. The Kiev Russians, with the help of their Varangian mercenaries, were able at this time to free themselves temporarily from nomad control. From 1061 to 1200, however,

9. *The Russian Principalities, eleventh century*

Kievan Rus was subject to constant attacks by the Polovtsi (also known as Cumans or Kipchaks), another Tartar nation which then controlled the Black Sea steppes, and lost its supremacy among the Russian principalities. Lack of unity was the chief weakness of the Slavs; for the mutual jealousy of the princes was such that they

would enlist the aid of Tartars and other aliens in order to attack each other.

To guard against the ever-present danger, the men of Rus resorted to the technique of building lines of forts to defend the frontiers they had established, for on the vast plains there were no natural features which could be used as permanent demarcation lines. This system, analogous to the "Great Walls" built by the Chinese for the same purpose, and often equally ineffective, subsisted until the early part of the last century. During the twelfth century the nomad pressure induced the Grand Prince of Rus, Audrei Bogoliubski, to move his capital from Kiev to Suzdal, about a hundred miles east of Moscow. This was an important part of the process by which the centre of gravity of the Russian state was transferred from Kiev to the north.

This progressive concentration of the population in the relative safety of the forests helped to build up the Great Russian nation, albeit with a strong admixture of Finnish blood. In this way the states of Novgorod and Muscovy grew in importance: the former owing to its being at the junction of the northern European route with the ancient Dnieper highway to Trebizond, and through Persia and Central Asia to China; and the latter because of its geographical centrality.

The Turkish Sultan Muhammad at this time ruled the Empire of Khorezm which comprised most of Persia and territories which are now included in Russian Central Asia and Afghanistan. His influence aroused the jealousy of the Abbasid Caliph An-Nasir who asked the Kara-Kitai Tartars, then in control of Kashgar, Khotan and Ferghana, to attack him. The pagan Khan of the Kara-Kitan had succeeded in absorbing the Muslim provinces of Trans-Oxiana, when already the dust-clouds of Temujin's hordes were arising on the skyline behind him. An incident over the murder of some Mongol merchants caused Genghiz Khan to attack and kill Muhammad: the latter was succeeded by his brilliant though rash son, Jalal-ud-Din, who took the initiative against the nomads and extended his dominion south-eastward as far as Seistan on the borders of India. When the full weight of the Mongol storm broke, Jalal-ud-Din, after putting up a gallant but vain defence, extricated a portion of his forces and withdrew south-east across the Indus, where the conquerors, sensitive to extremes of climate, declined to follow them; so that the Sultan with depleted forces was in due course able to make his way west to Isfahan in Persia. By 1224 he had recovered sufficiently to threaten the Arab capital of Baghdad but, after concluding a



10. *Asia in 1141*

temporary agreement with the Caliph, instead turned north against the Christian Kingdom of Georgia. Tiflis was captured, but the Georgians were at length able to drive the invaders out. Three years later Jalal returned and subdued Georgia, but in 1230 he was once more compelled to face the advancing Mongols, and lost his life in the succeeding operations. The Turco-Arab world, like the Slav principalities, had fallen victim to its own disunity: the sultans constantly intrigued and fought for control of the Caliphate; some allied themselves with the Kara-Kitai or even with the Mongols; some of the Turks had embraced Islam while others remained pagan.

Thus with the dawn of the thirteenth century the Russians were to share with the Muslims and the Chinese the greatest misfortune of all, the invasion of the Mongols under "The Emperor of All Men", Genghiz Khan. The forces of Batu, his grandson, crossed the Caucasus, subduing Georgia and Circassia, and invaded the Polovtsian Steppe. The Polovtsi, clutching at any straw, now turned to their former enemy, the Prince of Kiev, and formed an alliance of desperation. It was too late; in 1224 the allies were defeated at Kalka near the Azov Sea, the Prince and his chief subordinates being captured and put to death. The Mongols then turned away from Kiev to the Crimea and then suddenly headed back to Karakorum, their Gobi capital, leaving a trail of fire and slaughter in their wake. The death of Genghiz in 1227, necessitating the

gathering of chiefs at Karakorum to choose a successor, probably saved Rus from further devastation.

In 1237 another of Batu's armies, estimated by contemporary observers as 600,000 men and known as Altyn Ordu (the Golden Horde), crossed the Volga under Sabutai and penetrated into the forest zone, sacking cities and slaughtering their inhabitants. Traversing Russia they reached the very walls of Novgorod but, perhaps owing to the dire northern winter and lack of supplies, they suddenly wheeled about and disappeared. This unpredictable trait of the invaders was expressed by a contemporary writer in the words, "God knows whence they came, or whither they have gone."

In 1240, Genghiz having been succeeded by his son Ogodai (who had a Christian wife) they returned again, this time to impose a more permanent regime upon Russia, the first nomad empire to have extended its authority into the forest zone. Part of these forces turned against Poland and Hungary, and all the conquered territories were put under the suzerainty of the Golden Horde with its capital at Sarai on the Volga.

The Mongols did not attempt to interfere with the internal administration of occupied countries, being satisfied as long as the survivors paid tribute and maintained public order. The constant quarrels between the Russian princes, however, at length caused the Horde to decree that native rulers should hold their appointments by the Khan's grace and favour, a *yarlik* or licence being issued in each case from Sarai. The majority of the Russian princelings were able to overcome their religious and political scruples in order to ingratiate themselves with, and collect tribute for, the pagan conquerors, and Russo-Mongol co-operation became general, at least on the higher levels. It is recorded, for instance, that a Russian contingent took part in Kubilai's operations in China, and on the occasions when Novgorod and Tver rebelled against Sarai, the Prince of Muscovy received 13,000 horsemen from the Khan to help him deal with the situation, and felt no qualms in doing so. Intermarriage also took place between the families of Russian and Mongol noblemen, for analogous political reasons to those of the alliances between Chinese and nomads.

From their Tartar masters the rulers of Russia learned the techniques of autocracy, universal state service and serfdom, features which had not been characteristic of the primitive Slav communities. Byzantine influence had, in fact, already introduced the idea of an autocrat claiming to be the Lord's Anointed and the supreme interpreter of doctrine. That the Russians, despite all



11. *The Mongol Empire, 1290*

this, never became assimilated by the nomads was due primarily to religion; Christian and Byzantine culture, once absorbed, made a distinction which was one day to crystallize into Russian nationalism.

The rise of Moscow as the eventual rallying-point against Mongol domination may be said to date from 1242 when Alexander Nevski was confirmed by Sarai as Prince of Vladimir, a state which then included the minor town of Moskva. Alexander's successors gradually enlarged their domain by annexing or otherwise acquiring neighbouring territories, and by ingratiating themselves with the Khan in order to receive the *yarlik* of Grand Prince which gave them nominal authority to collect tribute from the other Russian vassals. At length, through their peculiar prudence and craft, the Muscovites were to grow strong enough to challenge their suzerain.

In 1251 Mengü, another grandson of Genghiz and brother of Kubilai, succeeded to the throne of the Great Khan, having subdued the Bolgars, Alans, Kipchaks and Russians living in the steppes flanking the Volga. Another brother, the Il-Khan Hülegü, finally subdued the Turkish empire of Khorezm (which then included Trans-Oxiana, Persia and Georgia) in a sanguinary campaign which lasted from 1252 to 1253. Two years later Hülegü

turned against the Caliph at Baghdad and defeated him, thus consolidating his rule over most of hither Asia including Armenia.

Early in the fourteenth century the Tartars of the Golden Horde embraced Islam but, true to their habit of religious tolerance, recognized the right of their subject populations to worship after their own fashion. By about 1350, however, the Horde in its turn began to suffer from the internal rivalries against which Genghiz Khan had warned his successors, and this encouraged the Muscovites to assert their independence by refusing to render tribute, to do homage at Sarai, and so forth. In 1380, for instance, the Grand Prince Dmitri Donskoi refused to pay, and in the subsequent campaign defeated the Mongol punitive expedition at Kulikovo. Another of these demonstrations, in 1408, caused the Tartars to ravage the country round Moscow, although they did not venture to attack the city. The great Mongol Empire, nominally controlled by Kubilai and his Yüan Dynasty in far-off Peking, had in fact already gone some way on the road to dissolution.

During the fifteenth century the Golden Horde itself crumbled under the assaults of yet another Tartar wave. Timur, or Tamerlane, an officer in the Army of Samarkand, supported the claims of Toktamysh to the khanate and marched victoriously to the Volga. Then turning against Toktamysh and the Horde, and destroying Sarai, he captured Astrakhan and continued north towards Moscow. Unexpectedly he turned away in the Tartar manner, possibly deterred by the approach of winter, and rampaged through the Caucasus back to Samarkand. Having laid waste and subjugated the lands of central and nearer Asia, Tamerlane set out for China: on the way, however, death overtook him and his empire speedily collapsed. This was the last serious Tartar invasion of Muscovy, and as the Golden Horde was now moribund, the stage was set for the rise of the Russian Empire.

In 1462 there sat upon the throne of Muscovy the first prince to become Tsar of all the Russias. Ivan III increased considerably the area of his principality by calling in the appanages which had hitherto been held by junior branches of the Rurik family, such as Tver, Riazan, Rostov and Yaroslavl: he attacked Novgorod on account of that city's proposal to ally itself with Lithuania against him, and in 1471 reduced it to the status of a tributary. In 1472 Perm acknowledged him as suzerain and in 1489 Viatka (now Kirov) followed suit. In 1480 he assumed the title of Tsar or Emperor. In 1503 some of the White (Western) Russians, hitherto under the domination of the Polish–Lithuanian federation, came over to Ivan's side, although at that time his effective southern



12. *Eurasia in 1415*

frontier was no further from Moscow than Tula. National strength and despotism grew up together; both were necessary to Muscovy's struggle against rival princes and the Tartar enemy.

Simultaneously the rise of Moscow was being indirectly assisted by earth-shaking events in the south. Constantinople had fallen in 1450 to the Osmanli Turks, a further wave rolling in from Central Asia, and the Byzantine Empire was no more. The Turkish tide flowed around the Black Sea coasts and in 1475 the Khan of the Crimean Tartars became the vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. But as if to ensure the continuity of the Eastern Christian Empire, Ivan had married Zoë Paleologos, heiress to the last ruler of Byzantium, and now adopted its device of the two-headed eagle, facing both east and west. Thus arose Russian conceptions of a Third Rome.

In 1502 the Khan of the Crimea annexed Astrakhan, once the trading port of the Golden Horde, and only the Khanate of Kazan remained of Batu's extensive domain. The survival of Great Russia, as a Christian nation embracing the Eastern Slavs from Kiev to the Baltic, was now assured, although bitter years of struggle lay ahead against the powers that hemmed her in. In the west she had to contend with the ambitious Swedes, Poles and Lithuanians, in the south the Turkish Empire controlled the

Black Sea hinterland, and on her eastern frontier stood the Khanate of Kazan.

And so until the middle of the sixteenth century the energies of the Great Russian state were mainly absorbed in internal consolidation, but a new era dawned with the accession of a brilliant and unbalanced tyrant of a type which has become familiar to Russian history. Ivan IV, surnamed the Terrible on account of his ferocity and cruelty, greatly developed the empire-building of his predecessors. Together with his ruthless successor Peter I, he is revered even by the Soviet regime as one of the architects of Russia's greatness, for it was in his reign that the Tartar yoke was finally broken.

In 1552 the Russian forces took Kazan and razed it to the ground. The Crim Tartars, who were advancing to its relief, were held in the south, and four years later Astrakhan also fell. Ivan now controlled the whole course of the Volga, while the way lay open across the Urals and the Caspian Sea. Circumstances were directing Russia's new dynamism to the east. The Turks and Tartars were still strong in the south, and in 1571 a horde from the Crimea actually sacked the town of Moscow, although the invaders did not succeed in entering the Kremlin citadel. The western borders were still menaced by the Swedes, Poles and Lithuanians, and Ivan's ambition of securing an outlet to the Baltic could not yet be realized. To the east and south, however, no natural barriers presented themselves, and only by continuous expansion could Russia feel secure.

As early as 1364 a trading expedition from Novgorod had crossed the Urals and penetrated to the River Ob. When, therefore, Muscovy incorporated the merchant city into its domains she continued to exploit this enterprise, although the later expeditions took on a more military character. In 1483, for example, Prince Kurbski with a well-armed force crossed the mountains and followed east–west affluents of the Irtysh until he, too, reached the Ob; many of the Siberian principalities, remnants of Genghiz's empire, were so impressed by Kurbski's demonstration that they submitted to the Tsar as overlord. In 1558 Grigori Stroganov, scion of a great Novgorod merchant family, got a concession from the Tsar to colonize and develop the land along the banks of the Kama River, but the enterprise was menaced by the Kirghiz Khan Kuchum who had enrolled various Bashkir and Ostiak tribes under his banner. Stroganov called for military volunteers and was joined by 640 Cossacks led by the outlaws Yermak and Koltzo. This party was able to carry out some valuable reconnaissance, but did not feel strong enough to attack Kuchum, whose Khanate was

another of the few remaining portions of Genghiz Khan's western empire.

In 1581, however, Yermak and 840 men made a second expedition, travelling with boats along the rivers and over portages, and took Kuchum's capital Sibir, which was to give its name to the vast new territories beyond the Urals. Yermak, his past crimes pardoned by the Tsar, rapidly subdued the natives of western Siberia with vastly inferior numbers but by the use of superior weapons, and established commercial relations with places as remote as Bukhara. He was at length surprised in a night attack and drowned while trying to escape by swimming the Irtysh; his small force was badly cut up, and Sibir had to be abandoned. In 1587, however, a new expedition founded Tobolsk, ten miles from Sibir, and the policy of bringing in Russian peasants to colonize these regions was instituted. In their pursuit of Kuchum and his remnants, the Russian expeditions encountered the recently established Kalmyk Empire under the self-styled Altyn (Golden) Khan. This new Tartar state occupied the northern part (Djungaria) of what is now Sinkiang, including the Ili valley, Tarbagtai, and Uliassutai in Western Mongolia, and was to play a significant part in the relations between Russia and China. As the Cossacks moved east they also began to see among the native peoples the textiles and other products derived from their close association with China, and these aroused their curiosity and cupidity.

Russia's improved position was now evident in dealings with her Asiatic neighbours. Ivan encouraged Russian merchants to visit Central Asia, and entered into diplomatic relations with the rulers of Bukhara and Samarkand in ancient Khorezm. We also note an insistence on prestige which can be traced through the protocol of the Tartar courts to that of the Chinese Emperors. The credentials of a foreign visitor, for example, would not be accepted if it did not bear the Tsar's correct title; moreover, Russian ambassadors began to insist that they should take precedence over other foreign envoys in Central Asian states.

In addition to the officially imported settlers, the open spaces east of the Urals attracted a flood of adventurers, landless peasants and others to the freedom of Cossack life on the moving frontiers, just as in earlier times Chinese renegades had sought careers beyond the Wall. This phenomenon paradoxically helped to establish serfdom by inducing the government to impose control on the movement of peasants from lands on which they were settled.

Ivan's death in 1584 ushered in the Time of Troubles. Feodor,

the heir to the throne, was a minor, and had been entrusted to the care of Boris Godunov, a converted Tartar. Feodor died in the obscure circumstances typical of the Russian court, subsequent tradition holding Boris responsible. Boris was elected Tsar by the boyars who hoped to use him as a tool, but the nation was thrown into turmoil by the appearance in Poland of a man purporting to be Prince Dmitri, an older son of Ivan's who was supposed to have died. With the help of a pro-Polish faction Dmitri gained the throne, but in turn was ousted by Prince Shuiski, who had been prominent in bringing about the election of Godunov. Boris himself died in obscure circumstances, and there followed a period when the throne was in dispute among a number of claimants, and central government virtually ceased throughout Russia. It was not until 1613, after the country had suffered untold miseries through civil war and social revolution, that Michael Romanov, related by marriage to the defunct House of Rurik, founded Russia's second and last dynasty.

With the restoration of order, fresh impetus was given to the conquest of the steppe. In 1620 the settlement of Yeniseisk was founded, largely for the sake of fur-trapping, but at this point the Russians found their way barred by the warlike Buriats, the northernmost element of the former Mongol empire. Unable to overcome them with the small forces available, the pioneers turned north-east and followed the line of least resistance to the Lena River, where the Tungusic Yakuts were overcome and the town of Yakutsk founded in 1632. It soon became necessary, however, to deal with the Buriat threat to Russian communications with north-east Siberia, and this was accomplished in 1641 by a few hundred Cossacks who then reached the shores of Lake Baikal. In 1651 Irkutsk was founded near the great lake, but in the meantime other expeditions had reached the Kolyma River within the Arctic circle. An expedition against the northern Tungus was succeeded by the establishment in 1647 of Okhotsk, followed by Anadyrsk the next year. By the end of the century the Russians had set foot in Kamchatka and crossed the Behring Straits to Alaska. In less than a hundred years the Muscovites had traversed northern Asia from the Urals to the Pacific, and direct contact with the Chinese Empire became inevitable.

Siberia, similar to Russia but with an even bleaker climate, soon became a Great Russian colony. Whereas in 1662 the number of settlers was recorded as about 70,000, by 1710 it had risen to a quarter of a million. In 1637 a Siberian Department was set up with its centre at Tobolsk, and in 1710 a horse-post service was



13. *The Growth of Muscovy, 1300–1584*

established between western Russia and Yakutsk, on the lines developed by Genghiz Khan five centuries before.

In the south the restless Kalmyks were on the move. In 1636 a section of them known as Torguts moved west from the upper Irtysh, overran the Turkmen east of the Ural River and settled around Astrakhan with an army of 30,000 men. These Torguts were later also to play a part in the relations between Russia and China.

At this point it may be relevant to say something about the Russians as colonists. Having forcibly subjected a native people, by methods not dissimilar from those of the Tartars, they would take complete charge of the administration and economy, but put no rigid barrier between themselves and the indigenous population: the only division was religious, and where a native became Christian he could mix on equal terms and intermarry with Russians. In later years many representatives of conquered races rose to high positions of authority, to cite only such examples as Boris Godunov, Izmailov and Stalin. Moreover the multi-national character of the Chinese and Russian states bears the stamp of the nomad "world empires" in which both these nations were at one time or another engulfed. And as with the Chinese colonists who advanced on to the steppe, the early Russian arrivals in Siberia were influenced in their way of life by the aboriginal tribes among whom they settled; this was particularly the case with the settlements east of Lake Baikal.

South of the Great Russian dominions the principality of Kiev, always more vulnerable than Moscow to the convulsions in the Near East, maintained an uncomfortable equilibrium with its Polish and Turkish neighbours. Its main military force was the Zaporoje Host on the Dnieper, which had been formed, like other Cossack contingents, to protect the steppe frontier. In 1648 the *ataman* (chief) Bogdan Khmelnitski, with a combined force of Cossacks and Tartars, attacked the Poles who had encroached upon Kiev's domains, and made himself master of the Ukraine or Little Russia. His government was an unstable one, however, for the Zaporoje Cossacks tended to split into factions, some leaning to Moscow, some to the Poles and others to the Turkish Sultan. The Little Russians, choosing the lesser evil, accepted the authority of the Tsar, and the Ukraine was united with Russia proper.

The latter half of the century is of interest to our study mainly because of the contacts made with the Manchu Empire and leading up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 which is described in the next chapter. This treaty, the first to be signed by the sovereigns of China and Russia, was in fact concluded during the



14. *The Russian State, 1598*

reign of the Empress Sophia, the ill-fated sister of Peter the Great. Sophia's prestige suffered a blow through the terms of the agreement being considered unfavourable to Russia, and her younger brother and co-sovereign took advantage of her unpopularity to strengthen his own position and eventually become sole Tsar.

Like other impatient rulers of backward Eastern countries he used Western instruments of progress without absorbing the spirit that had produced them and in complete disregard of the cost to the people. As an indication of the gulf between Russia and Europe which Peter was determined to bridge in his lifetime, it was decided as late as 1700 that years should be counted from the Birth of Christ instead of from the supposed Foundation of the World, as hitherto. And, like Kemal Ataturk later, he decided that if he put his people into European dress they would behave as such, so beards and robes gave way to wigs and knee-breeches.

During this reign Russia's foreign policy was occupied mainly with the West, and the new capital of St. Petersburg was founded; but raids on Kharkov, Astrakhan and other cities by the Sultan's

vassals in the Crimea determined Peter to secure his southern frontier. War with Turkey followed, and in 1695 a Russian combined operation led to the capture of Azov on the Black Sea. It was left to Catherine the Great, however, to achieve enduring ascendancy over the last representative of the steppe empires. For twenty-one years Peter was involved in his Great Northern War against Sweden, fired by his determination to open a "window to the West", and in 1709 the Battle of Poltava enabled him to consummate this ambition and to stabilize the western frontier. He was now free to turn once more against the Turks, but in the subsequent indecisive campaign Azov had to be given up. During his reign Asiatic policy, though continuously advancing, took second place to European problems.

The development of industry, however, and especially the manufacture of textiles, turned Peter's attention to the cotton-growing areas of Central Asia. This former home of Indo-European peoples, from which the Slavs themselves probably originated, had in the course of centuries been overrun by successive waves of mongoloid nomads, giving rise to a variety of related but distinct races loosely described as Turkic. Most of them had formed part of the Turco-Persian empire of Khorezm and all were united by Muslim culture. They were bordered on the south-east by the Djungarian Empire of the Kalmyks, a potential nuisance both to them and to the Chinese territories east of them.

In 1703 negotiations with the Khan of Khiva led to his acknowledging the Tsar as overlord in return for military aid, while a small force was sent to Yarkand in Turkestan to investigate reports of gold in that area. This latter expedition, repulsed by the Kalmyks in 1716, built a fortified post at Omsk which was to be a base for later expansion. In 1717 Russian arms received another setback when a force quartered in Khiva at the Khan's invitation was treacherously set upon by his troops and practically wiped out.

Six years later the Kalmyks began moving west under Chinese pressure and the Russians resorted to their steppe-frontier strategy, the building of a line of fortified posts or Cossack settlements against the nomads. An attack at this time by the Bashkirs was defeated, resulting in the founding of Orenburg and the southward extension of the outpost line to the Caspian. In 1731 the Lesser Horde of Kazakhs was brought within the Empire, leaving the Great and Middle Hordes still independent. In 1752 the line was advanced to the upper Irtysh, south of Omsk: it was from these bases that the conquest of Central Asia was to be launched in the mid-nineteenth century. Beyond the frontiers, however,

Kirghiz and other Turkic tribesmen continued to raid the trade routes from the Caspian to Khiva and Bukhara, robbing the caravans and selling the captives into slavery.

Peter had died in 1725 and had been succeeded by Catherine I, but it was not until the reign of the second Catherine, surnamed The Great, that Russia's imperial expansion got into its stride again. In 1772 she took a share in the Partition of Poland; and two years later, by the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, acquired from Turkey the right of freely navigating the Black Sea, with access to the Mediterranean through the Bosporus Straits. The same agreement detached the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire for annexation by Russia nine years later. From 1773 to 1774, however, the stability of the comparatively young Russian Empire was severely shaken by a widespread rebellion in the south-eastern provinces. A peasant leader, Pugachev, with a following of Don Cossacks, Finns, Bashkir Tartars, Kalmyks, Kirghiz and serfs, raised the standard of revolt in protest against the oppressive and over-centralized rule of St. Petersburg. Pugachev succeeded in reaching Nijni-Novgorod and even threatening Moscow before his force was defeated and he himself executed.

The setback caused by these disturbances was only temporary; Russia's external dynamism was for the time being stronger than her internal discontents. The pressure on Turkey continued, and in 1790 Catherine's great commander, Suvorov, stormed Izmail on the Danube estuary. As a result of the Turkish and Persian campaigns the Caucasus, with its jigsaw of Georgian, Armenian, Iranian and other races, fell into Russian hands, as well as the northern littorals of the Caspian and Black Seas. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the stage was set for the final act in the struggle between the forest and the steppe; Russia's conquest of Central Asia.

Trade between ancient Khorezm and the lands west of the Volga had been carried on for centuries, but with the break-up of the Mongol Empire a number of small and not very well-conducted states now lay across the route, resulting in insecure conditions for merchant caravans. This furnished a pretext for Russian intervention in the affairs of these states, and a series of steps leading to eventual annexation.

In 1839 an ill-fated expedition under Perovski set out to punish the troublesome state of Khiva, but was defeated by winter conditions and inadequate logistic arrangements, and few survivors returned. Profiting by this lesson, the Russians began in 1847 a more methodical advance into Central Asia, moving forward from

a succession of fortified bases. Thus by 1853 the middle course of the Syr Darya had been occupied, so as to facilitate the problems of movement and supply through the deserts. In 1865 Russian forces captured Tashkent with negligible losses in the face of vastly superior numbers, and followed this up by the taking of Samarkand. In 1868 came the occupation of Bukhara and Kokand which then became Russian protectorates. Khiva was not finally brought to heel until 1873, when an exhausting advance across the deserts was undertaken by two columns from the railheads at Orenburg and Krasnovodsk, and this Khanate was also made a Russian protectorate. In 1866 a Governor-Generalship of Turkestan had been set up at Tashkent; but the Muslim population was still restive and internal disturbances in Kokand led to its outright annexation in 1878. The Great and Middle Hordes of Kazakhs were now also brought within the Russian fold.

On the initiative of General Skobelev, the military architect of Russia's conquests in Central Asia, the railway began to move forward from Krasnovodsk behind the army. Construction started in 1880, and six years later had reached Merv; by 1888 the line was working to Samarkand. In dealing with his enemy Skobelev advocated administering such a blow that he would neither forget nor resent his defeat, thus formulating a principle on which the Russians have since often relied with success. But as with the Chinese Empire in its heyday, success was often achieved by intrigue and by the display of strength rather than by fighting.

At the conclusion of these operations the Governorate-General of Turkestan was divided into two provinces; Ferghana (formerly Kokand) and Transcaspia. When the territory had been thoroughly pacified the process of colonization began, and between 1893 and 1912 three-quarters of a million Great Russians and Ukrainians had been settled. Like their Tartar predecessors, the Imperial Government did not much interfere with the native way of life, but anti-Russian feeling was kept alive by disputes over land ownership and by pan-Turkic feeling which persisted until after the 1917 revolution.

The war against Turkey in 1877 was a further stage in Russia's drive to the south and to the ice-free ports of the Mediterranean, the pretext being the protection of the Slav and Christian populations in the Balkans. On the conclusion of peace in 1878 the enfeebled Ottoman Empire ceded to Russia the port of Batum, on the east coast of the Black Sea, and the Danubian province of Bessarabia.

Russia now controlled both the forest and the steppe.

CHAPTER IV

Early Contacts

As already explained, the first contacts of Russians with Chinese began long before there were any relations between their governments. Back in Byzantine days, when the early Russian states were separated from Chinese territory by a succession of steppe dominions, Russian and Chinese merchants met in the bazaars of the Near East and trade flowed between the two nations over the ancient trans-Asian routes. From China silk, textiles, gold and silver found their way to Russia and the Mediterranean; while Russian slaves, furs, hides and foodstuffs were exported to Asiatic lands.

This type of intercourse continued until the seventeenth century, when the Cossack expeditions east of the Urals reached those buffer states of the Celestial Empire which had never been permanently Chinese, such as Djungaria (Turkestan) and Mongolia. The former was the domain of the Kalmyk and Kirghiz nomads, whose tribes also extended eastward into Mongolia and westward as far as the Caspian Steppes; the latter country was at the time of the Russian advance inhabited by a weak federation of tribes under the theocratic rule of the Hutukhtu or Living Buddha at Urga, who were prepared to acknowledge the suzerainty of the nearest powerful neighbour.

There is a striking parallel between the histories of Russia and China during the first half of the seventeenth century. The Time of Troubles following the death of Boris Godunov witnessed a succession of bloodthirsty rebellions and wars, and ended with the eclipse of the old dynasty; similar conditions prevailed during the last fourteen years of the Mings which ended with the acceptance of the Manchus as an alternative to chaos.

In 1567 two Cossacks claiming to represent Ivan the Terrible arrived in Peking but the Emperor refused to receive them. The first recorded official Sino-Russian meeting was the arrival in 1616 of a Cossack *ataman* (chief) at Kobdo in Western Mongolia, where he paid his respects to the local Khan and met a Chinese envoy to the Khan's court. As a result of this visit, the ataman secured the Khan's good offices in arranging for the passage of a trading expedi-

tion through Mongolia to China; this was followed by the opening of the overland tea trade with Russia which has given rise to the shibboleth, already described, distinguishing those countries which received their tea in this way from those which imported it by sea.

In 1618 two Cossacks were sent by the Tsar across Mongolia and through the Great Wall at Kalgan with a view to making contact with the Ming Court; they were not received by the Emperor, but were given a letter from him to carry back to the Tsar, and contrived to bring away a map of the Chinese provinces which was a novelty not only to the Russians but to the world at large. In 1643 the Voevoda or military governor of the recently founded settlement of Yatutsk sent a force of 132 Cossacks down the Lena River. The next year, which happened to be that in which the Manchu Dynasty replaced the Mings, the expedition reached the Amur and continued downstream to the mouth. It then followed the Pacific coast for a short distance, founded Okhotsk, and returned to Yakutsk after an absence of three years, having met with negligible opposition on the part of the primitive Tungus tribes.

In 1650 the adventurer Khabarov, out to make a fortune, also took a party of seventy men to the Amur, but on this occasion encountered walled settlements and the comparatively well-equipped troops of the Dagur tribe. Khabarov attacked and captured Albazin (or Yaksa), which he fortified as a base for further operations: and after waiting for reinforcements he sailed and fought his way along the Amur to its junction with the Ussuri, where he defeated a superior force of Manchu regulars which had been sent up to deal with the Barbarian intruders. Khabarov was followed in 1654 by the Ataman Stepanov who, sailing down the Amur, then pursued the course of the Sungari River and forced his way up its tributary to Ninguta. After scouring the country for three years he ran into a superior Manchu force which killed him and destroyed his band. By this time the Manchus had brought up sufficient troops to clear the Cossacks from the region of the Amur, an operation which they accomplished by 1658.

In that year another of the Cossack expeditions had founded the settlement of Nerchinsk on the Argun tributary of the Amur, and pushed on against negligible opposition into Manchuria as far as the Khingan range. The Tungus tribes, engaged in agriculture, cattle-raising or fishing, were generally of a peaceful disposition and inadequately equipped to resist the well-armed Russians. These gave no quarter in battle and behaved with a ferocity which spread alarm among the inhabitants of north Manchuria till at length it attracted the serious attention of the Imperial authorities.

In the meantime the Russians had actually induced the Dagurs living north of the Khingan to declare their allegiance to the Tsar, and Peking began to appreciate that a new steppe Power had arisen with which it would have to deal.

In 1656 Feodor Baikov presented himself as the first Russian ambassador to the Court of Peking, but was not received because he refused to perform the kowtow, which involved touching the ground with the forehead before the Imperial throne. This item of ceremonial, which was obligatory for all foreign envoys, long delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations with most of the Great Powers, but was gradually overcome by a succession of ingenious compromises. The Russians, however, after several abortive attempts, apparently soon came to the conclusion that it was not worth jibbing at this act of obeisance, for three years later another envoy managed to secure an audience, although without achieving anything else of substance.

By this time news of the Cossacks' increasing audacity in the north had reached the capital, and in 1667 the Emperor K'ang Hsi sent a message to Nerchinsk demanding the extradition of a Tungus prince named Gantimur who had sought Russian protection. It had become clear to the Manchus that they could no longer deal with these Barbarians as a purely local affair, and the former unofficial contacts began to give way to more formal exchanges. One of the early difficulties, however, was that the Chinese authorities were often uncertain whether they were dealing with representatives of the White Khan, as they called the Tsar, or Cossack freebooters whom they distinguished by the name of *Lo-ch'a*. An advantage of this obscurity from the Russian viewpoint was that their Government was able, when expedient, to deny responsibility for outrages which might otherwise have led to open war.

Manchu troops now began to arrive on the Amur, and Khabarov's fort at Albazin was captured and destroyed; but at this time the Manchus were exercised by the activities of the Kalmyks, who were threatening their vassals the Khalkha Mongols, and after the Albazin operation they moved their troops from that area. In 1674 the Russians took advantage of this withdrawal to rebuild their fort and to infiltrate once more into the territory beyond the Amur; in fact, by 1681 the number of armed settlers was greater than ever before. The Manchu troops returned and again invested Albazin, but an exchange of letters between the Tsar and the Emperor led to a truce whereby the siege was raised pending negotiations.

The operations around Albazin involved the capture of several dozen Russians, in addition to which a good many decided to go

over to the Manchus and were sent to Peking, where they formed a community of their own until by intermarriage they were eventually absorbed in the Chinese population. These "Albazinians" even constituted a company of their own in the Emperor's Regiment of the Yellow-Bordered Banner, and later provided the Russian Government with an excuse to maintain representatives in Peking, ostensibly for their welfare.

The Manchus, realizing the urgency of a definite settlement with this new empire in the north, accepted a Russian ambassador who arrived in Peking in 1675, the first plenipotentiary to be received by China from any Great Power. The envoy was not by birth a Russian, but a highly educated man of Greek origin who had previously served the Prince of Moldavia. Russia was short of such men for diplomatic work, and Spathary, with his gift for understanding the minds of those with whom he negotiated, made a favourable impression on the Chinese court. He had not long taken up his post before he was approached by the Chinese expressing their wish "to settle the frontier question", and messages to and from the Tsar began to travel by horse and boat across the vast spaces of Siberia. As the Chinese, however, refused to correspond with Russia except as a superior dealing with an inferior, Spathary had to withdraw from Peking in September of the same year.

The language problem was not the least of the obstacles to be overcome. Under the Ch'ing Dynasty the court language was Manchu, a Tungusic tongue unknown to the Russians. The use of Chinese was impracticable for the same reason, but much of the early negotiations had been carried out in Mongol, for in both countries interpreters in that language could be found. When the Central authorities had to enter into direct discussions with the Tsar's representatives, however, they decided to make use of the Jesuits who had for several generations resided in Peking and were esteemed by the Chinese for their learning and for their advice on foreign affairs. When the Russians had overcome their initial prejudice against the Catholics and the use of Latin as a diplomatic language, they made considerable use of these intermediaries, not only as interpreters but as valuable sources of information about China.

In the meantime bands of Cossacks, some acting under instructions and others on their own account, were following the course of the Amur as far as its estuary, and the Manchus had to divert more troops to deal with them. It was clear that, unless serious hostilities were to break out, some understanding must be reached

on the subject of a frontier, which had never before existed as such because the rulers of China had been accustomed to think of their empire as extending as far as their arms could reach. It was mutually agreed, therefore, that a special negotiator should be sent from Russia to settle border questions, and Peter the Great despatched Golovin as High Ambassador with the additional object of exploring the possibilities of trading, since Peter's intention was to make bulk purchases from China by the State and not through private merchants. Another of Golovin's activities was to get in touch with the Hutukhtu, or Living Buddha, as he passed through Mongolia, but little progress was made in that direction since the Mongol ruler was more afraid of the Manchus than of Russia. This was, however, only the beginning of a long process which was eventually to wean that territory away from China to the status of a Russian protectorate.

The climax of Golovin's Far Eastern career was the conference at Nerchinsk to settle the problems created by the appearance of Russian power on the fringes of the Celestial Empire. The importance attached by the Chinese side to this meeting was shown by the attendance of two princes of the Imperial Family as well as the head of the Li Fan Yuan, the department responsible for outlying territories. It was still necessary, however, for the Chinese to keep up the fiction that this was a local delegation, since they did not yet accept that any foreign sovereign could treat with the Emperor on terms of equality. For this reason the proceedings at Nerchinsk were significant in that they initiated a revolution in China's external relations.

The formalities were indeed markedly different from those recorded at any conference between China and a Western Power. The representatives of each side assembled with a considerable escort of troops, and made camp. On an appointed day they approached the conference tent on horseback; the Russians discreetly dismounted first and moved a few steps towards the Chinese, inviting them to enter ahead of them. Golovin and his suite were at first somewhat put out by having to negotiate through two Jesuit priests, Gerbillon and Pereira, who were accompanying the Chinese delegation as interpreters and advisers: especially so when they proposed to address the Manchu officials direct, and the Jesuits effectively intervened on the grounds that they were the official interpreters, and throughout loyally supported the Chinese side.

The course of negotiations was necessarily influenced by the display of force mustered by the Manchus on this occasion; for Golo-

vin's party now found itself facing, not ill-armed tribal levies, but well-equipped Manchu regular troops in superior numbers. It was due to Golovin's skill as a negotiator that the Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed in 1689, gained something of substance for Russia. The most important article was that delimiting the frontier. The Chinese at first proposed the River Lena, but after a certain amount of bargaining a line was agreed on along the Gorbitza, the southern side of the Stanovoi range north of the Amur, the Oulo River and the course of the Argun. No Russian settlements were to be allowed beyond this line, although it was agreed that the merchants of either country might travel and trade freely in the other. Albazin and the other forts which the Russians had built along the Amur must be destroyed, and no Russian craft might in future navigate that river. As regards Khalkha Mongolia and the Kalmyk state of Djungaria, it was acknowledged that these were within China's sphere of influence and that she was to be left a free hand in those regions; their northern boundaries remained undefined for the time being. Procedures were also agreed for the mutual extradition of renegades, a border problem with which both empires were familiar; but a difficulty arose over the treatment of Prince Gantimur, the Tungus chief who had transferred his allegiance from the Emperor of China to the Tsar. After some delay the Chinese were informed that he had gone to Moscow and embraced the Orthodox Christian faith, and agreed to let the matter drop.

The importance of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first ever to be concluded by China with a foreign power on terms of equality, was that it put Russo-Chinese relations on an official footing and ushered in a period of peaceful coexistence which was to last until the middle of the nineteenth century. (The agreed frontier remained unaltered until 1858 when Russia, in competition with other Powers, decided to take advantage of China's decline.) Special missions now began to travel to Peking with the object of exploiting this first penetration, for at that period no other Great Power had the privilege of sending delegations to the Chinese capital. In 1693, for instance, they tested the agreement on trade by despatching a commercial mission to Peking, where it remained three and a half months without accomplishing anything substantial beyond eliciting a pronouncement by K'ang Hsi that he had no objection to trade in principle so long as it did not lead to political encroachment. After an unpromising start, trade did later increase considerably, particularly in tea, and was carried on by periodic caravans along the age-old routes across the Gobi and through Turkestan. These expeditions of course took many months to accomplish

their missions and were escorted by their own troops owing to the uncertain attitude of the peoples through which they had to pass.

During this period the Khalkha tribes of Outer Mongolia had felt themselves threatened both by the Russians, who were appearing in force on their frontiers, and by their western neighbours the Kalmyks, who had gained control of Turkestan and Western Mongolia under their redoubtable chief Galdan. Each of these powers had begun to send emissaries to Urga pressing for political and commercial privileges, and in 1686 the Mongols had decided that the safest course would be to put themselves under the protection of the Manchu Empire. As already described, this intention was consummated at the Congress of Dolon Nor.

Galdan, flushed with success, ended by playing into the hands of his enemies. In 1688 he attacked the Khalkhas, some of whom fled to Chinese territory and others to Russian protection in Siberia. The Kalmyk prince now found himself involved with both these Powers. In 1689, the year of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of Nerchinsk, Golovin's forces defeated a Kalmyk horde which had advanced to Selenginsk in Siberian territory, and forced them to give their allegiance to the Tsar. In the meantime Galdan rashly pushed on into Inner Mongolia where in 1690 he was defeated by the Manchu army, upon which the Hutukhtu and Khalkha princes swore allegiance. The Emperor K'ang Hsi now ordered an immediate counter-offensive which resulted in the occupation not only of Kalmyk (Western) Mongolia but their province of Djungaria in northern Turkestan. Following the Kalmyk defeat, the River Irtysh divided in the north the Russian and Chinese Turkestans; the territories now known as Soviet Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan then forming part of the Chinese Empire.

In 1712 the Manchu Emperor decided on the unprecedented step of sending a diplomatic representative to his powerful Barbarian neighbour, with the primary objects of gaining intelligence about the country and at the same time following up the activities of the Torgut Kalmyks who had fled to Russia. By the next year the envoy had reached Tobolsk, the seat of the Governor-General of Siberia, who announced that the Tsar would be unable to receive him, presumably owing to his European commitments at that time. The Chinese Mission was able, however, to proceed to Saratov on the Volga and to visit the Khan of the Torguts who had now settled there. In 1714 the Torguts in their turn sent a mission to Peking in order to discuss their somewhat ambiguous situation: the Russians took advantage of their tutelage to attach an archi-

mandrite and several army officers to the party, and were thus able not only to keep an eye on them but to carry out a reconnaissance of the route and of the political situation in the north-western parts of the Chinese Empire.

As relations between Russia and China had now become rather negative, a fresh mission under Izmailov was sent to Peking in 1720 in order to secure a personal interview with the Emperor. The usual difficulties arose over the kowtow ceremony, but eventually Izmailov agreed to perform it on condition that any Chinese envoy visiting St. Petersburg would do the same. As the Emperor had no intention at the time of despatching such an envoy, he concurred in this suggestion without hesitation. After reaching an agreement on permits for travel between the two countries, and on the building of a Russian church in Peking, but little else, Izmailov returned to Russia the next year, leaving behind an agent to handle the routine matters. Friction soon arose, however, owing to the lack of confidence which recent Russian actions had inspired. The Russians were accused of failing to abide by the agreement to return Kalmyk and other renegades wanted by the Chinese authorities; moreover, many years of depredations by Cossack bands in the Amur region had caused the Chinese to mistrust Russian promises. After several uncomfortable months, therefore, the agent withdrew without having accomplished anything.

A good deal more progress was made by Count Raduzinski's embassy in 1726. The Chinese were insistent on reaching a solution of the Kalmyk problem and on a more accurate demarcation of the frontier agreed upon at Nerchinsk, as well as the hitherto undefined boundary of Mongolia. Raduzinski arrived with a staff of nearly 100 and an escort of 1,500 troops, and was briefed to gather intelligence as well as to negotiate. Successful efforts were made to gain the goodwill of the resident Jesuits, who were at that time the best-informed foreigners in Peking, and use was also made of native agents and informers. The Russians even investigated the possibility of trade through the port of Canton, and the activities of English, French, Dutch and Portuguese merchants already established there.

Raduzinski, in his appreciation submitted to the Tsar, argued that in case of war the non-Manchu elements of the Empire would revolt, and the regime would consequently collapse. This was in fact a fallacy, for by that time the Manchus, having adopted Chinese culture and habits, were being assimilated to the much more numerous native population; moreover, the mandarinate or civil service which ran the Empire was staffed mainly by Chinese,

who had accepted the Manchus for much the same reasons as they have since accepted the Communists.

Raduzinski's diplomacy, and the Chinese reaction, were typical of the two nations. The Russians negotiated with great patience in the face of Chinese arrogance, and both sides used threats couched in urbane terms. Neither party, however, had any intention of resorting to extreme measures. After about a year's discussions Raduzinski repaired to Selenginsk to demarcate the Mongolian section of the frontier, the Chinese being represented by the Emperor's uncle. In order to impress the latter, the Russian envoy appeared with a large escort of troops and let it be known that his country was now free of her military commitments in the west.

The result was the Treaty of Kiakhta, signed in 1727, which regulated the relations between China and Russia until 1858. Supplementing the earlier Treaty of Nerchinsk, it delimited the frontier from Kiakhta, on the Mongolian border, eastward to the junction of the Argun and Amur rivers and westward to the Shabina pass in the Sayan mountains, giving Russia additional territory in the region of the upper Irtysh and Lake Baikal. It also stipulated the number and size of Russian caravans which might travel across Mongolia to Peking; and provided for the extradition of criminals fleeing across the frontier. An ecclesiastical mission and six language students were to be allowed to live in the Russian ambassador's house in Peking, but no resident political or commercial staff were permitted. The periodic flights of Mongols and other subjects into Russian territory increasingly exercised the Manchu Government, and after some further discussion the Russians agreed to close their frontier to immigration.

It was, however, not practicable to delimit precisely the frontier between Russian territory and the north-western corner of Mongolia, which was inhabited by tribes known as Uriankhai. Already geographical factors were turning the heads of these people away from the Khalkhas and towards the Russians: the Tannu Ola range formed a natural barrier to the south, while the Yenisei, taking its rise in that region, facilitated access to and from Siberia. As Russian influence grew, some tribes paid tribute to the Tsar's representatives and others to Peking, so that the territory remained virtually a no-man's-land until, as will be later described, the Russians were in a position to incorporate it into their own dominions.

The importance of the Kiakhta treaty was that, like the Nerchinsk instrument, it was freely concluded on a basis of equality: thereafter, owing to Russia's attention being focused on the Baltic and Black Seas, no others were found to be necessary until 1858,

when Russia imposed the humiliating Treaty of Aigun on a defenceless China.

It was not until 1730 that a Chinese embassy actually reached St. Petersburg, the first to be sent to any of the Great Powers. The primary cause was the Chinese desire for Russian co-operation in dealing with the troublesome Kalmyks who now abutted on both their territories, but little progress was made with this question owing to Russia's reluctance to disturb the Torguts settled on the Volga.

The Manchu authorities apparently grew to dislike the idea of Russian caravans crossing Mongolian territory into China, for in 1737 these were stopped from going further than Kiakhta. The Chinese merchants then went to Kiakhta to select their purchases, while the Russians proceeded to the Chinese frontier post of Maimaicheng to make their choice. Prices were fixed in terms of tea by government commissioners from each side, and transactions were by barter only. The trade was largely in Chinese tea, which was exchanged for Russian woollens, leather, sheepskins and textiles. By 1772 this trade had grown to such proportions that two officials of the Manchu Government were stationed at Urga to supervise it. One of these officials was actually always a Mongol because of the local interest in this commerce.

In 1757 the Emperor carried out a major "pacification" of Western Mongolia and Djungaria, consolidating his conquests by colonizing the territory with Manchu settlers, whose descendants remain to this day. The Kalmyks once more looked to Russia, and again many of them fled into Siberia where they remained a potential menace to the peace of the frontier. In 1791 Chinese forces ventured to cross into Russian territory in pursuit of some Kalmyk marauders, but strong reactions on the part of St. Petersburg caused them to withdraw, a further illustration of the fact that each side knew how far it could press the other.

Thus during the eighteenth century Mongolia became of increasing importance in Russo-Chinese relations, particularly for trade. Before the opening of the Treaty Ports and the days of steam navigation it afforded the most direct route for trade with China, but was regarded by Peking rather as a buffer state to isolate the Empire from foreign encroachment. During their colonization of Siberia the Russians had encountered the Buriat Mongols in the Baikal region, and had russified the more westerly tribes. A proportion of the Buriats retreated eastward, however, and settled around Chita, where they formed a Buddhist community closely akin to the Khalkha of Outer Mongolia. The Buriats were later to be of

considerable help in the Russian penetration of that country which, like Sinkiang, was destined to find its interests best served by facing north.

This brief account of the early contacts between China and Russia indicates that the primary concern of both countries was with the border territories, the inhabitants of which were neither Russian nor Chinese but whose politie were too unstable to provide reliable buffers. Apart from a limited trade and spasmodic diplomatic encounters, relations between the two central governments were of secondary importance.

CHAPTER V

The Break-up of China

WHEN the nineteenth century dawned, the glamour of Ch'ien Lung's court still lingered in the East; its close saw the Empire reduced to dust.

In 1805 China was beginning to feel the tremors of internal disturbance, in so much that Golovkin's embassy, sent in that year from St. Petersburg, was unable to achieve anything owing to the preoccupation of the Peking Government with home affairs. The Russians received another rebuff in the following year when their request to trade at Canton, a facility granted to Western Powers, was refused on the grounds that they were already trading overland. The Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842, opened several other ports to foreign trade, but at that time Russia's attention was absorbed by her relations with Turkey and she did not share in the privileges obtained at the point of the sword by Great Britain and France.

In Central Asia, however, the Russians found a "soft spot", where an ill-defined frontier cut through populations that were neither Chinese nor Russian. For many years the Kazakh nomads in Russian territory had been accustomed to move at certain seasons to pastures under Chinese control: the Chinese authorities viewed these encroachments with a measure of tolerance, but maintained a line of piquets whose duty it was to drive the intruders back if they strayed too far or stayed too long. In 1840 the Russians began to send troops into these areas to control the activities of the tribesmen, but the local officials, a couple of thousand miles from Peking, treated these operations with indifference. About the year 1850, however, when the Russian expeditions against the Central Asian Khanates led to their occupation of Tashkent and the founding of Vierny (now Alma-Ata) and Semipalatinsk on the approaches to Sinkiang, Russia found herself in a position to apply pressure at short notice to this isolated Chinese dominion, and in 1851 a local trade agreement opened Kuldja (Ili) and Tarbagatai to Russian trade.

The exploitation of Siberia was also gathering momentum, and by 1834 voluntary and forced colonization had brought Russian

settlers east of the Caspian, on to the Ural Steppe, and to the very borders of the Chinese Empire. Cossacks with their families were now filtering in growing numbers into North Manchuria and Mongolia, and settling there as ranchers, farmers, trappers or traders. At this period Manchuria was ostensibly an Imperial preserve into which Chinese were not permitted to immigrate: the country therefore remained sparsely populated, particularly in the bleak north, and infiltration by Russians was difficult to detect or prevent. Tungus tribes at one time inhabited not only Manchuria but were found in eastern Siberia as far north as Yakutsk and the surrounding country. The arrival early in the nineteenth century of Russian colonists and their accompanying administration, including tax-collectors, caused a movement of Yakuts towards the Amur and the displacement of the Tungus north of that river. This led to an unsettled situation on both banks of the Amur.

In 1847 Russia began to adopt a more dynamic policy in the Far East, encouraged by the deteriorating situation of the Manchu Dynasty and by suspicions that British activities in China might encroach upon Russian interests. Muraviev, appointed Governor-General of Eastern Siberia with his administrative centre at Irkutsk, was given considerable freedom of action and took full advantage of his opportunities, acting as agent of the ambitious Tsar Nicholas I rather than of the more cautious Russian Government. In 1854, during the Crimean War, he organized a military expedition which proceeded down the Amur and founded Cossack settlements at Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Nicolayevsk and other places; justifying these operations on the grounds that they were directed against British and French forces threatening Russia's Pacific coast. More Russians were later brought in from Trans-Baikal to populate these settlements, which soon developed into considerable towns.

A third expedition in 1856 was on a larger scale, the number of peasant families being increased, while in the following year convicts of both sexes were introduced: all these movements entailed the use of the Amur by Russian steamships, which had been excluded by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, but the Chinese were at this time not in a position to oppose them by force and Muraviev was able to bluff the local authorities that the operations were of a temporary significance. At the same time Nevelskoi, Muraviev's senior naval officer, was busy along the Pacific shore reconnoitring harbours and anchorages at several points down the coast as far as the Korean frontier, and founded the port of Nikolayevsk, named after his Tsar. The Chinese paid little attention to these activities

which did not at the time appear to them of great consequence.

In 1858, while Peking was preoccupied with the chaos caused by the Taiping Rebellion and the war against Great Britain and France, the Manchurian authorities were bluffed and cajoled by Muraviev into signing the Treaty of Aigun. By this instrument the left bank of the Amur (in *de facto* Cossack occupation) was confirmed as Russian territory, while the country east of the Ussuri River was to be administered as a Russo-Chinese condominium. Thus the whole Pacific coast north of Korea, up to the Behring Straits and Alaska, became part of the Tsar's possessions. The use of the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri rivers by Russian shipping was legalized, and navigation restricted to the two contracting powers. Yi Shan, the local governor, had already shown his incompetence in the "Opium War" against Great Britain and was no match for Muraviev's tactics: he was subsequently disgraced by his government, which refused to ratify the treaty.

Simultaneously with the negotiations at Aigun, the new Russian Minister to China, Putiatin, succeeded in concluding a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation at Tientsin, which placed Russia on the same footing as the Western Powers as regards the opening of seven ports to foreign commerce, and the exercise of consular jurisdiction. In 1860, moreover, the Russians were able to take advantage of the Anglo-French occupation of Peking to pose as mediators. Learning confidentially that the Western allies intended to withdraw their forces to Tientsin, they suggested to the Chinese that they should use their good offices to obtain such an evacuation in return for the ratification of the Aigun Treaty by the Central Government. Thus the Treaty of Peking, signed in 1860, confirmed all that had been gained by Muraviev, with the addition that the maritime Ussuri territory should be ceded absolutely to Russia. The opportunity was also taken of extracting privileges in Mongolia and Sinkiang. Russian merchants were to be permitted once more to travel across Mongolia to Peking, via Kiakhta, Urga and Kalgan, a Russian consulate being accepted in the Outer Mongolian capital. The Kazakh piquet line was in future to be considered as the frontier of Sinkiang, thus giving Russia part of the Ili District; and the city of Kashgar, in addition to Kuldja and Tarbagatai (opened in 1851) was made accessible to Russian commerce. Duty-free barter trade was also authorized along the Russo-Chinese frontier.

To all this the Chinese could not but agree, so that at one stroke China's northern screen was exposed to penetration by Russian influence. The Ussuri Host of Cossacks was raised to populate the

new province, while in the far north-west Russia's geographical propinquity was paving the way for economic domination. Muraviev, flushed with success, now proposed a Russian protectorate over Outer Mongolia; but St. Petersburg, anxious not to go too far for fear of complications with the Western Powers, declined any further adventures for the time being.

The instruments drawn up at Aigun, Tientsin and Peking may be considered as the first "unequal treaties" concluded between the Chinese and Russian Governments, for they had hitherto dealt with each other on a level. From that point up till 1917, Russia's China policy differed in kind, but not in principle, from that of other competing Powers: thus she acquired concessions for residence and trade in the Treaty Ports of Tientsin and Hankow to match those of Great Britain and France, and enjoyed the same extra-territorial privileges for her subjects. While those nations were, however, mainly concerned with Central and Southern China, Russia considered Manchuria and the northern provinces as her special sphere of interest. A difference in technique is also worth noting. During the Taiping Rebellion the Western Powers attempted to support the legitimate government by lending foreign officers and advisers such as Gordon and Ward, while the Russians turned the rebellion to good account by timing their demands so as to catch the Peking administration at its weakest.

Nevelskoi's coastwise exploration had discovered a land-locked harbour, capable of being kept open in winter, which was occupied in 1860 and named Vladivostok, "Dominion of the East". It was during this period of expansion that the Tsar made his celebrated pronouncement: "Where the Russian flag has been hoisted, it is never to be lowered", so that the more cautious attitude of the Russian Foreign Office was liable to be obscured by adventures such as those of Muraviev, often encouraged personally by the Emperor. The only backward step on the Pacific coast was the sale of Alaska in 1867 to the United States as an unwanted embarrassment: the price was low, because the existence of gold had not yet been discovered.

Although on a short-term view China's reactions to the encroachments in the north appear to have been feeble, they were followed by measures which in the long run were to be more effective than any military operations. The Imperial Government, which had hitherto limited Chinese immigration into the homeland of the Manchu House, now decided to admit large numbers of land-hungry peasants from Shantung and other provinces south of the Wall. As a result the whole character of the country became trans-

formed. The forests and steppe, once the habitation of primitive Tartars and wild life, were flooded by industrious farmers and merchants, so that by the end of the century there could be no doubt as to its nationality.

By 1862, having prised open the trade doors a little wider, Russia induced the Chinese to agree on the so-called Overland Trade Regulations, which laid down that Sino-Russian trade between points within 100 *li* (approximately 33 miles) of the Sinkiang frontier should be free of customs duty: the duties on other imports were fixed at one-third of those on goods of third party countries.

In 1864 a Muslim revolt against Chinese rule played into Russian hands and led to their direct intervention. The population of Sinkiang, as already explained, is mainly of Turco-Tartar origin and almost entirely Muslim by religion, with a few Chinese officials in nominal control. An important minority, however, is the Tungans, descendants of early Chinese colonists who embraced Islam and are of a chronically turbulent disposition. At that time a particularly successful revolt put them in control of Urumchi the capital, Kuldja the gateway to Russian Turkestan, and several other towns.

The infection, however, spread to the Uighurs, the major element in the population, and a force led by Yakub Beg set up a rival government at Kashgar and moved north against the border sultanate of Kuldja (Ili). Yakub ousted the Tungans and conquered virtually the whole of Sinkiang. He then set up a khanate of his own, which was given qualified recognition by Great Britain, Russia and Turkey, the Powers chiefly concerned with the future of this part of Asia. As Yakub's ambitions soon appeared to extend to Russian Central Asia, however, the Tsar's troops took the opportunity in 1871 of occupying the Ili district on the pretext of maintaining law and order and of forestalling alleged British-Indian designs on that gateway. Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, in many ways resembled his contemporary, Muraviev of the Amur. He was allowed a considerable measure of initiative and made full use of any opportunities to pursue a forward policy. His reaction to Yakub Beg's threat to Ili by occupying it with Russian troops took place without previous reference to St. Petersburg.

The Manchu Government now suddenly awoke to the importance of Sinkiang, appreciating that the loss of that dominion would expose Western Mongolia to foreign penetration and thus endanger Shensi, Shansi and other provinces of China proper. The Viceroy of Shensi and Kansu, Tso Tsung-tang, who had taken a

leading part in suppressing the Taipings, was therefore instructed to deal with Yakub Beg and despatched his army through the barren north-west, cultivating the land as it went in the traditional Chinese manner. This deliberate campaign led to the recapture of Urumchi in 1876 and of Kashgar in 1877, and to the flight and subsequent death of Yakub, who was variously reported to have been murdered, died of fever, or to have committed suicide. The Tungan leader Po and several Uighur chiefs, setting a precedent which was often to be repeated, fled to Russian territory; while the Sultan of Kuldja accepted an invitation to settle with his harem and entourage at Vierny (now Alma-Ata), leaving his state in the occupation of Kaufmann's troops. Yakub's short-lived regime thus as rapidly disintegrated.

The Chinese were now faced with the problem of retrieving Ili from the Russians. After some discussion the Treaty of Livadia was signed in 1878, by which another slice of Western Ili, including the Tekes valley controlling the approaches to Kashgar, was ceded to Russia; while China paid her an indemnity for the expenses incurred in occupying it. The city of Kuldja itself would be evacuated. Russian consulates were to be opened in seven cities, and it was agreed that Russian trade between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was to be free of customs duty. This treaty raised an immediate outcry in China, was repudiated by public opinion, and became virtually a dead letter.

In 1880, the Russian garrison having now been in possession of Kuldja for some nine years, the Chinese authorities demanded that it should be handed back to them, and a deadlock was reached. Both sides brought troops up to the frontier and an ugly situation developed. As so often happened in Sino-Russian relations, however, fresh diplomatic negotiations were opened just in time, and the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881 was signed. This restored Kuldja and Inner Ili to Chinese administration, but the non-Chinese population was given the option of moving across the frontier to join the 50,000 who had already done so when Western Ili had passed to Russia. Only two Russian consulates were to be opened, pending the development of trade, but the indemnity was now increased to compensate Russian subjects for their losses in the restored part of Ili. For the first time Russia had disgorged territory which she had once absorbed.

At this period Russia's attention was more fully taken up by Manchuria, and the exploitation of Outer Mongolia was left to small private concerns which found it difficult to compete with Chinese merchants able to import low-priced seaborne goods. The

first Russian trading firm in Urga, the capital, was established in 1860, and was a pretext for the right to open a consulate, secured by the Peking Treaty of that year. An agreement in 1862 allowed Russian merchants in Mongolia to import goods free of duty.

It was inevitable, however, that Mongolia should become of increasing interest to Russia's eastern empire. The Chinese policy had always been to discourage the overdevelopment of their border territories, preferring to put a belt of quasi-desert between themselves and potential enemies (the Chinese characters used to transliterate "Gobi" mean "Barrier"). The Russians, with their sparse population and extended commitments in Siberia, disliked a frontier line difficult to defend and feared the eventual pressure of the Chinese millions upon their eastern possessions; they were thus concerned to exert a counterbalancing influence on the frontier peoples. Mutual suspicion was cumulative, leading, as we shall see, to a reversal of Chinese traditional policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1850 and 1880, however, the various rebellions had accounted for some sixty million Chinese subjects.

As Russia's colonization and development proceeded, mutual distrust also increased between her Government and that of Britain, largely owing to the vaguely defined frontiers dividing the Indian and Chinese Empires and the motley collection of Central Asian states lying north of them. While the British authorities feared Russian intrigue and subversion in their border territories, St. Petersburg affected to see the sinister hand of England working against it in Central Asia. This was in reality the continuation of a process in which the helplessness of Turkey and Persia and the supposed vulnerability of India's north-west frontier had already traced a line between the two Powers across Asia from west to east.

A crisis occurred in 1891 when Russian troops, pushing into the lofty massif connecting the Himalaya and Hindu Kush ranges and known as the Pamir, caused alarm to the military authorities in India and extracted a protest from Peking. The Chinese claimed that the eight districts into which the Pamir was divided had belonged to China at least since the time of Ch'ien Lung, and went so far as to despatch a token force to the area. Once more an embarrassing situation was saved by negotiation, and again at China's expense. As a result of representations by both London and St. Petersburg, the Chinese troops were withdrawn, and it was agreed that the frontiers between India, Russia and China should be settled by diplomatic discussions and a boundary commission. As a result of subsequent developments only one of the eight dis-

tricts was left to China, the remainder being divided between Russia and British India.

Among the countries which have played a part in Anglo-Sino-Russian rivalries is Tibet. This arid plateau, with a homogeneous population of three or four million people more closely related to the Chinese than to the Turks and Mongols of the north, has never been an integral part of China and, largely for geographical reasons, has on the whole had more traffic with India and the Himalayan states. As the centre of the Yellow Sect of lamaist Buddhism, however, it has for more than two centuries had great influence on the culture and outlook of the Mongols, and it was largely for this reason that the Manchus invaded this hitherto independent realm in 1720 and stationed an *Amban*, or Resident, at Lhasa in order to observe the activities and if possible guide the external policies of the Dalai Lama. About 1790 the Tibetans recognized the Emperor's suzerainty, and during the first half of the nineteenth century Tibet was formally part of the Chinese Empire, although the Dalai Lama continued as an autonomous ruler within the country. Chinese rule was never willingly accepted, and acts of exploitation by Chinese officials and merchants caused frequent revolts.

But the country's central position, bordering both upon China's Muslim north-west and upon the Indian sub-continent, made it inevitable that during the nineteenth century both Britain and Russia should be apprehensive of intrigues there by the other party. Stories of sinister activities by rival agents appear to have been much exaggerated; but towards the end of the century Russian travellers appeared in Lhasa, and about 1890 Dorjiev, a Siberian Buriat, got in touch with the Dalai Lama through priests in Outer Mongolia. His accounts of Russia interested the Tibetan Pontiff to such a degree that he twice, in 1898 and 1900, sent a diplomatic mission to St. Petersburg. When this became known, British suspicions of a possible Russian protectorate were intensified and pressure was put on the Lhasa Government to receive a representative from India also. As no response was made by the Tibetans, an expedition under Colonel Younghusband advanced to Lhasa in 1904, upon which the Dalai Lama fled to Urga and was taken under the protection of the Russian Consul-General. After this the Russians, preoccupied elsewhere, concerned themselves little with Tibet, which thereafter plays an insignificant part in Sino-Russian intercourse.

In 1899, Anglo-Russian relations were somewhat improved by an agreement on the building of railways; Great Britain's sphere

was to be the Yangtze basin while the Russians would limit themselves to the territories north of the Great Wall, including Outer Mongolia. Russia however had far-reaching ambitions, with a strategic flavour, for controlling China by linking up with her French ally in South-east Asia, and Franco-Belgian capital was working in Russian interests by exploiting railway concessions to connect North China to the southern provinces.

The century ended with the climax of Russia's eastward expansion, the building of the Trans-Siberian and Manchurian railways.

While Russian railroads were still in their infancy, proposals had been made to supplement the horse-post system by a highway across Siberia, but the difficulties of such a project delayed it until the coming of rails made transportation on this scale a possibility.

By 1890 Russia's network had reached the Urals at three points, Tiumen, Zlatoust and Orenburg; and the following year construction of the Siberian railroad was started from both ends. The Tsarevitch, afterwards the ill-fated Nicholas II, travelled to Vladivostok to inaugurate work on the eastern section of the line, and narrowly escaped death at the hands of an anti-Russian fanatic as he passed through Japan. The original alignment was via Omsk, Irkutsk and Chita to Khabarovsk, thence along the east side of the Ussuri to Vladivostok; but it was soon appreciated that if it could be taken through Manchuria the distance would be cut by some 500 miles; moreover it would traverse economically promising territory instead of the forest and swamps north of the Amur. At this juncture fate, in the shape of Japan, played into the hands of Russia.

In 1894 an insurrection against the King of Korea, possibly inspired from without, led to intervention by the troops of both Japan and China, each of which considered "The Land of Morning Calm" to be within its sphere of influence. China, the traditional suzerain of Korea, was not prepared to tolerate the stationing in the country of superior Japanese forces. War broke out, in which the modernized Japanese army easily defeated the ill-equipped Chinese, and in 1895 the Treaty of Shimonoseki excluded their influence from Korea (now declared independent) and gave Japan Formosa, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula at the southern tip of Manchuria, including the harbours of Ta-lien and Port Arthur (Liushun). The latter acquisitions aroused instant opposition from Russia which, with the backing of France and Germany, forced Japan to relinquish them: these three Powers were in due course to make substantial claims on China's gratitude. This was the beginning of Russo-Japanese

rivalry which was to have a profound influence on the Far Eastern situation for the next fifty years.

Witte, the astute Russian Finance Minister, planned to carry the Trans-Siberian railway, which had now reached Lake Baikal, through North Manchuria to Vladivostok, and in 1896 approaches were made to the Peking Government. The Chinese, however, were at first understandably suspicious of Russian intentions, and had already given the concession for building the line from Peking into South Manchuria to the British. Witte argued that his proposed Manchurian line would not only develop the territory through which it passed but would help to defend it against attack by other Powers, implying Japan.

Li Hung-Chang, China's able Foreign Minister, favoured an alliance with Russia with a view to avenging at some future time the defeat by Japan, and in 1896 a secret Sino-Russian Treaty of Alliance was signed. This covered a contract for the construction by a Russian private company of a railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok which could be redeemed by China in thirty-six years, and would in any case pass to her without compensation after eighty years. These time limits were not regarded very seriously in St. Petersburg, where it was assumed that, as things were going, North Manchuria would soon be virtually in Russian hands. The treaty, which was to remain in force for fifteen years, also provided for mutual military support in case of Japanese aggression against China, Korea or the Russian Far East, and for the use of all Chinese ports by the Russian navy in the event of war. During hostilities Russian troops would be able to use the trans-Manchurian railway for the movement and maintenance of troops, and in peace-time the line could be utilized by troops in transit.

The clause about the private railway company was interpreted in an ingenious and somewhat obscure manner. The Russo-Chinese Bank was created under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance in St. Petersburg as the Russian partner in the agreement, and in turn gave birth to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. As China was not in a position to provide much capital, the Russian Ministry of Finance was in effect the controlling influence in the project, although much of the money was actually raised in Paris on the strength of Franco-Russian political co-operation.

Construction began in 1898, crossing the Manchurian frontiers at Manchuli and Suifenho, and using the Russian broad (five foot) gauge, whereas other railways in China were built to standard gauge. The same year Russia leased Ta-lien (Dairen) and Port Arthur from the Chinese Government for twenty-five years

and obtained its agreement to the laying of a branch from their North Manchurian line so as to link up these ports to the Russian system. This move was initiated by the Tsar as an answer to the leasing of Kiao-chou Bay in Shantung by Kaiser Wilhelm II, and was made without the knowledge of Witte; not only did it illustrate a fatal weakness in the government of Russia, but was a major cause of the disastrous clash with Japan.

Witte, responsible for the subsequent negotiations, wanted the branch line to be built to broad gauge also, both to facilitate the running of through military trains in case of a Japanese threat from Korea, and to make full use of her only completely ice-free ports in the Far East. The Chinese, however, insisted on standard gauge, which was that used for the adjacent systems.

In 1900 the Powers were temporarily thrown together by the outbreak of the Boxer Rising. Like the Taiping Rebellion fifty years before, it was largely an expression of discontent with the decadent Manchu regime and its impotence in resisting foreign pressure. The hard core of the revolt was a secret society calling itself The Patriotic and Harmonious Fists, which pursued its aims with fanaticism and savagery, and gained considerable popular support in the north. The Empress-Dowager and her adviser Jung Lu succeeded in working on the Chinaman's natural xenophobia and turned the rebels' wrath against foreigners and Christians. The result was widespread massacre and sabotage, aided and abetted by the authorities, and leading to the despatch of an international force to rescue the Legations besieged in Peking. In Manchuria the Boxers did considerable damage to the installations of the C.E.R. then under construction, while Chinese artillery even bombarded Blagoveshchensk across the Amur: whereupon Russian forces occupied the whole of Manchuria including the capital Mukden, as well as Harbin, Tsitsihar and Newchwang, a port in the south. The local authorities at length acceded to Russian demands that Chinese troops should be withdrawn from Manchuria and that a Russian Resident should be appointed to supervise the Mukden administration. Thus when the rebellion had been suppressed and the Manchu Government forced to make reparation to the Powers, Russia was in full military occupation of Manchuria and received moreover the largest share of the Boxer Indemnity.

By 1901 the tracklaying of both the northern (Chinese Eastern) and southern (South Manchuria) railways had been completed, and in 1903 the Chinese Eastern Railway began to operate a through service from Siberia to Vladivostok.

Under the terms of the contract of 1896 a strip of land, to be

under the exclusive control of the railway administration, had been made over by the Chinese, but as the limits of this zone had never been laid down the C.E.R. were able to erect buildings without regard to space restrictions; thus whole new towns, with considerable Russian populations, grew up rapidly. Harbin, the headquarters of the administration, consisted of a Russian and a Chinese town, and in 1907 a Russian Municipal Council was established. Russian garrisons watched over internal security. A further advantage secured by Witte was that, as in Sinkiang, goods imported from Russia by this railway paid only one-third of the duty levied by the Maritime Customs, thus facilitating Russian economic domination. The South Manchurian Railway, when completed, was also incorporated in the above system.

At this time proposals for a railway across Mongolia from Kiakhta to Peking were opposed by Witte who considered that such a move, like Muraviev's suggestion in 1860, would arouse too much opposition from the other Powers. The Manchu Government, for its part, appreciating that Outer Mongolia might one day suffer the fate of Manchuria, began actively to encourage Chinese colonization, which was also aided by pressure of population. It was even planned to build a Chinese railway from Kalgan, on the Great Wall, to Urga, but this project never materialized for lack of financial support. The Mongols, for their part, were alienated by the increase in the Chinese garrisons and by having to support a burdensome administration.

The scene was now set for the inevitable showdown with Japan. After her successful penetration of the Amur territories and Central Asia, Russia had reached her natural limits. Hitherto her expansion into the steppes had enjoyed instinctive and broad national support; but by the end of the nineteenth century Russia's objectives appealed to a relatively small class of industrialists, merchants and bankers; further expansion had no popular basis and was bound to fail. The Tsar's government was carried forward by a fatal momentum. The economic development of his country made the acquisition of markets the more urgent, while the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 induced the Russians to tighten their grip on Manchuria. In contrast to the policy of the nineteenth century, however, that of Nicholas II was vacillating, and often carried on by secret Imperial instructions which by-passed the responsible ministers.

The clash with Japan was due to Russia's southward drive. Vladivostok, which had to be kept open by ice-breakers during the winter, was too far north; she had therefore jockeyed Japan out of

Dairen and Port Arthur in 1895, and on various pretexts delayed the evacuation of her forces which had been brought into Manchuria to restore order during the Boxer Rebellion. In 1903 the Amur territories and the Liaotung Peninsula (which was included in the lease of Dairen and Port Arthur) were made a viceroyalty directly responsible to the Tsar, while the Mukden occupation continued. A company was formed to exploit timber along the west bank of the Yalu on the Korean border, and troops were stationed there ostensibly to protect them; although, with her vast forests nearer home, Russia could not have been in need of these resources. The Japanese were further provoked by the setting up of a Russian customs barrier on the frontier of Korea.

The sequel is well known. In 1904, after protracted but fruitless negotiations which included a Japanese proposal for mutual non-interference in Korea and Manchuria respectively, the Japanese opened an undeclared war by attacking the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, which was terminated the following year by the Treaty of Portsmouth. Russia's defeat may be attributed largely to the fact, already explained, that the heart of the nation was not in the war, and to the coincidence that Russia had encountered, at the extreme limit of her expansion, a newly emergent military power close to its base. The results were far-reaching. The peace treaty called for simultaneous evacuation of occupied areas by both sides, except for the Liaotung Peninsula and South Manchuria Railway zone which were now transferred to Japan. Russia recognized Japan's paramount interest in Korea, while Japan also received South Sakhalin and certain fishing rights off the Russian coast. Russia had thus lost control of South Manchuria and her direct means of access to China proper, and began perforce to concentrate her efforts in the north and north-west, including Mongolia.

Even more than that, the defeat of a Great and partly European Power by a small Asiatic nation encouraged nationalist movements already stirring throughout the Orient: in China there had been much sympathy with Japan, largely caused by Russia's aggressive attitude during the preceding decades. As far as Russian expansion was concerned, the tide had turned against her in the Far East, and from now on the relations between Russia, China and Japan were to form an inseparable whole.

In spite of this head-on clash, Japan and Russia soon came to realize that they had common interests as regards both China and the other Powers, and in 1907 they signed an agreement which, among other things, expressed respect for the treaties and other

arrangements which each had concluded with China. The most important feature, however, was a Secret Convention providing that Russia should not interfere with Japan's position in Korea, while Japan would respect Russian interests in Outer Mongolia. Manchuria was divided into two spheres of influence, Russian (including the C.E.R. system) in the north and Japanese (including the South Manchuria Railway) in the south.

There were now some 200,000 Russians living in the C.E.R. railway zone, including 30,000 Frontier Guards organized as infantry detachments along the line. The administration, including that of the police, was entirely in Russian hands, while Russian industries were being developed. Russian steamers plied on the Amur and Sungari rivers and to the limit of navigation on the former's tributary, the Argun. Against this must be set the Chinese population, amounting to fifteen million, which included a commercial element that faced Russian private traders with stiff competition; moreover, the opening up of the country encouraged Chinese immigration on an ever-increasing scale, and in the north-west there was frequent intermarriage between these immigrants and the Russian settlers.

In 1909 American proposals for an international consortium to take over and develop Chinese railways in Manchuria, in order to prevent dangerous rivalry, caused the two eastern Powers to close their ranks still further and to conclude the Russian-Japanese Convention of 1910 to protect their mutual interests. Faced with such determined opposition the project was dropped. In the same year the St. Petersburg Government revived its interest in Mongolian trade and in the practicability of building a branch line from the Trans-Siberian Railway through Kiakhta to Urga. In the case of the railway project, however, the Russians found it necessary to proceed with caution: not only was it likely to raise complications with both China and the other Powers, but among the Mongols themselves there was a deep-seated prejudice against railways. A generation of war and revolution was to pass before this scheme was to materialize.

Russian merchants in Outer Mongolia now began to compete with the Chinese, while settlers of various kinds, including farmers and trappers to the number of about 5,000, had entered the country by 1911. The Russians also secured from the Mongol leaders a request to supply officers for the training of the local troops and to provide their equipment and ammunition: Russian economic advisers were also active. Until 1907, although the Chinese predominated in Mongolian trade, they had interfered little with the

internal administration, and mass immigration was forbidden. Russia's defeat by Japan, however, encouraged Peking to adopt a more forward policy against the possibility of Mongolia's sharing the fate of Manchuria: as already described, Chinese immigration was encouraged and Chinese garrisons were established at Urga and other points. An *Amban*, representing the Chinese Government, was stationed at Urga, but the Mongol princes tended to rally round the Hutukhtu or Living Buddha in opposition to Chinese encroachment.

Despite these external rivalries, the first decade of the twentieth century discovered many similar features in the domestic situations of China and Russia. The regimes in both countries had been shaken by military defeats and a general lack of confidence in their governments. Among the educated and semi-educated of both populations, moreover, a feeling was growing up that their nations could catch up with the modern states of the West only by overthrowing their existing political systems. In both Russia and China the executive, untrained in constitutional government, reacted by resorting to repressive measures which were bound to fail.

CHAPTER VI

The Chinese and Russian Revolutions

IN this brief survey it is necessary to limit our description of these revolutions, occurring within a few years of one another, to their effects upon Sino-Russian relations.

The Chinese revolution of 1911 had much in common with earlier revolts. The failure of the Manchu regime to maintain China's ancient prestige against foreign enemies who, far from being the "petty monsters and puny hobgoblins" of Imperial Rescripts, had revealed themselves as powerful nations capable of reducing China to impotence, had aroused the traditional feeling that the dynasty had had its day. Moreover there was a latent sentiment against the Manchus, oriental Normans who had not been entirely assimilated and whose numerous Bannermen were paid for sinecures out of the Imperial Treasury. But in addition there had grown up a class of men, like Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who had received a Western, or partly Western, education, and who realized that China could never match the Occident under her reactionary form of government. It was this last factor which caused the 1911 revolution to differ from its predecessors and gave to it a quasi-foreign character.

The attempts of the masterful Empress Dowager, who died in 1908, to repress the spread of Western and revolutionary ideas were doomed to failure, largely because many of the revolutionaries could find sanctuary in the foreign Concessions, in Hong Kong and overseas, and continue their work there. The Empress's heir being a minor, the tottering throne was ineffectively supported by a regency for its three remaining years.

The revolutionaries' main instrument was the army, for subversive ideas had taken root in many of the military academies. The spark which fired the revolt was a mutiny of troops at Wuchang, opposite Hankow, on 10th October, 1911, after which disorder spread rapidly throughout the country, expressing itself in popular hatred of the Manchus. A republic was proclaimed on 1st January, 1912, and Yuan Shih-Kai, who had long served the Throne and now controlled the troops in the north, was made President by the revolutionaries. His somewhat conservative

15. *Growth of the Russian and Soviet Empires, 1533–1944*

government soon found itself opposed by the Kuomintang, or Nationalist party, which had been founded by Sun Yat-sen as the Eastern Gate Society (Tung-men Hui) before the revolution, and pursued a radical programme that became a thorn in Yuan's side.

The immediate effect of setting up a republic was to destroy the multi-racial Imperial structure. The so-called Chinese Empire had always been known by the name of the dynasty, *Ming-kuo* under the Ming, *Ch'ing-kuo* under the Ch'ing (Manchus) and so on. Although the component parts of the Empire were not all Chinese, they were all subjects of the Throne; the new "People's Kingdom" (*Min-kuo*) had therefore to devise, at one stroke, a different system, and devised an ineffective one. The idea of Tributary States was rejected by the theorists as incompatible with democracy, and it was proclaimed that the five peoples of the former Empire, Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Muslims, were all equal members of the republic. A flag of red, yellow, blue, black, and white stripes was devised, each colour symbolizing one of these races. In effect the Chinese, greatly outnumbering all the others combined, dominated the whole structure with no traditional justification save size of population, like the Great Russians in their empire.

The natural consequence was a further weakening of China's position as regards the foreign Powers, especially Russia. Man-

churia, the population of which was now overwhelmingly Chinese, soon became a virtually independent State under the rule of an ex-bandit named Chang Tso-lin, who did business on his own account with both the Russians and the Japanese, and Peking's writ for a time ceased to run there.

The first reaction of the Muslim peoples of Sinkiang was to revive their aspirations to independence. Of all China's dominions Turkestan had been consistently the most unreconciled and the most remote from Chinese culture. Ever since the conquest of Djungaria, first by the Kalmyks and then by the Manchus, the Turkish-speaking peoples had sighed for the departed glories of Khorezm, and little encouragement was needed to fan into flame the embers of resentment against the Chinese colonists. This situation, as we shall see, was to enhance the influence of Russia, placed so advantageously by the factors of geography and economics.

In Outer Mongolia, where the Manchu Emperor had been accepted as Bogdo Khan, a meeting of princes rejected the idea of a republic, expelled the Amban and Chinese officials, and proclaimed the Urga Living Buddha as Great Khan of the Mongols on 28th December, 1911. The echoes of this event were heard both among the Buriat Mongols of Siberia and the tribes in Chinese Inner Mongolia; and exercised the minds of the two Powers concerned. Neither liked the notion of a Greater Mongolia.

Although many Russian imperialists were sympathetic to the idea of a Mongolia free from Chinese and open to their own influence, and apprehensive lest the Japanese forestall them there, the Foreign Minister Sazonov, preoccupied with the situation in the Balkans, was disinclined to increase Russian commitments in Asia and to foster an independence movement which might not only invite hostilities with China but have repercussions on her own territory. Russia's policy for centuries had been to maintain a chain of well-disposed buffer states between her sparsely populated Siberian possessions and the teeming Chinese millions. Mongol fear of Han colonization, which had already swamped much of Inner Mongolia, had already before 1911 stimulated feelings of anti-Chinese nationalism, and thus gave rise to an atmosphere favourable to Russia as the only other Power from which the Mongols could hope for anything.

The result of these mutual anxieties was the Russo-Chinese Protocol of 1912, which stipulated that Outer Mongolia was a part of China but would continue to enjoy internal autonomy; a limited number of traders but no Chinese troops or colonists would be allowed in Outer Mongolia, a Chinese official being

stationed at Urga to look after the interests of local Chinese. The Russians, for their part, were permitted to station a small number of armed guards at their various consulates, and were able to maintain concerns in the country for the exploitation of local resources. In other respects the *status quo* would be maintained.

The weak point of this instrument was that it left undefined the extent of Outer Mongolian territory, the boundaries of which had never been clearly determined while it formed part of the Empire. It also roused much anti-Russian feeling among the more radical and vociferous revolutionaries in the south, many of whom urged the immediate despatch of military expeditions to Mongolia, and other measures quite impracticable in the circumstances. As a gesture Peking did station some troops at Altai and Kobdo, on the western fringe of Khalkha, and strengthened its garrisons in Inner Mongolia. In order to facilitate the acceptance of the agreement, President Yuan had to suppress Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist opposition (Kuomintang), which however based itself on Canton and was able to build up its strength in the south and bide its time.

As might have been expected, Inner Mongolia, where the native population was now greatly outnumbered by Chinese immigrants, did not join its northern neighbour in any demand for independence, and its penetration by agricultural settlers continued under the Republic as it had under the later Manchus.

The position of Tibet, which had never been permanently clarified under the Empire, was even more indeterminate under the Republic. On the outbreak of the revolution the Chinese garrison withdrew from Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama returned from the exile to which he had been driven by the forward policy of the late dynasty. The Republic, committed to claiming Tibet as part of its territory, eventually found itself engaged in border fighting with the Tibetans who were able to prevent Chinese penetration and to maintain an autonomous regime. In 1912, however, Great Britain recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet so as to forestall any possible Russian action.

Returning to Mongolia; in November, 1912; Russia had come to an arrangement with the *de facto* regime in Urga by which Russian traders could import and export goods free of duty, while immigrants might lease vacant lands for cultivation: any disputes or disagreements would be settled by consultation between the consuls and the Mongolian authorities. In the same year the former secret convention with Japan was extended to create a Russian sphere of influence west of an imaginary line running north from Peking: east of the line, that is, eastern Inner Mongolia, was to be

the Japanese sphere. Neither Power then wished to encourage aspirations for a Greater Mongolia. In 1913, following the Protocol already cited, the situation was temporarily tidied up by a Russo-Chinese-Mongol Agreement acknowledging Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, but substituting Chinese consuls for the former Amban. The Urga Government was granted the right to negotiate commercial and industrial treaties direct with foreign powers; while neither Russian nor Chinese troops might be stationed in the country with the exception of consular guards. Outer Mongolia was from now on virtually a Russian protectorate, for the shadowy Chinese suzerainty could not be enforced.

In the north-western corner of Mongolia, about the head-waters of the Yenisei, lies the mountainous forested region already described, inhabited by the Uriankhai branch of the Mongols. The people lived in an even more primitive manner than the Khalkha to the east, and since 1860 had fallen much under the influence of Russian traders and settlers. Geographical conditions made access from Siberia easier than from Eastern Mongolia, and much more so than from China. In July, 1914, so as to protect the Trans-Siberian railway from possible attack through Mongolia, Russia extended a protectorate over the Uriankhai district, now renamed Tannu Tuva, all its external relations being made subject to the Russian Chief of Frontier Affairs.

Russia further strengthened her economic hold over Outer Mongolia in 1914 by a loan of three million roubles without interest, on condition that a Russian financial adviser was accepted in Urga and Russian instructors were appointed to train the local troops. A Mongolian monopoly bank was set up, with its directorate in St. Petersburg, while the Chinese were prevented from establishing any bank in the country. About 20,000 rifles and light equipment were supplied for the army, but the Russian officers encountered much obstruction, attributed to the jealousy and prejudice of native leaders.

The Russian Foreign Ministry, however, was still careful to avoid extending its commitments unduly. Under the agreement Mongolia was unable to appoint diplomatic representatives, even to St. Petersburg. Railway development was retarded both by Russia's unwillingness to see a line linking Outer Mongolia to China, and by the view that the financial return would not justify a link with the Trans-Siberian through Kiakhta. This caution, together with Russian discouragement of the Pan-Mongol idea, caused a certain amount of resentment in Urga and in the neighbouring territories, such as Inner Mongolia and western Man-

churia, where there were considerable Mongol populations. This resentment took the form of a letter from the Living Buddha to the Emperor of Japan, perhaps prompted by some of the visiting Japanese officials and military officers who were now taking an interest in Mongolia. The letter asked for the Emperor's help and support in the struggle for Mongolian unity, and was sent through the Russian Foreign Office as being the only available channel for diplomatic intercourse. The Tokyo Minister of Foreign Affairs showed some embarrassment at being handed this communication by the Russian Ambassador, for at this time the Japanese Government did not wish to become embroiled with St. Petersburg over the Mongolian question; and it is probable that the Japanese visitors to Urga had been serving merely the interests of the army or other pressure groups, a national habit which was to have serious consequences in the Far East twenty years later. In the circumstances the Japanese Government declined to accede to the Hutukhtu's request.

In September, 1914, a further Sino-Russo-Mongol conference was assembled at Kiakhta to co-ordinate and finalize the various informal arrangements already made with respect to Mongolia. The Chinese, encouraged by Russia's preoccupation with the war in Europe, were inclined to be aggressive, mainly with a view to restoring their lost economic domination in Khalkha. The following year, however, a tripartite agreement was arrived at, which virtually continued the *status quo* but provided that Outer Mongolia should be an "autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty", a status which in practice amounted to a joint Sino-Russian protectorate. The Mongolian government was authorized to make commercial and industrial agreements with foreign powers, while Russian and Chinese subjects were to enjoy extra-territorial rights. The terms of the Russo-Mongol protocol of 1912 were also confirmed. The Russians had thus retained most of their gains, and by 1915 Chinese or other foreign influence was practically excluded from the politics and economy of Outer Mongolia. At the same time Mongolian forces took the opportunity of occupying Kobdo, the centre of Western or Kalmyk Mongolia, while the Russians stationed troops in Uriankhai, virtually cutting it off from Outer Mongolia, On the other hand, Russian attempts to reform the country's economic system were obstructed by the Lamaist Church, which was not only suspicious of extraneous influences, but saw in them a threat to its privileges and position; it was not until the coming of the Soviet regime that this opposition was forcibly overcome.

Although outside Mongolia proper, the Barga District (Hulunbuir) in the north-west corner of Manchuria was inhabited mainly by Khalkha Mongols whose enthusiasm for a Pan-Mongolian federation was likely to involve Russia and China in further disputes. In November, 1915, therefore, a Russo-Chinese agreement was negotiated which acknowledged Peking's sovereignty over Barga but specified that its administration should be supervised directly by the Central Government and not by the Manchurian province of Heilungkiang within whose borders it lay. Chinese troops, moreover, might in future enter the district only by agreement with Russia for the purpose of maintaining or restoring order, and must be withdrawn as soon as their mission had been accomplished. If foreign capital were required for the development of railways, Russia was to be given the right of first refusal.

At this point it will not be out of place to remark on the terms "sovereignty" and "suzerainty", which appear so frequently in agreements negotiated during the period. In European diplomacy the distinction has long been clarified, sovereignty denoting direct authority and suzerainty connoting the quasi-feudal idea of vassalage. Both the Chinese and Russian languages, however, are notoriously imprecise, and it is probable that the negotiators sometimes used the terms indiscriminately to imply a paramountcy devoid of substance. It certainly made little difference to Mongolia's position which word was used.

In 1916 Russia and Japan, as war-time allies, found it opportune to enter into further agreements for the protection of their mutual interests in the Far East, and a Russo-Japanese Convention declared that neither Power would join any political combination directed against the other, and that they would support one another, if necessary by military action, in case these interests were threatened by third parties. This agreement was about to be cast to the winds by the Russian revolution.

Under pressure from the Powers, but not without opposition from Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalists, China entered the war against Germany and Austria on 14th August, 1917: in return the Allies postponed for five years their shares of the Boxer indemnity payments, with the exception of Russia, the largest beneficiary, which agreed to the postponement of only one-third the amount. As a result of the Russian revolution, however, with the risk of hostile forces penetrating to the Far East, China, whose government was then dominated by the pro-Japanese Anfu clique, entered into an agreement with Japan in May, 1918, for joint

military action in Siberia. Russo-Chinese relations were thus thrown into the melting pot.

At first the Russians were too preoccupied with their own internal struggle to devote much attention to the Far East, but when the Bolsheviks had made peace with Germany in March, 1918, and consolidated their position in Western Russia, they had perforce to quell the internal opposition which was building up under Admiral Kolchak in Siberia. An extraneous but disturbing element in this situation was the Czech force, composed of released prisoners-of-war from the Austro-Hungarian Army, which fought its way across Siberia and reached Vladivostok. This port contained large quantities of supplies shipped there by the Allies for the support of Russia's war effort, and it was accordingly decided to send a joint force for its protection, and to guard against possible operations by released German and Austrian prisoners-of-war or Bolshevik troops. Accordingly, in August, 1918, detachments from the British, American, French, Italian and Japanese armies were landed in Vladivostok to oppose the further advance of the Red troops, and each took over a section of the railway system. The Japanese, owing to their geographical proximity, were able to forestall their allies in the speed and scope of their occupation, and not only attempted to dominate the Chinese Eastern Railway, but stationed their troops along the Siberian line as far west as Lake Baikal.

Admiral Kolchak, former Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, had taken command of the White forces and set up a government at Omsk which was accorded conditional recognition by the Powers; but by 1919 the Reds, advancing eastward along the Trans-Siberian railway, forced him back to Chita and themselves came face to face with the Japanese in the Baikal region. Unwilling to provoke Japan, the Bolsheviks halted, while a compromise was worked out for future government of the Far Eastern territories. In January, 1920, Kolchak gave up the struggle, was handed over to the Reds and executed; and his followers agreed with them to set up four republics east of Baikal and centred respectively on Verkhne-udinsk, Chita, the Amur and Vladivostok. The first-named was run by a combination of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks; being the nearest to Red territory, it soon fell into the hands of the former. The Chita administration, controlling the junction of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian railways, was headed by Ataman Semeonov of the Ussuri Cossacks with Japanese support, while the Amur Republic was from the first in a chronic state of chaos. In Vladivostok, the last foothold of the Allied forces, sat

Kerensky, the head of the Petrograd Provisional Government which had been ousted by Lenin.

The attitude of China at this time was anti-Bolshevik, owing to her commitments to her war-time allies, and she agreed to co-operate with the expeditionary forces sent to Eastern Siberia. Japan took advantage of the 1918 military pact with China to bring some 60,000 troops into North Manchuria, where she attempted to exercise sole control over the Chinese Eastern Railway. This gave rise to a number of incidents with the Chinese authorities who had hoped to reassert their own position on the railway; until, after American intervention, it was agreed to set up an Inter-allied Commission to exercise general supervision over the C.E.R. and that portion of the Trans-Siberian railway still in Allied hands. Under the Commission two boards were created to deal respectively with military transportation and movement control.

In the meantime the position of the White Russian armies had seriously deteriorated. Verkhne-udinsk having gone over to the Bolsheviks, a Red army was raised there which captured Chita from Semeonov's forces. In April 1920 the Far Eastern Republic was proclaimed, with its centre at Chita, as an ostensible compromise between the several revolutionary factions; but by tactics which are now familiar, the Bolsheviks were to gain sole control two years later and incorporate it into the Soviet Union. By this date the Whites had been virtually driven from Siberia, and all the Allied troops had withdrawn except the Japanese contingent, which did not leave until after the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. This conference was intended, among other things, to achieve stability for the Far East and guarantee the integrity of China, but Japan was an unsatisfied signatory and Soviet Russia did not take part. It could not, therefore, be effective in the long run.

With the end of the Allied intervention the railway commission was dissolved and the administration of the C.E.R. legally passed to the Chinese. In October 1920 an agreement was signed by them with the Russo-Asiatic (formerly Russo-Chinese) Bank whereby the administration, policing and defence of the line were to be the responsibility of the local Chinese authorities, while employment was to be "equitably divided" between Russian and native citizens. After the outbreak of the revolution most of the privately owned Russian steamship companies on the Sungari had wound up their affairs, and navigation on that river and along the lower Amur to Khabarovsk and Nikolayevsk came into the hands of the Manchurian authorities. The rights of the Chinese Eastern Railway to operate shipping were also cancelled.

The tug-o'-war between Russians and Chinese for control of the C.E.R. was now resumed in a different form. As China did not recognize the Soviet Government, she continued to deal with the Tsarist Minister in Peking and the consuls in various parts of the country; and recognized General Horvath, who had been appointed before the revolution, as Russian manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Immediately after the start of the revolution, Horvath's position had been undermined by subversive elements among the many thousand Russians employed on the railway, who formed a Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates on the Petrograd model and in December, 1917, attempted to take over the management by force. This was prevented by the Manchurian authorities with the support of the foreign Consular body at Harbin, and 4,000 Bolshevik railway guards were disarmed. Horvath, however, was not content with merely continuing as Manager of the line, but considered it his duty, as representative of the Imperial Russian Government, to use the railway zone as a base of operations against the Bolsheviks. This led to his removal in March, 1920, by the Manchurian authorities and his retirement to Peking, after which China found herself in complete control of the railway for the first time since its construction.

In the meanwhile the Soviet regime in Moscow had lost no time in endeavouring to retrieve Russia's shaken position in the Far East. In 1919 Karakhan, acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued a Declaration repudiating all former treaties and agreements made by the Imperial Government at China's expense, and all privileges which had been obtained by Russia in China, Manchuria and Mongolia. This applied to the Chinese Eastern Railway concession and the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916 but, as appeared later, not to the territorial acquisitions from the Chinese Empire which had been gained during the past eighty years.

The Bolsheviks were thus making a virtue of necessity, for they were not in a position, owing to their commitments in the west, to insist on their rights or to hold the Chinese to any agreement. On the other hand they hoped, by appealing over the heads of their government, to gain their goodwill at the expense of the other Powers, such as Britain and America, which still enjoyed special rights. Moreover, this move might be expected to undermine the position of the Tsarist officials who continued to function in China, and particularly their hold on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

At first the Chinese public, especially the *literati* and students, were favourably impressed; but the Government, uncertain how long the Soviet regime would last, preferred to ignore the Declara-

tion and gradually to take Russian interests under its own control so as not to alarm the Treaty Powers.

Disappointed in their hope of inspiring a general revolutionary upheaval throughout Europe, the Bolsheviks increasingly turned their attention to China, doubtless following up Lenin's observation that the way to London and Paris led through Peking and Delhi.

In 1920 the first official contacts were made between China and the new regime in Russia, when Lenin's stalking-horse, Yurin, was received in Peking as the representative of the Far Eastern Republic. It was decided that the time had come to withdraw recognition from the Imperial regime, and its consulates and Concessions (at Tientsin and Hankow) were finally closed down by the Chinese authorities in the following year. The Peking Government also took occasion to abrogate the burdensome Overland Trade Agreement whereby Russian commerce across the western frontiers had been free of duty: henceforth the same dues were to be levied as those charged by the Maritime Customs on the merchandise of overseas countries. Yurin accomplished little beyond cultivating certain politicians and educationalists, and returned to Siberia the following year.

Yurin's visit was returned in September of the same year by a mission to Soviet Russia headed by General Chang Shih-liu. On arrival in Moscow the General was handed a second Declaration which was noticeably less favourable than that of 1919 in two important respects. Instead of offering to return the Chinese Eastern Railway without compensation, as implied in 1919, it was proposed that the two Powers should negotiate a treaty to regulate its future operation. Secondly, remission of the Boxer indemnity should be conditional on China's undertaking to make no payments to authorities or representatives of the Tsarist regime. The reasons for this changed attitude are not far to seek: the Soviet Government now felt itself firmly in the saddle, while the power of the White Guards and officials in Manchuria had been broken with the end of the Allied intervention.

After the Chinese revolution the hold of Peking over Sinkiang, always tenuous, had been greatly weakened, the Muslims taking advantage of the Central Government's difficulties and various local chiefs setting up autonomous governments. The Soviet regime availed itself of this state of affairs to enter into a trade agreement with the authorities in control of Sinkiang. It also concluded an agreement with the provincial government at Urumchi for the repatriation of White Russians under an amnesty, with the

object of removing a potential source of opposition in that province.

Across the frontier, in Russian Turkestan, conditions had been unsettled since 1916, when the Kirghiz had resisted conscription for the Imperial Army. On the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, revolts were organized against the vassal Khans of Khiva and Bukhara who were replaced by "People's Republics" under Communist Party control. The Governorate-General of Turkestan was also overthrown and for a time a confused situation obtained, the nationalism of the Muslim populations running counter to the centralized policy of the Russian Bolsheviks.

Nowhere is the opportunism of Soviet tactics better illustrated than in Central Asia, where the natives now aspired to independence or a wide measure of self-government. Lenin had in theory admitted the right of national minorities to secede, but the importance of Central Asian cotton to Russia's textile industries, first appreciated by Peter the Great, made it imperative to secure these territories and to develop large-scale centralized irrigation schemes. Demands for an autonomous Turkestan were turned down by the Bolsheviks and all nationalist movements ruthlessly suppressed by the Red Army. Enver Pasha, the Pan-Turanian enthusiast and former leader of the Young Turks, had been ousted from Turkey by Mustafa Kemal and took command of the Basmachi revolt. This was an Islamic "holy war" initiated by the Turkmen in Afghanistan, and in 1921 the Basmachi force crossed the Oxus and drove the Reds from Russian Turkestan. Their triumph was short-lived, however; Frunze's expedition recaptured the province and Enver was killed.

With the elimination of Kolchak's White Armies from Siberia, the absorption of the Far Eastern Republic into the Soviet Union, and the subjection of Central Asia, the Russian civil wars had by 1921 practically come to an end, and the Soviet era began.

Outer Mongolia, however, was to become a centre of strife in which the Bolsheviks, the Whites and the Chinese were all involved. Ataman Semeonov, after his expulsion from Chita by the Red Army, concentrated his so-called Asiatic Corps, consisting mainly of Buriats, on the Mongolian border; and in March, 1919, convened at Verkhne-udinsk a conference of representatives from Outer and Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and even Tibet, together with the local Buriats. These last had long resented the Russian colonization of Trans-Baikalia and the requisitioning of their land for the Siberian railway, and in 1917 had demanded national autonomy; many were therefore attracted by the pan-Mongol idea.

Semeonov, who enjoyed Japanese support and claimed to be of Tartar descent, assumed the leadership of a Greater Mongolian government which it was proposed to establish at Hailar, capital of Barga, on the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was also planned to send a force into Outer Mongolia to suppress the pro-Chinese faction and anyone else who opposed this project. The scheme proved, however, unwelcome to the Hutukhtu in Urga and to many leading Mongols, who saw in it the possible exchange of their loose vassalage to China for direct control by Japanese or Russians. It was dropped altogether when Semeonov was driven from Siberia in 1920 by the Red forces and took refuge in Manchuria.

The Peking Government, still under the control of the pro-Japanese Anfu Party, decided the time was ripe to take advantage of Karakhan's recent Declaration and to assert itself once more in Outer Mongolia. In the summer of 1919, therefore, troops were sent into the country under Hsü Shu-Tseng, Commander of the North-west Frontier Defence Force. "Little Hsü", to give him the name under which he became notorious, was commissioned in conjunction with the Amban or Chinese Resident to exploit the resources of Outer Mongolia in the interests of China, but proceeded to do so in his own. Ignoring the Amban, Chen Yi, who had gained the confidence of the Living Buddha, he also hoped to gain for himself the credit for bringing Mongolia into the Chinese fold. In addition, with Japanese assistance, Hsü negotiated a loan on the security of the animal and mineral resources, and acted with such ruthlessness and brutality towards the natives that anti-Chinese feeling rapidly grew.

The climax came when Hsü assembled his troops before the palace of the Hutukhtu, giving the old man forty-eight hours in which to accept his terms for direct subordination of Mongolian administration to Chinese control, which involved surrendering its existing autonomy and abrogating its former agreements with Russia. After a hasty discussion the Mongol princes agreed to accept the ulimatum, although the Living Buddha declined to affix his signature, and the native troops surrendered their arms as demanded. All key posts were taken over by Chinese officials, and Hsü styled himself Pacification Commissioner. The Soviet Government, ironically taking a similar stand to Semeonov's, made an ineffectual protest. Hsü's triumph, however, was short-lived, for in the summer of 1920 the Anfu Government was ousted by General Wu Pei-fu, and Hsü's office was eventually taken over by his rival Chen Yi, who was put in charge of all Chinese interests in Outer Mongolia. By this time, however, Chinese harshness and

lack of understanding had so alienated Mongol opinion that only a spark was needed to set off an explosion. That spark was struck by Baron Ungern-Sternberg.

The Mad Baron, as he came to be called, was an officer of the Russian Imperial Army and had served in Semeonov's Asiatic Corps. After the latter's defeat and flight into Manchuria, Ungern escaped with 3,000 Buriats and other heterogeneous troops into Outer Mongolia where they lived for some time as bandits, robbing the Chinese merchant caravans. In 1921, proclaiming himself a Buddhist, the Mad Baron made common cause with certain of the princes against the Chinese, raised the standard of Pan-Mongolism, and with 5,000 Mongols and Tibetans drove the Chinese from Urga and began a ruthless extermination of anyone not of his confused way of thinking. The movement had the approval of Chang Tso Lin, the warlord of Manchuria, who felt his independent position strengthened by it, and of the Japanese, who visualized a string of friendly buffer states between their sphere of influence and Soviet Russia.

Opposition on the part of the Reds now materialized in the form of a Mongolian Revolutionary Party. In 1920 some Mongol Communists had been in personal touch with Lenin and Stalin, and with their help and that of Buriat Communists the Bolsheviks succeeded in organizing, near the Siberian border, a few hundred Mongolian partisans who proclaimed a revolutionary regime. These Ungern attacked from Urga in the summer of 1921 with a force of 11,000 cavalry, and actually crossed the frontier into Siberia. By this time, however, the Bolsheviks had gained the upper hand and had decided that Pan-Mongolism must be suppressed, for it not only threatened traditional Russian interests in Outer Mongolia but, as already explained, was attracting the notice of their own Buriat population. They therefore called upon Peking to help in suppressing the Whites and, being met by a refusal, invaded the country ostensibly at the request of the "Mongolian Revolutionary Government". Ungern, whose excesses had by now alienated his followers, found himself deserted and was captured. In September, 1921, he was executed by the Bolsheviks at Novo-Nikolayevsk and Outer Mongolia once more lay open to the north.

A growing number of Mongols, opposed both to the Chinese and the Whites, now rallied to the Mongolian National Revolutionary Party; this had already set up a provisional government on Russian territory at Kiakhta, headed by Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan, the latter destined to become the ruler of the "Mongolian People's

Republic". Although sponsored by the Bolsheviks as the most promising horse to back, the party contained many factions and at that time looked for inspiration to Genghiz Khan rather than to Lenin. At its first congress in 1921, it called for a Pan-Mongol state: this did not suit the Russians, who were not only opposed to it in principle but had also to consider their relations with both China and Japan, and their efforts were thereafter directed to purging the party of strongly nationalist elements.

The combined forces of the Red Army and the Mongol revolutionary partisans occupied Urga in July, 1921, and soon cleared the country of both Chinese and White Russians, the Soviet troops taking up positions at key points which they retained until a Soviet-type "republic" was safely established in 1925. No time was lost in setting up a National Revolutionary Government at Urga, headed by pro-Russian princes and lamas with the failing Hutukhtu as titular monarch, few other classes of the population being sufficiently interested to take any active part. Mutual recognition of the Soviet and Mongol revolutionary regimes immediately followed, together with the signing in November of an agreement establishing close and friendly relations. The accompanying declaration that China's suzerainty would be respected seemed a mockery in the circumstances, since there was no Chinese representation in Outer Mongolia and no intention of permitting it.

In the Uriankhai district there were analogous developments. Soviet forces drove out the Chinese troops which had entered the country in 1919; and with a minimum of delay Moscow gave recognition in 1921 to the newly-born "Tuvinian People's Republic", named after the mountain range in whose shadow it lies and which guards the approach to the Kuznetsk industrial region.

In making a general appreciation of the similarities in the effects of the Chinese and Russian revolutions, one can detect a developing community of interests directed against the West; a wide section of Chinese opinion hoping to make use of Soviet support in asserting itself against the political and economic supremacy of the Maritime Powers, and the Russian Communists utilizing China to mask their eastern flank and to attack Western interests in the Orient. Thus, throughout the Chinese revolutionary period, Russia supported both nationalist and Communist movements wherever they arose, a course that was tortuous but often successful. On the other hand Chinese weakness encouraged the Soviet Government, on the defensive in Europe, to pursue Russia's traditional forward policy in China's border territories, an exercise which was bound sooner or later to involve her once more with Japan.

CHAPTER VII

The First Communist Attempt

THE Russian Communists, seeking to exploit the Chinese revolution, were able to contemplate with satisfaction the incipient split between North and South which has been a recurring phenomenon throughout the history of the Middle Kingdom.

The government in Peking, even after the fall of the Manchus, was composed of stolid and conservative northerners, while in 1916 the President, Yuan Shih-Kai, was already considering the assumption of the imperial title. The more radical and voluble politicians in the South, jealous and mistrustful of the northern cliques, found a leader in Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a Cantonese revolutionary who had lived and studied abroad, and had prudently remained there until the 1911 revolution had taken place. Sun founded the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party whose professed principles embraced democray and what is now known as the Welfare State: the party's programme also included the liberation of China from any form of foreign domination.

It was inevitable that the Soviet Declaration of 1919 repudiating the "Unequal Treaties" should arouse considerable enthusiasm in the more naïve members of the Kuomintang, which was at that time in opposition, and when Yurin arrived in China in 1920 as representative of the Far Eastern Republic he found ready listeners among them. He at once set about cultivating university teachers and students as being the most receptive material, but made little impression on the Peking Government. His departure was hastened by ill-health and he returned to Russia in 1921, having achieved nothing official but doubtless satisfied with the opportunities he had had for propaganda among the intellectuals.

Marxist ideas had already been introduced into China at the end of the World War by well-known scholars such as Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, both professors at the National University of Peking, who had contacts with Moscow. Mao Tse-tung first met them in 1919 as a clerk in the university library and was much influenced by their opinions, although his views were necessarily limited to the Chinese scene. In 1920 Li founded a Society for the study of Marxism in Peking and Chen a similar association in

Shanghai; and under instructions from Lenin's emissary Voitinski Communist cells were organized at Peking by Chen Tu-hsiu, at Changsha by Mao, at Hankow by Tung Pi-wu, at Canton by Chen Kung-po, and at Tsinan by Teng En-ming. The following year the Chinese Communist Party was formed and held its first congress in the French Concession at Shanghai. This was attended by thirteen delegates, some of whom had been trained abroad and others, like Mao, had never left their native soil. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai were from the first members of the Central Committee of the party: Chu Teh, another founder-member, who had been a cadet at the Yunnan Military Academy, was at this time travelling in France, Germany and Russia, making contact with political thought of varying revolutionary hues.

China, with her tradition of arbitrary government, her poverty, ignorance and discontented student body, was, like Russia, a fertile soil for the Communist seed, but the Chinese party owed its successful development to Soviet experience and guidance, particularly in organization. In 1922 the Soviet Union sent to China an official representative of much greater calibre than Yurin. Joffe, a former professor of international law, arrived in Peking to discuss the future relations between the Chinese Government and Moscow. He was an astute negotiator but his lack of understanding of Chinese mentality caused him to make serious blunders. Joffe developed Soviet policy along two lines: he put out anti-imperialist propaganda which pleased the politically-minded intelligentsia, but at the same time warned the Peking Government that the Moscow Declaration of 1919 was a fundamental programme only, and did not contain detailed conditions. He pointed out that Karakhan's statement did not mean the automatic surrender of Russia's legal rights until the problems involved had been settled by freely negotiated agreements. The chilliest part of this cold douche was directed at the Chinese Eastern Railway: even if China resumed control of the line, Joffe explained, this would not annul Russia's interest in it as part of the "great Siberian railway" system uniting one part of the Soviet Union with another. As regards the vexed Outer Mongolian question, little progress was made, since that country was still in a state of revolutionary disorder following Ungern-Sternberg's adventure. A large part of the Chinese literate public, which might otherwise have been favourably disposed towards Soviet Russia, began to suffer from disillusionment.

Joffe's mission was to cultivate Japan as well as China and he went on to Tokyo, having several unofficial meetings with Baron Goto, a politician in favour of recognizing Soviet Russia; but

Japanese public opinion was hostile and he returned to Russia without having accomplished anything there.

In the meantime the open rupture between the Peking Government and the Kuomintang had led to Sun Yat-sen's setting up his own government in Canton. Here he began to seek recognition as well as economic and military assistance from those countries, including Great Britain, which had interests in China. Most of the Powers were naturally reluctant to encourage separatist movements, but in 1921 Sun was visited by a Soviet emissary. In 1923, disappointed in his hopes from the Western nations and troubled by the indiscipline of his party, he decided to turn to Moscow for help. Joffe was accordingly directed to Shanghai to meet Sun Yat-sen, and on 26th January they issued a joint statement of policy. Although it was ostensibly agreed that conditions in China did not favour Communism on the Soviet model, it was declared that the revolutionary parties in both countries had much in common and could work together. The Bolsheviks, for their part, appreciated that they were likely to make more progress with the southerners than in Peking, and immediately agreed to send a political and military mission to Canton.

In October 1923 Mikhail Borodin arrived as Chief Political Adviser, with Kisenko and Galen (also known as Bluecher) as military experts. Borodin had previously been attached to Mustafa Kemal during the revolution in Turkey, but had later been expelled when Atatürk came to realize that Soviet help did not stop at altruism. Of Galen, with his German alias, little is known save that ten years later he was to command the Soviet forces in the Far East. A military academy was established at Whampoa with Chiang Kai-shek as the first commandant. Chiang had paid a visit to Moscow before taking up his appointment, and according to a captured Communist dossier made a favourable impression as a revolutionary commander "although he shows a tendency towards personal ambition which needs watching".

With the help of Borodin's mission the Kuomintang was reorganized to facilitate co-operation with the Communists, many of whom had already filtered into the Nationalist ranks. The hierarchy was built up on almost identical lines, with a Central Executive Committee, party cadres guiding the administration at each level, political commissars in the army, and so forth. At this time the Chinese Communist Party numbered only about 300, mostly intellectuals, with no support from the masses.

In 1924 the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang included Li Ta-chao, Mao Tse-tung and other Communists, but

Li insisted that there should be no fusion, thus leaving his party free to follow an independent line, if expedient. This atmosphere, coupled with the Communists' skill in manœuvring themselves into the key positions, inevitably led to friction between the two wings of Sun's movement which was to reach serious proportions. In October, 1924, a change of government in Peking encouraged Sun to visit the northern capital with a view to negotiations, but he was taken mortally ill and died there in March, 1925.

The political climate of China was now ripe for another revolution. Among the literate classes, in the north as well as the south, disappointment with China's treatment at Versailles, coupled with Moscow's promises of support for a nationalist and anti-imperialist movement, gave rise to widespread pro-Soviet sentiment: the Bolsheviks' resistance to foreign intervention also struck a chord of sympathy in Chinese hearts. The Kuomintang's external programme was the familiar one of anti-foreignism, directed on this occasion against "the imperialist powers". Internal policy included the limitation of private capital, the redistribution of land, and the nationalization of large enterprises, all watered-down versions of the Communist programme.

While the Nationalist revolution was preparing in the south, Moscow was simultaneously negotiating with the legal government of China through official channels. In September, 1923, Karakhan, who had acquired experience of Far Eastern questions as Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Peking as Soviet representative, and was at first generally welcomed because as acting Foreign Commissar he had issued the Moscow Declaration of 1919. He had broken his journey at Mukden and had a preliminary meeting with the Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, on the subject of the Chinese Eastern Railway, well knowing that no settlement could be implemented without Chang's agreement. On arrival in the capital he produced less favourable versions of the Declarations, which omitted to mention the return of the C.E.R. to China without compensation, and insisted upon the establishment of diplomatic relations before discussions upon this subject could begin. As there was much public pressure for relations with Russia, and as the United Kingdom and Italy had already recognized the U.S.S.R., official opinion followed suit, and after informal discussions between Karakhan and Wang Cheng-ting, representing the Foreign Ministry, an Outline Agreement was initialled early in 1924.

The main points of this agreement were the resumption of diplo-

matic and consular relations, the renunciation of extra-territoriality and of the Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity; the C.E.R. was also to be restored to China without compensation after sixty years, instead of the eighty years previously specified. The Chinese Government, however, failed to support its representative and would not approve the agreement without modifications, particularly a clarification of Russia's attitude to Mongolia. At this Karakhan adopted a threatening attitude and gave it three days in which to sign, otherwise "the Chinese would be responsible for all incidents arising out of the breaking-off of negotiations." The technique differed little from the manœuvres at Nerchinsk and Kiakhta in previous centuries, and discussions were for a while suspended. C. T. Wang sent out circular telegrams justifying his line of action to the Chinese public, and educational bodies supported him against the government's attitude.

At length the Peking Government, influenced by reports that the Russians were also negotiating in Tokyo, Mukden and Canton, agreed to a compromise and in May, 1924, an Agreement on General Principles was formally signed on behalf of both parties. Under the terms of this instrument, which differed little from the original draft, the Soviet Union surrendered Russia's extra-territorial rights and her share of the Boxer Indemnity (which was to be used for education). It also acknowledged that the Chinese Eastern Railway was an exclusively Sino-Soviet enterprise under joint administration, and would revert to China without compensation after sixty years. It was also agreed that Outer Mongolia was an autonomous state under Chinese sovereignty, and Russia undertook to evacuate her troops as soon as arrangements could be made.

Owing to the growing Nationalist movement in the south and the insubordination of provincial warlords in the north, Peking's authority had by now shrunk almost to the dimensions of a local administration; so Karakhan took care to negotiate a similar pact at Mukden with Chang Tso-lin, who was at this time the real arbiter of affairs in Manchuria and North China. This was inevitably but reluctantly rubber-stamped by Peking, as it gave Chang a lucrative say in questions concerning the C.E.R. which should properly belong to the central authority. It was significant that Sun Yat-sen's rival government in Canton, already pro-Soviet and glad to see its northern rivals weakened, raised no objections.

The 1924 Agreement also provided for an eventual conference to settle outstanding problems in detail, but Karakhan deliberately procrastinated over this for three reasons: the Peking ad-

ministration was now so weak that little value could be attached to negotiations with it; Moscow was already busy on a pact with Japan; and in any case it suited the Soviet Government not to fetter its freedom of action by binding itself to any written conditions. A topsy-turvy situation was in fact developing. The Soviet Embassy in Peking was a focus of underground activity, while Russian diplomatic efforts were being directed more and more to the Nationalist–Communist centre in Canton. Li Ta-chao and other northern Communists, in order to avoid the attentions of the police, were using the Soviet Embassy as a safe, if somewhat irregular, hiding-place.

Following upon the Agreement the administration of the C.E.R. was in 1925 reorganized with a board of ten directors, half of whom were to be Chinese and half Soviet citizens, with a Chinese President and Russian Manager. Chinese face was preserved by making their President chairman of the board, although real power resided in the office of Manager.

The Chinese also succeeded in having the profits of the railway deposited in both Soviet and Chinese banks; for hitherto all the monies had been held on Russian deposits.

From the first there was constant friction. By 1926 the Manager, Ivanov, had secured virtual control and began to make difficulties about the carriage of Chinese troops, always an uneconomical operation at that time. Things rapidly came to a head when Chang Tso-lin wished to move forces along the line to deal with a revolt led by General Kuo Sung-lin, and Ivanov was arrested for obstruction. Marshal Chang won his point after discussion with the Soviet Consul-General, Ivanov being removed and the troops conveyed.

Mukden had now become the centre of gravity for open Sino-Soviet discussions, for the reason that the gravest points in dispute between the two governments were those concerning Manchuria. Karakhan was disliked by Chang Tso-lin and in September, 1926, was replaced by Chernik, but the negotiations soon came to a halt because Moscow had decided to exploit success in Canton rather than reinforce failure in the north.

In the same year the delicate question of Russo-Japanese relations in Manchuria was temporarily settled. Moscow and Tokyo established diplomatic relations, agreeing that the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty remained in force and thereby confirming their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria, the Declaration of 1919 notwithstanding.

Although the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924 acknowledged

Outer Mongolia's autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, no representatives of outside governments, even of China, were to be allowed into the country. Both parties were of course aware that the Chinese Government was not in a position to assert its sovereignty, and the Mongols considered themselves virtually independent. Until 1921 Outer Mongolia had been ruled in the traditional way by hereditary princes set over tribes and leagues of tribes. The Khan, or temporal sovereign, had disappeared during the Manchu dynasty, but the Hutukhtu (Living Buddha) of Urga was regarded as the supreme authority. Nearly half the male population were lamas, and the monasteries owned a high proportion of the livestock and a great number of serfs. It was therefore natural that in its early days the National Revolutionary Party consisted mainly of the princes and lamas, since the masses were illiterate and ignorant. Thus the upper classes, while taking advantage of the revolution, resisted the kind of reforms prompted by the Soviet-trained minority who were bent on achieving control of the party.

In 1922, however, following the defeat of Ungern-Sternberg, a purge began of the more conservative members, and Buriats from the Soviet Union, by virtue of their superior training, began to take over the chief administrative posts. An even more successful technique was the organization of the Mongol Youth Corps, again with the help of extraneous elements, which took orders direct from the Communist headquarters in Moscow and thus acted both as a check on the National Revolutionary Party and as an instrument of Soviet policy.

In May, 1924, the Living Buddha paradoxically died, and the last obstacle to a Soviet-type "People's Republic" was removed. A programme of "sovietization" on the Russian model was begun, the prince and higher lamas being deprived of political power; but as the economy was not based on individual land ownership but on livestock, an attempt was made to organize these in collective ranches. Many new Soviet trade agencies also opened up in Urga. A further purge of the Revolutionary Party was carried out in order to remove any opponents of these policies, and many fled to Inner Mongolia and to the Mongol areas of Sinkiang. The administration was so organized that each post was nominally headed by a Mongolian, with a Buriat or Soviet Russian adviser beside him, the Mongolians' lack of training and experience naturally resulting in the real power being wielded by the advisers and technical experts. The puppet government then requested that the Soviet troops should not be withdrawn so long as the

regime was in danger, thus putting the defence of the country into Russian hands.

For the same reason the teachers in the schools, which were set up to usurp the educational role of the monasteries, were almost entirely Soviet Russians or Buriats. At the beginning Russia's own need of manufactures and of technical man power led to foreigners of other nationalities, particularly Germans, also being employed as specialists and as providers of vehicles and machinery. But the Soviet Government, realizing the importance of excluding influences other than its own, made great efforts to remedy this situation, and during the next five years both Chinese business men and foreign experts were alike kept out.

On the economic side, a Mongolian State Bank was set up with Soviet help, and the *tughrik*, a currency linked to the rouble, was issued. The Soviet pattern of economic organization could not, however, be exactly followed, since there was virtually neither industry nor agriculture, and the complete collectivization of livestock (the local form of wealth) was found to be impracticable owing to the lack of trained staff. In 1925 the Mongol Government signed a contract with the Soviet Union for the construction of a railway from Kiakhta through Urga to Pangchiang on the Chinese border, but events were to prevent the realization of this project for another thirty years.

In 1923 ambassadors were exchanged between the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian "republic", even before diplomatic relations had been established between Moscow and Peking. This action alienated a large section of Chinese opinion, especially in the north, which regarded the presence of Russian forces as an infringement of sovereignty. In 1925 Moscow declared that its troops had been entirely withdrawn, but by this time Outer Mongolia had become the Soviet Union's first puppet state, and its military advisers remained in the country to assist in the modernization and training of the army on Soviet lines.

Within the "Mongolian People's Republic" there naturally remained strong tendencies to reaction, particularly by the princes and lamas whose wealth and position were being undermined. Tenacious Chinese traders also worked hard to regain their influence. The task of the new regime was made easier, however, by the fact that it was unrecognized by any government save that of the U.S.S.R.: moreover visas to enter the country could be obtained only in Moscow or Urga, now renamed Ulan Bator Khoto (City of the Red Hero). The Soviet Government, for its part, found itself under the necessity of continuing the Tsarist policy of

checking any tendencies to Pan-Mongolism which might also affect its position in Tuva, north-west Manchuria or the Buriat part of Siberia.

The Uriankhai region, later known as Tannu Tuva, had been finally separated from Outer Mongolia in 1922, when it was occupied by additional Soviet troops in order to forestall White Guard adventurers of the Ungern-Sternberg type. On the establishment of the "Mongolian People's Republic" the Uriankhai tribes hoped to join it, but were dissuaded from this course by the steadying influence of Soviet forces. Moreover, several generations of Russian colonization and settled farming had imposed upon Tuva a character distinct from that of the rest of Mongolia; and the Tannu Ola range had become of increased importance to Russia in the defence of the developing Kuznetsk coalfield, near the frontier of Siberia. From then till 1949 the "Tuvinian People's Republic" was virtually a Soviet protectorate and on its way to becoming a member of the U.S.S.R.

In 1923 the Buriats, who had been so useful to the Russians in penetrating Outer Mongolia, were given a sop by being included in a Buriat Soviet Republic, but gradual colonization by Great Russians has since reduced them to a minority in their own homeland. Centuries of Russian rule have also made them less subject to lamaist influences than the Mongolians proper, and they have become ready instruments of Muscovite policy.

In Inner Mongolia, the firmer hold of the Chinese authorities and armed forces prevented any serious attempt at a Pan-Mongol movement, and the only major disturbances were those due to the operations of rebellious Chinese generals upon that territory. From 1920 onwards the troops of Feng Yü-hsiang, the so-called Christian General, were fighting Chang Tso-lin for the dominion of North China, and contrived to obtain military supplies from the Soviet Union, which was of course interested in weakening Chang's hold over Manchuria.

The province of Sinkiang covers an immense area, about one-third of that of China proper; but the population, variously estimated at between four and six million, is three-quarters Muslim. Not more than 200,000 are pure Chinese, the majority of the inhabitants being of nomad stock (Uighur, Uzbek, Kalmyk, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Mongol and Manchu) with smaller numbers of Iranians (Tadjik), Russians, and Tungans or Chinese Muslims. These last, inhabiting eastern Sinkiang and the province of Kansu, are the legacy of early Chinese expeditions and the most difficult element to control. The Chinese, Manchus and Mongols are largely

Buddhist but the remainder, except the Russians, follow Islam. North of the Tien Shan range near the Russian border the country is relatively fertile and forested, but most of Sinkiang, and particularly the southern portion, is arid and uncultivated. As the peoples on both sides of the Soviet frontier are closely akin, and the distance to the nearest Chinese railhead over 1,500 miles, Sinkiang, like Outer Mongolia, has inevitably been drawn to Russia economically and politically. The mineral resources, believed to comprise gold, copper, lead, iron, coal and oil, attract Russian interest, as does the known production of wool, hides and foodstuffs.

After the defeat of the White armies in the Russian civil war about 100,000 refugees, including a large number of troops, crossed the frontier into Sinkiang, partly to escape pursuit and partly to organize a base for further operations against the Bolsheviks. The Chinese governor, Yang Tseng-hsin, determined to avoid a repetition of the events in Outer Mongolia, when Soviet troops intervened and the Chinese found themselves excluded, maintained a neutral attitude and caused the White Russian troops to be interned in order to afford the Reds no pretext for intervention.

The Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924 had provided for an exchange of consuls in Sinkiang and Soviet Central Asia, where several thousand Chinese were still living: Soviet Consulates were accordingly opened in Urumchi and four other towns, while Chinese consuls were received in Tashkent and four smaller cities of Turkestan. This arrangement opened the doors to increased Soviet infiltration: the much shorter and better communications with Russia as compared with China, and the slender hold of the Peking Government, soon led to Soviet economic and political domination of the whole province except for Kashgar and the districts nearest the Indian frontier, which were still a British sphere of influence. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, the inability of the Central Government to deal with Sinkiang's chronic disturbances was to have its natural consequence in the direct intervention of Soviet forces.

In Russian Central Asia the Bolsheviks, as already stated, had quelled the Basmachi revolt, although guerrilla resistance continued till 1923 and some rebel groups were reported on the Afghan border as late as 1932. At first suitably indoctrinated natives were brought into the administration, while the former ruling class, or *begs*, were deprived of political power and dispossessed of their property. In accordance with the anti-religious

and anti-clerical policy of the Communists, the authority of the mullahs and the wealth of the religious foundations (*Waqf*) were also undermined.

By 1924, however, Moscow realized that further measures were called for to destroy the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic sentiments which were still rife, and during the following year the ancient territorial divisions were replaced by artificially created national regions based on ethnic distribution. The former Emirate of Bukhara, for instance, which had been a protectorate in Russian Turkestan, was divided into Tadjik (Iranian) and Uzbek (Turkic) portions which were later incorporated in larger national units. In addition the Turkmen, Kirghiz, Uzbek and Tadjik "republics" came into being, although a higher co-ordinating authority had to be evolved to manage the railway and irrigation systems which cut across the new boundaries. This reshuffling of an old jigsaw had for the Soviet Government the advantage of exhibiting to the Turkmen and Tadjiks across the Persian, Afghan and Chinese frontiers ready-made national states ostensibly under the control of their kinsmen.

Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925 resulted in the Communists gaining virtual control of the Nationalist movement. The value of his name to the Soviet cause, that of sovietizing China as an instrument against the Powers, was indicated by the establishment of a Sun Yat-sen University for Chinese students in Moscow. In preparation for the coming civil war the "National Government" in Canton put Chiang Kai-shek, the Commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, in command of the Southern army, and Borodin set up agencies in Hankow and other cities, where subversive activity was undertaken to soften up Central China in the rear of the Central Government troops. In July, 1926, the Northern Expedition set out from Canton and, without serious fighting, carried all before it. As in earlier and later civil wars, the people somehow knew that the party in power had "forfeited the mandate of Heaven", and were prepared to give the new regime a chance. Thus the rebel advance was assisted by strikes and civil commotion engineered by agitators behind the lines of the Northern Government, and by wholesale defections of Northern troops. By the end of July the provinces of Hunan, Hupei and Kiangsi had fallen into the hands of the Kuomintang–Communist coalition. Hankow was captured, the British concession looted, and in December the seat of the so-called Nationalist Government was moved there from Canton.

Soviet Russia now judged it timely to come out on the winning

side, as she was to declare in favour of the Chinese Communists twenty-three years later. Her propaganda machine was put to work on their behalf, and at an international Buddhist congress, for example, Buriat lamas appealed to Mongolian, Tibetan and Indian Buddhists to back the Chinese Nationalist movement. Her break with the Peking Government became absolute in 1927, only three years after mutual recognition. During March of that year some White Russian troops serving under the Northern General, Chang Tsung-chang, intercepted at Pukow a Soviet steamer carrying consignments of Communist literature, Borodin's wife and other Red agents, who were detained. At the same time the Peking authorities ordered universities and schools to be searched for subversive persons and material, and a number of leading Chinese Communists took refuge in the Soviet Embassy. With the agreement of the Diplomatic Corps the police formally entered the Chancery of the Embassy and arrested Li Ta-chao (who was later executed) and sixty others. Seeing smoke coming from the chimney of the Military Attaché's office, which was, however, in a separate building not covered by their warrant, they summoned the fire brigade to put out the fire, entered the office and rescued a number of documents which were being consigned to the flames. These were of the most varied description, including a complete set of *Punch* and other papers from the British Embassy's waste-paper baskets, but did establish the connections between the Soviet Embassy, the Chinese Communists and many of the Nationalist leaders. The personnel of the Soviet Embassy, naturally enough, soon left China, but the consuls in semi-independent Manchuria and in South China remained at their posts and so maintained indirect contact in these important areas until the open dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929.

At this point began the inevitable split in the Nationalist movement. The control of the expedition was, through the influence of Borodin and Galen, becoming more and more subordinated to Soviet direction, and this roused feelings of jealousy and apprehension in the minds of many Kuomintang members, to whom nationalism and xenophobia were synonymous. Chiang Kai-shek and his closer followers also appreciated that the extremists in the Nationalist movement, through their excesses, would destroy their own cause by creating an opposition too formidable to overcome. Not only would the remaining Northern leaders be encouraged to resist with greater desperation, but much-needed financial support would be withheld by the powerful merchant class and financial houses. Moreover the Powers, alarmed by the trend of

events, had despatched considerable forces to Shanghai and other centres of foreign interest.

In April, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek instituted a purge of the Nationalist Party in Nanking and other centres, although Hankow and its satellite towns, Hanyang and Wuchang, were dominated by Borodin and the Communists until June. Chiang improved his international standing by exchanging his first wife for Soong Mei-ling, a member of a rich banking family with wide connections abroad. Her brother, Sung Tzu-Wen (T. V. Soong) became Governor of the Bank of China, and one of her sisters was married to H. H. Kung, who was to be Chiang's Minister of Finance. Her other sister, glamorous as Sun Yat-sen's widow, unfortunately leaned towards the Communists and has remained a family embarrassment to the present day.

By July, supported by the Shanghai bankers and merchants and with the acquiescence of the Powers, Chiang's anti-Communist faction had gained the upper hand, and all Soviet advisers were dismissed; Galen returning to Moscow via Shanghai, Japan and Siberia, and the remainder through Honan, Shensi and Mongolia. In December the Nationalist Government, now established at Nanking, broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It was characteristic of Russian policy at this time, however, that Moscow, anxious for her interests in Manchuria, continued as already explained to maintain relations with Chang Tso-lin in the north.

In December the Communist element in Canton, using the Soviet consulate as headquarters, had staged a rising which was put down by the troops of the local commander Chang Fat-kwai; following which the National Government expelled the Soviet consular and trade officials from Canton, Shanghai and Hankow. In July, 1928, the Chinese Communist Party consequently found it more expedient to hold its National Congress in Moscow, where it received directives from the Comintern for its future action, and Li Li-san assumed the effective leadership of party policy.

Meanwhile the Communist junta of Hankow, with a portion of the Nationalist–Communist forces and the Fourth Army from Nanchang, which defected in August, retired into the hilly country of Central, South-east and South China, from which Chiang's troops were unable to dislodge them. Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh proceeded to organize the greater part into a military area with headquarters at Chinkangshan, while smaller cadres were formed by Ho Lung, Peng Te-huai, Kao Kang and others in different

provinces. The Hupei–Hunan–Kiangsi area was to be the stronghold of the Communists for nearly seven years, and preserved the movement for the favourable opportunity which, in China's fluid situation, might turn up at any moment. The failure of Chiang's forces to eradicate it was due partly to preoccupation with other rebellious warlords and partly to the unreliability of the troops, who were mainly impressed and irregularly paid peasants untrained for fighting, and desertion from one side to another was a frequent occurrence. Moreover the Communist movement, as already explained, attracted many discontented and enthusiastic persons who considered the Kuomintang's policy too equivocal and hoped that Communism might provide a better answer. And after 1931 the National Government was further distracted by the Japanese threat, of which the Communists took full advantage.

So ended the first attempt by the Communists to capture China, along with Russia the most fertile ground for the spreading of their creed. This initial failure may be ascribed to lack of sufficient preparation and to divisions among the revolutionaries themselves. Russia's prestige was low in the eyes of a large section of the politically-minded in China, while many of the most influential saw that their personal interests were better served by connections with the trading nations of the West.

The Communist International had now to do some hard thinking, but in the event decided to keep the Chinese movement alive until conditions would once more be favourable. It is probable that at this point it initiated the policy of building up the prestige and economy of the U.S.S.R. as an example to Asiatic revolutionaries and nationalists.

CHAPTER VIII

The Impact of Japan

Moscow's attitude to the Chinese Communists has varied so much over the past thirty-five years that to the casual observer it often appears contradictory. A closer study, however, reveals certain basic principles which have been steadily adhered to. The Chinese Communist movement was founded with Soviet help and encouragement, but it grew in a different soil, and Moscow was not always able to appreciate its strength or chances of success at any given moment. It becomes clear, however, that Soviet Russia had an abiding interest in Chinese Communism as an ally against both the Western Powers and Japan. With her lively sense of opportunity she was prepared to make use of alternative means if these should prove more effective; and as the Japanese menace increased, the Kremlin appreciated that the best policy was to support whatever force in China would best obstruct Japan's aims. Although, therefore, Soviet Russia never lost interest in the Chinese Communists, her support of them varied in inverse ratio to her relations with Japan.

After the Communist débâcle of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek set to work to assert his rule over the whole of China. His government at Nanking had been recognized by the Powers (with the exception of Russia) as the central authority, but the country was yet far from being united. In the north Chang Tso-lin, hostile to Russia but on good terms with Japan, governed a virtually independent Manchurian state; in Shansi, Shantung and Yunnan powerful military governors kept their own armies and ruled like feudal barons; in the southern province of Kwangsi Li Tsung-jen maintained his "model" state. Communist troops still held much of Central and South-east China.

In 1928, however, Chang Tso-lin was killed when his train was mined just outside Mukden in circumstances not yet fully explained, and he was succeeded by his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang. Unlike his rugged father, the "Young Marshal" had become accustomed to luxury and to the influence of favourites, and disinclined to accept the role and the risks of a dictator's life. He was soon induced, in return for financial concessions, to acknowledge the

Central Government at Nanking and to sit as their representative in Mukden.

The disgruntled Communist leaders led their following, which then totalled not more than 10,000 men, into Kiangsi province and the remoter parts of Anhwei, Hupei, Hunan, Fukien and Kwangtung. Mao Tse-tung went to Kiangsi as chief political commissar, while Chu Teh became the military commander-in-chief; the other leaders were scattered among the various detachments. Disputes between Mao, as the actual master of a Soviet area, and Li Li-san with his returned students from Moscow, ended in a victory for the former, and Li was recalled to Russia.

In 1931 an "All-China Soviet Republic" was proclaimed, with Mao Tse-tung as president, in the Kiangsi town of Juichin. Mao had been educated in Peking and Hunan and was in closer touch with Chinese conditions than many other leaders of the party, such as Chou En-lai, who had spent much time abroad. He controlled his scattered regions through a Soviet-type Political Bureau and Central Executive Committee at Juichin. By this time the Chinese Red Army claimed to have acquired a strength of 350,000: from the first its status in relation to the revolution was one of the points of difference between Communist development in China and in Russia, for the commanders of the Chinese Communist armies were also at the head of the Government and of the Party. In the U.S.S.R. the Bolsheviks were careful to guard against bonapartism by separating military from political authority.

Another important element, as in Russia, India, Egypt and other politically immature countries, was the student body; half-educated, impatient and frustrated. In China, however, the students did not represent any social class: they were the heirs to the mandarin system by which for centuries China's government had been conducted, a system whereby the ability to pass examinations opened the administration to rich and poor alike. Thus the leaders in the Chinese Communist movement have been, to a greater extent than in Russia, drawn from many strata of society.

From the first the Chinese Communists supported Soviet Russia's policies, even, as we shall see, when these were disadvantageous to their own country. During this period, for example, they accepted with dumb approval the stable relations between Russia and Japan (each of which respected the other's sphere of interest in Chinese territory) although the latter had formally recognized the Kuomintang Government, while the former had not.

In Central Asia, Soviet internal and external policies were dis-

tinguished by a somewhat blurred line. On its own side of the frontier Moscow was steering a delicate course between the appeasement of national feeling and the breaking down of national traditions. The Soviet authorities have admitted to the difficulty of doing away with customs founded on centuries of Islamic culture, but the goal of the Communist Party is to reduce all nationalities to the same economic and social level, so that conditions in Samarkand shall differ as little as possible from those in Sverdlovsk. Collectivization of agriculture, for example, was forced upon the peasants, and as in Great Russia and the Ukraine, troops were used to quell resistance. Development was thus necessarily slow, if not actually negative, and in Kazakhstan the population, which had been nearly four million in 1926, amounted to slightly more than three million in 1939. Moreover, from 1926 onward there was a noticeable increase in the number of Russian settlers in all the Central Asian "republics", which during the next thirty years was to change appreciably the character of the population in many places.

Beyond the Ala-tau range conditions in Sinkiang favoured the continued growth of Soviet influence, and the absence of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Nanking encouraged the former to deal directly with local leaders. Between 1927 and 1930 the Turkestan–Siberian railway, which had reached Semipalatinsk in 1914, was extended to Frunze (formerly Vierny), and by 1932 the whole line was completed from Novosibirsk on the Trans-Siberian to Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea. During this period motor roads were also built to link the Turksib railroad with Ili and Kashgar in Sinkiang. To meet this challenge there was but a single unsurfaced road running down the Kansu corridor to the far-away railhead at Sian.

But the train of events which led to direct Russian intervention began with the assassination in 1928 of Governor Yang, who had hitherto managed to maintain the equilibrium of his province between the Red and White Russians and the Central Government. He was succeeded by the more inept but less scrupulous Chin Shu-jen, who devised a project for encouraging Chinese immigration by offering grants of land to settlers. Trouble started in 1930 when land belonging to the Muslims of Hami was so allotted, and a native revolt broke out. An appeal was made to the Tungan chief Ma Chung-yin, who in 1931 advanced with his followers from Kansu towards the provincial capital. At this time Ma and other Sinkiang nationalists were under the influence of pan-Islamic ideas originating in Turkey, and opposed to both Chinese

and Russian encroachment. Many of them looked to Japan as a counterbalancing force, distance evidently lending enchantment to their political view.

Chin Shu-jen, despairing of help from Nanking, which was involved with the Communist rebels, now addressed himself to Moscow. The Russians decided to back him rather than Chiang Kai-shek's Central Government or Ma Chung-yin's Islamic ambitions, which might have repercussions in their own Central Asian territories. A secret agreement was therefore concluded through the local Soviet representative for the provision of military and industrial supplies in exchange for commercial and financial privileges in Sinkiang. As with analogous arrangements in Outer Mongolia, no reference was made by either party to the Central Government, but in April, 1933, the Governor was removed by a local *coup d'état* staged by discontented Chinese and Chin's White Russian mercenary troops, and actual control passed to Sheng Shih-tsai, the local military commander. This change was later confirmed by Nanking, who threw Chin into prison on his return to China proper.

Ma Chung-yin, finding the Government opposition too strong, retired to Suchow in Kansu; but on hearing of Chin Shu-jen's removal, took advantage of the hiatus and moved westward again as far as Kucheng. At the same time rebels in Ili proclaimed an East Turkestan Republic. After a brief pause Ma marched once more on Urumchi but was surprised and put to flight at finding the provincial troops reinforced by White Russian units and by 7,000 Chinese reinforcements from Manchuria which the Soviet authorities had transported through their territory in circumstances to be explained shortly. In 1934 Ma and his Tungans arrived once again before Urumchi and laid siege to the capital, being assisted on this occasion by a simultaneous revolt under General Chang Pei-yuan in the Ili district, always a seat of separatist movements. Sheng Shih-tsai, like his predecessor, had no recourse but to turn to Russia, and the rebellion was suppressed by the prompt action of Soviet aircraft and of troops without Soviet badges who could perhaps be described as "volunteers".

Moscow's influence in Sinkiang, which had hitherto been mainly commercial, now entered the political sphere and was greatly increased. Although Sheng appeared to be in complete control of the province, in effect the Soviet Consul-General wielded supreme power. In return for her direct military assistance Russia obtained from the provincial authorities the right to exploit the mineral resources and the concession (which was not taken up) for a rail-

way linking Urumchi with Sergiopol on the Turksib. Certain anti-Soviet officials were removed, and a situation developed where the Russians, without having to sponsor a Communist or any other political party, were able to control Sinkiang through the Chinese official minority. There was indeed some infiltration by Chinese Communists into the administration, for Mao Tse-Tung's brother became Commissioner of Finance. Most of the Chinese officials, however, were concerned mainly with their own position and profits, and during the vagaries of the succeeding years would play off the Russians against the Central Government and vice versa, in accordance with their relative strengths from time to time. The pro-Soviet orientation of the Sinkiang government naturally involved discrimination against other countries, whose nationals were discouraged and if necessary prevented from entering the province. Russian ascendancy, however, did not primarily depend upon political factors but upon a favourable economic situation as compared with that of the Nanking Government. The construction of the Turksib Railway encouraged trans-frontier trade rather than the transport of goods through the long Kansu corridor; while the Tungan rebellions had made the Sinkiang currency almost worthless, and customs duties accordingly negligible from the Soviet point of view. In 1933 the U.S.S.R. was importing more from Sinkiang than from the rest of China put together.

After his failure in 1934 Ma Chung-yin, evidently deciding that co-operation with Russia now presented a rosier prospect than rebellion, suddenly crossed into Soviet territory, where he was well received and remained until Moscow had a suitable task for him. The Russian units which had been sent across the frontier to help Sheng Shih-tsai returned to the U.S.S.R., but a large number of Soviet civil and military advisers remained, with whom Sheng successfully co-operated for the next nine years. Russia had secured a virtual monopoly of Sinkiang's trade.

As regards Inner Mongolia; in 1928 the Nanking Government, having achieved sovereignty over North China, proceeded to strengthen its hold over that territory so as to counteract local agitation for autonomy and guard against any risk of Mongol nationalism spreading from Outer Mongolia. The region was divided into three provinces named Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, each under a Chinese governor who controlled both his own immigrant nationals and the Mongol princes.

By 1929 the Russian hold over Outer Mongolia's economy was virtually complete, and the era of persuasion may be said to have passed. Expropriation of the tribal princes was begun, and experi-

ments were made in collective farming. State control of trade and political discrimination virtually eliminated the Chinese merchants, so that even tea had to be transported by sea to Vladivostok and thence through Soviet territory to Ulan-Bator: already Russo-Mongol commerce formed a significant percentage of the Soviet Union's total foreign trade. All external contacts ceased except with Russia and the Soviet pattern of anti-religious propaganda was followed, attacks now being openly made upon the position of the lama church and its considerable property. The chief instrument of this policy was the head of the government, Choibalsan, who had been educated first at a lamaist monastery and subsequently at a Russian school in Kiakhta. Like Stalin, he had sampled the discipline of a religious seminary and perverted it.

Continued colonization of Siberia resulted in the Buriat Mongol population being outnumbered by Russians in its own "republic". This not only reduced the risk of Pan-Mongolism infecting Soviet areas, but was the conscious result of the need to import from the west the higher skills required in the industrial development of Siberia and indirectly of Outer Mongolia.

Russia's activities in Outer Mongolia, and her increasing hold over the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, caused considerable anti-Soviet feeling in China, and were largely responsible for the Nationalist policy of colonizing Inner Mongolia and sending troops into the Barga district in north-west Manchuria. The latter action was to precipitate forcible intervention by the Soviet Army in that region. Indeed, events in North Manchuria soon showed that Soviet Russia was no less prone to defend her sphere of influence than her Imperial predecessor. After the resumption of Sino-Russian relations in 1924, the Chinese had proposed that disputes relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway should go to arbitration. This would have allowed other Powers to be called in, and the Soviet Government refused to agree. In the meantime the railway was making large profits and it was to the advantage of the Soviet Union, as it had been to the Tsarist Government, to postpone its redemption by China as long as possible. In general, the Russian attitude was that the railway was virtually a Russian concern, and the less the unstable and inefficient Chinese authorities interfered the better.

In 1929, after prolonged friction between the Chinese and Soviet officials of the line, the Manchurian authorities, with the approval of the Central Government, seized control of the railway and arrested several senior members of the Soviet staff on the grounds that they had been involved in the dissemination of Com-

munist propaganda. The Soviet consulate-general in Harbin was also entered and searched, and local consular relations, which had survived the Moscow–Nanking diplomatic breach, were at last severed. Russia at once stopped all trans-frontier traffic and demanded the reinstatement of the arrested employees, the termination of Chinese supervision of the Far Eastern (formerly Russo-Asiatic) Bank and the acknowledgement of her right to use Soviet troops for the protection of the railway: traffic across the frontier would only be resumed if the Chinese accepted these terms. The Chinese, not appreciating that Russia was now in a stronger position as a result of her recent understanding with Japan, refused to comply. Accordingly on the 12th August, Soviet troops entered Manchuria, using as an additional pretext the necessity of defending the C.E.R. zone against the activities of the many White Russians still employed there.

Each side naturally accused the other of opening fire first. Chang Hsüeh-liang ordered the mobilization of his army, but the initiative was with the Russians, who, with the help of river gunboats, advanced up the Sungari and took Tungkiang on 12th October. On 17th November they arrived at Chalai Nor and occupied the frontier station Manchuli. The United Kingdom, United States and France invoked the Kellogg Pact outlawing war; but the Russians refused any mediation and the Chinese Communist Party helped to augment the Central Government's discomfiture by applauding Russia's actions. Nanking, lacking support from any quarter, thus had no alternative but to recommend the "Young Marshal" to negotiate. In December China signed the Khabarovsk Convention, accepting all the Soviet terms. *De facto* Russian control of the C.E.R. was thus restored, and the remaining White Russian troops in Manchuria were disbanded. The following October, after many postponements, a conference was assembled to arrive at mutually acceptable conditions for the resumption of diplomatic relations and the future running of the railway, the Soviet representative being the notorious Karakhan. This dragged on until 1931, when the Japanese, who had acquiesced in Russia's operations in the north, were encouraged to take corresponding action in their own sphere of influence. At that point the conference abruptly ended.

The Japanese Army, which had gradually achieved a dominating influence over its government, now judged the time propitious to detach Manchuria from the control of Nanking. It had suited Japan very well to deal with a local warlord, but it was now obvious that Chiang Kai-shek was bent on reuniting the former

Empire on a nationalist basis. The Kwantung Army, comprising the Japanese forces stationed along the South Manchuria Railway, was an instrument ready to hand to stop this. Accordingly, on 18th September, 1931, Japanese forces unexpectedly issued from their garrisons, seized the capital Mukden, and with little fighting drove Chang Hsüeh-liang's forces from South Manchuria, some crossing into China proper and others fleeing north. Although the Japanese at first declared their intention of avoiding operations in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, it proved impossible to eliminate the Manchurian forces without pursuing them into Heilungkiang; moreover it was soon apparent that Russia was not in a position to oppose their advance. As with the Powers' representations over the Sino-Soviet hostilities in 1929, the League of Nations proved quite unavailing in dealing with what its Japanese member considered to be its vital interests, and Manchuria was completely occupied in six months.

On 18th February, 1932, the birth of *Manchoukuo* ("Manchu State") was announced; with Pu Yi, the last representative of the Ch'ing Dynasty who had abdicated as a child in 1911, as "Chief Executive". The following year he was proclaimed Emperor, thus facilitating the government of the country without undue attention to democratic procedures, and reviving a focus for the loyalties of the Mongol and Muslim subjects of China.

The Soviet Government agreed to remain neutral in this dispute, as Japan had been neutral during Russia's operations in 1929, and even facilitated the movement of Japanese troops by allowing them to use the C.E.R. It also accepted the *de facto* replacement of the Chinese Nationalist authorities on the railway by those of Manchoukuo. On the other hand the dislocation of the service caused by the Japanese operations inevitably brought about a deterioration in Russo-Japanese relations, and the Soviet authorities took the precaution of moving as much rolling-stock as possible into their own territory. The impotence of the League of Nations and the corresponding threat to both Chinese and Russian interests caused a consequent *rapprochement*, and diplomatic relations were established in December, 1932, between the Kremlin and Nanking.

The Communist cause stood to gain two advantages from the turn of events. The Soviet Union was gratified that the Japanese had directed their attention to China, and was prepared to encourage the latter's resistance rather than to be herself committed. The Chinese Communists, supporting the Russian attitude, could also make capital out of the Central Government's inability to

offer effective resistance. Subsequent events suggest that, from the Communist point of view, Great Britain and America were basically more important adversaries than either Japan or Germany: Stalin, in fact, counted on an eventual war for markets between an Anglo-Japanese alliance and the United States.

The Soviet Union had now to decide how to live with a Japanese-occupied Manchuria. The Kwantung Army, in entering the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, had virtually taken control out of the hands of the Soviet management, and nothing short of war would restore the situation. In April, 1933, the Japanese through the Manchoukuo government demanded the return of the rolling-stock which had been taken into the U.S.S.R.: when the Russians failed to comply the puppet authorities stopped all trans-frontier traffic, both at Manchuli and Pogranichnaya. General Galen (Bluecher), now commanding the Soviet Far Eastern army, made a bellicose speech, but in May the Soviet Foreign Commissar told the Japanese Ambassador that his government would be willing to sell the C.E.R. in order to settle the problem. When this leaked out, there was naturally a most unfavourable reaction in China at what was regarded as a breach of faith by Russia, coming so soon after the resumption of diplomatic relations. This feeling was aggravated by the Vice-Commissar (Karakhan) assuring the Chinese Ambassador that no sale was contemplated and two days later Litvinov confirming to the Press his proposals for the sale. Karakhan was thereupon transferred to Turkey as ambassador.

In June a conference assembled in Tokyo, attended by representatives from Russia, Japan and the puppet Manchurian state. Among the many difficulties that arose, those of price and ownership were outstanding. The Russians valued the railway at 250 million gold roubles, whereas Japan—"Manchoukuo"—offered 40 million. The question of ownership was complicated by the facts that the Russo-Chinese contract signed in 1896 specified that shares in the C.E.R. could be held only by Chinese or Russian subjects, and that after 1917 the Soviet Government had nationalized the Russo-Asiatic Bank which financed the railway. Moreover, although in their Declarations of 1919 and 1920 the Bolsheviks renounced the privileges obtained by the Imperial Government, they had claimed ownership in the C.E.R. during the negotiations of 1922.

The latter problem was eventually shelved, leaving only the question of price. Russia had originally built the railway and rolling-stock in an extravagant manner, perhaps with a view to making redemption by the Chinese difficult; but disorder and

sabotage, not adequately checked by the Kwantung Army, now began to reduce its value. The Japanese also started to plan alternative lines to threaten the very future of the C.E.R. At length, after nearly two years of hard bargaining, in which China was not even consulted under the provisions of the 1924 treaty, Russia sold her share to Manchoukuo for 112 million gold roubles, thus becoming the only power except Japan to give *de facto* recognition to this puppet. Payment was guaranteed by Japan, the money being raised by bonds issued in that country. The railway was virtually incorporated into the Japanese system and renamed the North Manchuria Railway.

The effective frontier between Japan and Russia now coincided with those of Eastern Siberia and Outer Mongolia. In Tsarist times these had been drawn in favour of Russia's strategy: now Japan sought to reverse the position, taking advantage of the fact that both Russia and China were virtually without other allies at that juncture. Moreover there was anything but full understanding between the two victims, for Russia's sale of railway rights without consulting her Chinese partner had caused much anti-Soviet feeling.

The frontier between Manchuria and Mongolia had never been clearly defined, partly because the populations on either side were entirely tribal and pastoral, and partly because both had been possessions of the Emperor of China. Now Russia's Mongol protectorate was faced with the spectacle of Japanese troops in the neighbouring territory of Barga, and a new type of Pan-Mongol propaganda made use of the former unity of the Mongols under Manchu suzerainty. With Soviet assistance, therefore, the Outer Mongolian army began to prepare itself for the defence of its frontier with Manchuria. Russia also gave asylum to the defeated Manchurian troops of General Ma Chan-shan, who were allowed to cross into Siberia from Heilungkiang, and rejected Manchoukuo's demand for their extradition. These men were re-equipped and transported by the Trans-Siberian and Turksib railways to the frontier of Sinkiang, where, as already described, they were to serve as an instrument of Soviet intervention.

At this time the Communists judged it prudent to allow some internal relaxation in Outer Mongolia, where sovietization had been pushed too hurriedly. After 1932 changes were made more gradually, accompanied by attempts to persuade the ordinary Mongol of their advantages. Collectivization of livestock was also abandoned. The size of the priesthood was limited. a plausible argument being that more men were needed for "productive" work. The organization of the tribes into Leagues and Banners

was also broken up, the ostensible reason being to increase administrative efficiency, and the undeclared aim, as in Turkestan, to destroy traditional loyalties.

The menace of Japan also caused Russia to speed up the colonization of Eastern Siberia, where the population of the Far Eastern provinces amounted to less than two and a half millions, compared with nearly 200 millions in the whole Soviet Union. Extra wages and other privileges were offered to voluntary immigrants, and the troops were also granted improved conditions. The building-up of the Soviet Far East was, however, necessarily a long-term operation, so that for some time it would be necessary to appease Japan in that quarter.

The foregoing events could not fail to bring about profound internal movements in China. As a result of constant pressure by Government forces, and after seeking advice from Moscow, the Communist army decided to pull out. Accordingly in October, 1934, about 90,000 of them, with families, started to withdraw from the Kiangsi *enclave* and to move into the far north-west of the country. This movement took a year and was a typical example of traditional Chinese strategy which advocates leaving your enemy a line of retreat. A corridor was afforded by the Government troops right across China, passing through Hunan, northern Kwangtung, Kweichow, northern Yunnan and Szechwan; and a year later some 30,000 Reds assembled in the sparsely populated areas of Kansu, Ninghsia and northern Shensi, setting up their headquarters at Paoan. The remainder had either succumbed to the rigours of the journey or had dropped off when the initial enthusiasm had waned. The main body was later joined by further groups which had been dispersed in other parts of the country. The effect of this operation on the surviving inhabitants of the corridor was a temporary one, so-called "Soviet areas" being set up during the occupation of the Red troops and the population reverting to its normal existence as soon as they had passed, except for the piles of skulls, reminiscent of Tamerlane, which were found in the evacuated localities.

Here, on the fringes of Mongolia and remote from the main centres of Nationalist China, the Communists were in a position to keep in physical touch with Soviet territory and to build up a virtually independent state: from the Soviet point of view, it was also an advantage to be in proximity to the Chinese Communists who might be useful to them on future occasions.

This movement, coupled with the Japanese invasion, was accompanied by a *rapprochement* between the Communists and certain

sections of the Kuomintang, on the basis of resistance to Japan. A non-agression pact, directed against Tokyo, was concluded between Nanking and Moscow, but otherwise Russia now stood isolated in the Far East. The Communist International sought to rectify this situation by calling on all members to co-operate with "anti-fascist" governments (that is, against Japan, Germany and Italy), and by electing Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and other Chinese Communists to its Executive Committee. For their part, however, the Chinese Communists excluded Chiang Kai-shek from the "anti-fascists" with whom they were prepared to co-operate, and set up a so-called Soviet government, Mao Tse-tung heading the civil and Chu Teh the military administration. Chiang Kai-shek, determined to achieve national unity before going to war with Japan, sealed off the Red territory with a cordon of fresh troops, and Nationalist aircraft bombed towns occupied by the rebels. Most of these, however, lay among loess hills in which cave-dwellings have for centuries been built, and bomb-proof protection was easily available.

The mounting threat of Japanese penetration was, as we shall see, to cause a gradual modification of these attitudes. Thus the rapid defeat of Chang Hsüeh-liang, Nanking's Manchurian vassal, and the withdrawal of his forces from the Three Eastern Provinces, had an unexpected sequel as regards China's internal and external situations. Those of the Young Marshal's troops that had escaped within the Great Wall were, by agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, settled in Shensi province with their headquarters at Sian, then the western terminus of the Lunghai railway. Although intended to take part in the anti-Communist campaign, they were naturally in a disgruntled frame of mind and tended to interfere with the administration of the province, becoming a potential source of trouble to the Central Government.

By the end of 1936 Chiang Kai-shek could no longer ignore the pressure of opinion in the north-west of the country, where these exiles and the Communists, now in close touch with each other but at a safe distance from the Japanese, were urging a firmer policy against the continued enemy encroachment and evoking sympathetic demonstrations in other parts of China. Associations with names like "The Society for Removing Treacherous Men with Blood" and "The Women's Acceleration Society" were springing up in Nanking, Shanghai and other towns, and threatening those who co-operated or traded with the Japanese. In December, therefore, Chiang travelled to Sian for discussions, but found himself detained by the Young Marshall and confronted with

demands which included resistance to the Japanese, co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and equal treatment for the Nationalist, Communist and ex-Manchurian armies. The last-mentioned was probably of most importance to the dissidents, whose financial and material positions were vastly inferior to those of the Central Government forces. One may also detect old enmities dating from 1927–1928, when Chiang Kai-shek had asserted himself as the paramount authority in China.

The anti-Japanese posture of the Communists was indeed somewhat questionable, as they had themselves done nothing to check the enemy, and in fact were endangering the Central Government by urging it to undertake a war for which its forces were inadequately prepared. At the same time they accepted with equanimity the analogous encroachments by Russia on the independence of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. They now clamoured for Chiang's execution. Moscow, however, evidently decided that effective Chinese resistance was more likely to be achieved by backing Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government; and the Sian *junta* was attacked in the Soviet press. The Chinese Communists promptly conformed, and Chiang's life was probably thereby saved. In a typically Chinese way, the parties concerned set out to compromise. Chou En-lai, now Vice-Chairman of the joint "Anti-Japanese Military Council", offered to mediate between the Young Marshal and Chiang, and an agreement was reached whereby the three parties were to co-operate under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership against the Japanese. In return the dissident troops were to be given an official status on terms of equality with the Nationalists.

Accordingly in May, 1937, the Chinese Red forces received the title of "National Revolutionary Army" under the supreme command of Chiang Kai-shek as Generalissimo. Their partisan units were named The New Fourth Route Army, and the Red troops in Shensi were designated Eighth Route Army. This accommodation was an unsatisfactory makeshift, as indeed attempted co-operation with Communists has proved to be the world over. There was no coalition, for the "Regional Soviet Government" remained in control and retained its own army. Although a National Political Council and a Supreme War Council were set up, on which both sides were represented, in the Japanese-occupied areas each party worked underground for its own return to power when the time came.

There were factions in both the Kuomintang and Communist Parties which appreciated the artificiality of this co-operation and disapproved of the compromise: in the latter, however, these were

handled like the Trotskyists had been in Russia, and the official line was that the party would gain more by at least temporary collaboration. Under Mao's leadership the Chinese Reds slavishly followed the twists and turns of Moscow's foreign policy in its relations with the West, Japan and their own legal Government.

During this period Japanese propaganda was endeavouring to drive a wedge between China and Russia by stressing the dangers of Communism, and at the same time trying to loosen both Russia's and China's hold on the Mongols by means of the Turco-Tartar Movement. This somewhat spurious exercise was based on the supposed community of interests of all the steppe peoples, Mongol and Turkic, which the islanders of Nippon were altruistically sponsoring. Use was also being made of Buddhist monks as Japanese agents in both Outer and Inner Mongolia, and a "self-governing Province of Hsingan" was proclaimed in the Mongol part of Manchuria. In the meantime the Nanking Government had become aware of the discontent among the Inner Mongolian tribes, who were tending to look at both Russia and Japan as possible liberators from the Chinese yoke; and in 1934 an Autonomous Political Council was set up, upon which the chiefs of Leagues and Banners were represented, although real power still rested with the Chinese authorities.

In 1934, also, the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian "Republic" concluded a Mutual Assistance Agreement, under the terms of which Soviet troops could be invited into Outer Mongolia if she were attacked by a third party. This pact, arrived at without consulting China, naturally annoyed the Nanking Government, but Russia's main object was to avoid a direct clash with Japan which she was not at that time in a position to meet, and her relations with China had to take second place. Her influence in China proper was in any case less than that of Japan or the other Powers owing to the absence of substantial trade relations; while her economic predominance in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang made the protection of those spheres of interest more immediately vital.

With the arrival of Japanese and puppet troops on the undefined Manchurian-Mongol border incidents began to occur between them and units of the Outer Mongolian army, each claiming to be defending their rightful territory. Moscow regarded this development as of the utmost gravity. The Mongols of Barga, on the Manchurian side of the frontier, at first welcomed the Japanese as their protectors against both Chinese and Russians, and their attitude was likely to have an effect on opinion in Outer Mongolia. Stalin

was also aware that Japanese militarists were talking openly of occupying Eastern Siberia as they had done during the anti-Bolshevik intervention. The Outer Mongolian Prime Minister travelled to Moscow to discuss defensive measures, and in Mongolia itself several executions were announced of pro-Japanese traitors and spies. In February, 1936, Stalin announced to the Press that the Soviet Union would support Outer Mongolia if attacked, and the following month a Protocol of Mutual Assistance was concluded, reinforcing that of 1934. This provided that if either country were the victim of aggression by a third party, the other would come to its aid, although the Nanking Government vainly protested that Outer Mongolia was a part of China and could not make agreements with foreign powers. The pact was, in fact, shortly to be invoked at the time of the major Russo-Japanese collisions in 1938 and 1939.

In Tannu Tura developments followed a parallel course to those in her larger neighbour, and with Russian assistance a "people's republic" was set up on Soviet lines, although still nominally independent. As the U.S.S.R. was the only Power to recognize it, and provided the only means of access to the outer world, Russian influence was understandably paramount.

In 1933 the Japanese, having occupied the province of Jehol and incorporated it into Manchoukuo, had also begun to penetrate Inner Mongolia. The border between Jehol and the tribal territory of Chahar, like that between Barga and Outer Mongolia, is open steppe without well-defined features, and the Chinese forces based on Kalgan were in no shape to defend this extensive territory. Moreover, the nomad population had been alienated by the Chinese policy of settling their pastures with agriculturists which, owing to the light soil and dry winds, tended to produce "dust-bowl" erosion. The Japanese took full advantage of these grievances, and their agents put to the princes the benefits of joining in a revived Manchu Empire or alternatively setting up a Mongolian state under Japanese protection.

In 1935 the Japanese, having consolidated their position in Manchuria, now began to exert political and military pressure on North China; and even created a puppet regime between Tientsin and the Great Wall which was used, among other things, to introduce Japanese goods free of duty into China. At this time Japanese military opinion was divided as to the desirability of attacking Russia immediately, before the subjugation of China had been completed, or of falling in with the Navy's project of an eventual move against British and Dutch possessions in the South Seas

Until the outbreak of the World War, however, the Kwantung Army set the pace, with Russia and China as the major objectives.

The Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 between Japan and Germany, joined by Italy in 1937 and obviously directed at the U.S.S.R., increased diplomatic tension between Moscow and Tokyo, and anti-Russian demonstrations took place in the latter city. Disputes arose over shipping, fishing rights, trade and consular representation, and the Soviet Government deported many Koreans from their Far Eastern provinces for fear they might be Japanese agents or sympathizers. Owing perhaps to the time-lag in the operations of her mighty bureaucratic machine, however, Russia continued to ship pig-iron and other strategic materials to Japan until 1937, when the traffic was officially reported as having stopped.

In 1936 the Kwantung Army, with the assistance of Chinese turncoats, entered Inner Mongolia from Manchuria and occupied the market town of Dolon Nor. By promising the Mongols protection against the Chinese immigration policy they had won over a part of the Autonomous Political Council headed by Prince Demchukdongrob (more conveniently known by his Chinese name Teh), the most influential of the tribal chiefs; and by 1938 had overrun both Chahar and Suiyuan. In October, 1937, Prince Teh was set up in Kalgan as the head of a "Mongolian Autonomous Government" on the lines of Manchoukuo.

Disputes began to arise during 1937 about the ownership of the islands in the Amur River, which forms part of the frontier between Manchuria and Siberia; and in June of that year Japanese troops occupied two of them, claiming that they were on their side of the channel. After an exchange of fire the Russians withdrew, and the Japanese, regarding this as a test of Soviet strength, felt reassured about pursuing their military aims in China.

During this period Moscow's relations with Sinkiang were more complex than those with Outer Mongolia. The "New Dominion" was still recognized as a Chinese province, and as the Japanese menace grew it was necessary to steer a difficult course between native separatism and support of the Central Government. In order to combat Japanese intrigues, Russia did not encourage outright independence, and the Sinkiang administration professed loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek right through the World War; but Moscow was prepared to ignore Nanking whenever it was advantageous to Soviet interests to do so. In 1938 a Soviet Russian regiment was stationed in Hami on the pretext of defending the province against a possible Japanese invasion.

In addition the Russians were able further to develop their

communications with the western provinces on the plea of aiding China in her struggle. Thus the roads across the frontier were improved, and an airline was established linking Moscow with Chungking (the war-time capital) which included an intermediate stop at Urumchi. A local trade agreement was also signed, whereby Governor Sheng was supplied with arms against Sinkiang's cotton, wool and hides. On the Chinese side, work was intensified on the Sinkiang–Kansu route, the ancient Silk Road, which was as yet hardly fit for heavy motor traffic. Corvées totalling some 100,000 labourers, under military supervision, were put to work on this task. In 1937 an Islamic revolt broke out in Urumchi itself, brought about by Mussulmans from the south of the province intriguing with members of the provincial government: as the Central authorities were by this time heavily involved with Japan, the disturbance was put down, as on previous occasions, with the help of Soviet troops.

Despite these numerous cross-currents, and the overriding desire of Russia to avoid a direct clash with Japan, relations between Moscow and Nanking, and between the Chinese Communists and Kuomintang, improved as the common threat of Japan increased, contributing to the Kwantung Army's decision to subdue China by military means.

CHAPTER IX

The Triangular War

On 7th July, 1937, a collision occurred outside Peking between Japanese and Chinese troops, and it became obvious that Chiang Kai-shek must either be prepared to fight or face a serious revolt within his own ranks. He chose to precipitate hostilities in Shanghai, where the Japanese had only a landing-party of some three thousand men, and where the Powers might be expected to intervene owing to the concentration of foreign interests in that port.

On 13th August some Chinese aircraft attempted to bomb the Japanese cruiser *Idzumo* but succeeded only in causing considerable casualties among Chinese and foreigners in the adjoining International Settlement. At the same time about 80,000 troops, including two German-trained "model" divisions, were brought up to surround the Japanese. The latter, however, were speedily succoured by troops from Japan who landed in the Yangtzekiang and in Hangchow Bay so as to threaten the rear of the besieging forces.

China was disappointed in the attitude of the Western Powers which, apart from sending reinforcements to protect the foreign Concessions, did nothing to restrain the Japanese. By November these had driven the Chinese forces from the Shanghai area and had begun their conquest of Central China.

This situation suited Russia, however, whose attention was occupied by Hitler's antics in the West, and who was not in a position to challenge Japan by force of arms: she was therefore grateful for anything which would divert the Japanese Army, and from this time began to adopt a firmer attitude towards Tokyo in the diplomatic field. In order to encourage China to continue the struggle she now concluded with her a Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, signed on 21st August. It is noticeable that all Soviet non-aggression pacts have been directed against a third party, and on the basis of this one Russian military and technical advisers were sent to China, and several training centres were established. Military equipment, including some fighter and bomber aircraft, and financial credits were supplied against tea, wool, tungsten and other materials. At this time Nanking was buying arms wherever

they could be had, so that British, American, Italian, Russian and other training missions were operating in various parts of the country, while the German Military Mission which had helped to build up the Central Government's army continued its work until the Japanese induced Hitler to withdraw it in 1938.

Soviet supplies were at first shipped from Odessa, but as all Chinese ports had by October, 1938, fallen into Japanese hands, the ancient Turkestan Silk Road was increasingly used; the route, 3,000 miles in length, following the alignment through Ili–Urumchi–Lanchow–Sian–Hanchung–Chengtu–Chungking, where stores were distributed to both Central Government and Communist forces. The consignments, which included aviation spirit, were transported by lorry, camel and pack-mule, considerable quantities being unloaded at Lanchow, the capital of Kansu, for the Soviet aviation and technical training centre established there. The tonnage which could be transported by these means was necessarily very limited, but the gesture of aid, coupled with the non-aggression pact, had a propaganda value in the absence of any similar demonstration by other Powers, themselves preoccupied with the German menace. Moreover the opening up of this route further increased Russia's influence in Sinkiang.

At the time of the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities Russia was herself facing problems in Central Asia not unlike those confronting the Nanking Government in Sinkiang. Although twenty years had passed since the revolution, Moscow still had to deal with Turkic nationalism and Islamic sentiment. In 1937 it was found necessary to revise the history books of the Khorezmian peoples: colonization by Imperial Russia, hitherto denounced by the Communists, was declared to have been a lesser evil than continued subjection to tyrants such as the Khan of Khiva, or subjugation by other predatory powers, the British for instance. The eventual benefits derived by the people were held to justify the earlier conquests. The traditional heroes, till recently held up as examples of national revolutionary pride, were now denounced as reactionaries.

Nor did the local languages escape revision. In the early days of Soviet rule the Arabic script, in which Central Asian Turkish and Persian were written, was replaced by Latin letters on the lines of Atatürk's reformed alphabet in Turkey, with the object of neutralizing the cohesive force of Islamic calligraphy. This was not done without the opposition of the mullahs, naturally the class most opposed to Communist innovations. The underlying motives of Russian nationalism, however, soon obtruded into this question,

and it was realized that the romanized system was objectionable from two points of view: it provided too direct a link with Turkey, whose relations with Russia had deteriorated since Atatürk's time; and it placed a needless obstacle in the way of transcription within the Soviet Union. In 1938 it was therefore decided that these languages should be written in the Cyrillic alphabet, and the unfortunate Uighurs found themselves learning yet another system. When new words were incorporated into the language, steps were taken to ensure that they came from Russian rather than from Turkish, Persian or Arabic, while the Russian language itself was made compulsory in the schools.

In spite of all these measures the persistence of opposition to Soviet rule may be judged from the fact that during the years 1937–1938 the execution was announced of many native officials, both senior and junior, for following a nationalist line.

In the meantime measures were being taken in China to implement the agreements made between the Kuomintang, the Communists and the ex-Manchurian troops. A Defence Council, on which the component forces were represented, was set up in Chungking under Chiang Kai-shek as Generalissimo, from whom the Red forces were theoretically to receive directives. In 1938 this was reorganized as a Political Council which included Mao Tse-tung and six other Communists. In fact there was virtually no co-operation in the field, the Communists and the National troops being too much engaged in watching each other to operate effectively against the Japanese. And, as will be seen, their bloodiest encounters were internecine ones.

In July, 1938, the Japanese carried out a further test of Russia's intentions. On the Russo-Manchurian-Korean border the hill feature of Changkufeng commanded both the new Japanese military port of Rashin in Korea and the Soviet waters of Possiet Bay. The Russians sought to occupy the height but were opposed by a Japanese force, each side claiming the hill as being within its own territory. Serious operations developed, several thousand men of all arms being thrown into the engagement without any declaration of war. Eventually, on 11th August, it was agreed that both sides should stand fast while a boundary commission delineated the actual frontier. For the second time Japan was reassured, and the Kwantung Army now moved some of its troops from Manchuria and pressed on into Central and South China.

So long as tension persisted between Russia and Japan, China continued to receive Soviet support and aid. In June, 1939, for example, a commercial treaty was concluded between the Soviet

Union and the National Government of China, and a Sino-Soviet Aviation Company was formed with a Chinese President and equal contributions of staff and capital.

Later in the year, however, the curious Russo-German-Japanese triad underwent a change of posture owing to the Soviet-German Pact of 23rd August. This was a shock to Japan and had the effect of suddenly putting an end to incidents on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier and of causing an improvement in relations between Moscow and Tokyo, both governments consequently feeling freer to deal with major problems on other fronts. At the same time Russia turned her back on Great Britain and France, and her relations with the United States grew cooler: her attitude to the Nanking Government also became less helpful, as she considered it was leaning too far towards Britain and America. As Mao Tse-tung slavishly approved the Russo-German agreement, and as Chiang Kai-shek was now of less value to Russia, so relations between the Kuomintang and Chinese Communists again deteriorated and the tenuous truce between their troops broke down. The Communist Eighth Route Army and the Nationalist Command each accused the other of hostile actions, and in October, 1940, open fighting developed between Government forces and the Communist New Fourth Army. The latter was defeated and officially disbanded, but in fact kept its arms and was reorganized into guerrilla formations which thereafter avoided pitched battles with Chiang's formations. At this point co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists virtually ended, and Japan now felt safe on the mainland of Asia.

An indication of Russia's changed attitude to the Western Powers was the effect of her actions in Sinkiang, where by 1939 Soviet ascendancy had reached such proportions that the local authorities began to expel British-Indian residents, leaving Russia with a virtual monopoly of trade in the province. The Consulate-General at Kashgar, which was the centre of British influence and an observation post on China's western frontier, was boycotted and virtually isolated from the population. Sinkiang had in fact become economically dependent on the Soviet Union, and virtually all manufactures were now imported from that country.

In spite of the Russo-German Pact, however, trouble once more arose on the vexed Manchurian-Mongolian border, the incidents increasing in severity and in the number of troops engaged. In May, 1939, Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolian troops clashed at Buir Nor, each side being supported by aircraft and armoured vehicles supplied by its protector. In June aircraft were engaged

over the disputed frontiers; and in July the pastures of Nomonhan, which for centuries had been used indiscriminately by nomad tribes, were the site of another battle. Officially only the two puppet states were involved in these hostilities, and in September, their attentions diverted to more important events elsewhere, Russia and Japan sponsored a truce pending demarcation of the frontier.

In September, 1940, Moscow received a further shock when Japan declared her adherence to the Anti-Comintern Military Pact, as she had hitherto been a member of the political alliance only. It now began to dawn on the Russians that opportunism could not go on paying for ever, and that they must be prepared to guard two fronts. Their armed forces were in process of reorganization after the Finnish War, and Stalin realized that he could do little more than take advantage of Germany's temporary preoccupation with the West to prepare for an eventual trial of strength with Hitler. In the meantime Japan must be appeased.

It was perhaps the anxiety of the U.S.S.R. to prevent a Japanese walk-over in China that contributed to a patching-up of Kuomintang-Communist differences. In 1941 the latter sent liaison officers to Chungking who remained in touch with the Generalissimo's headquarters until 1945, part of their functions being to prevent friction between the parties and further clashes between their troops. Apart from this, little of positive value was achieved for the prosecution of the war.

In April, 1941, the Moscow Government, anticipating early war with Germany, had safeguarded its eastern frontiers by concluding a five-year Neutrality Pact with Japan, which reaffirmed mutual respect for Russia's interests in Outer Mongolia and those of Japan in Manchuria: it also enabled the Japanese to withdraw troops from Manchuria for eventual use against Russia's future allies. In June a Soviet-Japanese Commercial Convention was signed, providing for exchanges of goods to the value of 30 million yen a year for five years; and an agreement was reached on the demarcation of the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier. Stalin was so gratified by these developments that when the Japanese Foreign Minister was leaving Moscow after the negotiations, he publicly embraced both him and the German ambassador at the railway station. Chinese opinion, having perhaps relied too much on Soviet altruism, was taken aback by these developments, especially by Russia's acknowledgement of Manchoukuo and Japan's recognition of the "Mongolian People's Republic". Chungking made an ineffectual protest, and Sino-Soviet relations thereafter cooled considerably. It

seems incredible, looking back on this period, that the three major actors in the Far Eastern drama, egotistical and cynical as they were, should have been constantly shocked by each other's fickleness.

When war broke out between Russia and Germany in June, 1941, overt assistance by the U.S.S.R. to China ceased, partly because of the neutrality pact with Japan and partly because the Soviet Union could not spare the resources. Russia could, however, still count on China to create some diversion for the Japanese, as British and American equipment was reaching Chiang Kai-shek's forces by the Burma Road and by air.

Outer Mongolia's part during the war was to supply the Russian forces in Siberia with horses and meat, and to guard against Japanese penetration. The Chinese Communists, who never criticized Moscow's foreign policy or Stalin's sudden vagaries, approved of the intimate relationship between the two countries on the grounds that a Communist Outer Mongolia would automatically merge with a Communist China when established. Events were to prove this theory mistaken.

Russia's preoccupation with the German invasion, and her neutrality pact with Japan, had the effect of diminishing Soviet prestige in Sinkiang and in turn giving rise to Russian suspicions that Sheng Shih-tsai might now turn on his late masters. A plot to assassinate him was discovered, and Sheng retaliated by executing all the leading Communists in Urumchi including Mao Tse-tung's brother. He then addressed himself to the Central Government, which was ready to forgive him his nine years of bloody and oppressive rule for the sake of its restored authority. Moscow could now but acquiesce in the changed situation, and Soviet troops were withdrawn in April, 1943, when Chiang Kai-shek's forces entered the province. At the same time the Russian advisers and technologists, who had been invited in by Sheng Shih-tsai to help in exploiting oil and other minerals, were recalled to the U.S.S.R., taking their equipment with them.

The Central authorities were now in a position, for the first time since 1927, to control Sinkiang's external relations, and took the opportunity of replacing the pro-Soviet officials by Kuomintang nominees. Sheng proved difficult to deal with, besides being anathema to Moscow and the Chinese Communists, and was therefore removed by Chiang Kai-shek in 1944 as "an obstacle to Sino-Soviet friendship"; Wu Chang-hsin, a veteran member of the Kuomintang, being installed in his place. These developments, due to the war, had only a temporary effect, for geography and

economics were the deciding factors in Sinkiang's long-term orientation.

In its own Central Asian territories, as in the Soviet Union as a whole, Stalin's regime made concessions to national feeling and religious sentiment when it was possible to direct them against the external enemy: in all cases, however, this was a war-time expedient to be discarded as soon as victory was achieved.

With the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 Russia was gratified to feel that the Japanese Navy's policy of attacking the maritime powers where they were weakest had now prevailed, and thereafter she was able to devote her attention and resources more fully to the vital western front. She was now indifferent to China's fate and to the course of her war with Japan.

In 1944, with the tide of war beginning to turn in Russia's favour, rebellion once more broke out in Sinkiang. During March the Kazakh chief Usman led a revolt supported by aircraft from Outer Mongolia, and in November an Uzbek named Farkhad, well supplied with arms, succeeded in occupying a large part of Ili and resuscitating the "East Turkestan Republic". Negotiations followed between the Nationalist authorities and representatives from Ili, and in August, 1945, resulted in a compromise whereby the dissidents would recognize the supremacy of the Urumchi administration in return for a measure of local autonomy and on condition that government troops did not enter the district.

In February, 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met at Yalta to discuss in secret the last stages of the war and the subsequent organization of peace. Although the discussions were extended to include the Far East, China was not represented. It was agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany and in return for certain territorial and economic rewards. Here Russia's traditional imperialism reasserted itself, for her conditions amounted broadly to a restoration of the situation as it was before her defeat by Japan in 1905. Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria was acknowledged but the "pre-eminent interests of the U.S.S.R." were also recognized: the C.E.R. and the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway were to be operated by a Sino-Soviet company. Port Arthur would once again be leased to Russia as a naval base, while Dairen would be an international port in which Russia's interest would be pre-eminent. The *status quo* in Outer Mongolia would be preserved, while South Sakhalin and adjacent islands were to be returned to Russia, which would also gain possession of the Kuriles. President Roosevelt was convinced that Russian military co-operation would

be essential to clear the Japanese army from Manchuria even if their homeland were successfully invaded, and was therefore prepared to concede most of Stalin's demands in the Far East. As in Europe, the Western Allies tended to concentrate on military victory without giving sufficient thought to post-war objectives: the Soviet Union, on the other hand, shaped its strategy, so far as the Germans allowed, with a view to its long-term political aims.

The results of the Yalta conference were officially made known to Chiang Kai-shek in June, although he had during the intervening months gained a fair inkling of what they were. Faced, for the first time, by a united statement of policy on the part of the Powers, Chiang had no alternative but to make the best of the situation. He lost little time in sending T. V. Soong, his brother-in-law, acting Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, to Moscow in order to get the most favourable terms he could, particularly regarding the former leased territory of Liao-tung. After two visits, and personal negotiation with Stalin and Molotov, Soong agreed that after the conclusion of peace with Japan Port Arthur should be administered by a joint commission of which the chairman and a majority of the members would be Russian, while the civil administration was to be wholly Chinese. A joint commission, with a Soviet head, would also administer Dairen.

As regards Outer Mongolia, Soong's visit happened to coincide with that of Choibalsan, its Prime Minister, and after discussion the Chinese representative consented to recognize for the first time the independence which had in fact long existed, at least so far as China was concerned; but with a face-saving condition that a plebiscite must show this to be the wish of the Mongols. The qualification "within its present boundaries" was also added to guard against possible future claims to the Barga District or Inner Mongolia which, after ten years of Japanese control, would automatically revert to Chinese sovereignty.

When Soong paid his second visit to Moscow in August, he took with him Hsiung Shih-hui, the Commissioner designate for the North Eastern Provinces (Manchuria), and on the 14th a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed. This instrument embodied the advantages and privileges which Russia had won at the Yalta Conference, but was indeed quite unnecessary since Japan's defeat was already in sight.

The Russian gains were in fact greater than the losses of 1905. The Port Arthur naval base was to be restricted to joint use by China and the U.S.S.R., but its defence was to be a Soviet responsibility. Dairen was to be a free port, but with a Soviet harbour-

master. The whole Manchurian railway system, now styled the Chinese-Changchun Railway (Changchun being the junction of the north and south networks), was to come under Sino-Soviet management with a Russian Director for a term of thirty years, after which it would revert to China without compensation. As regards Outer Mongolia, China had definitely renounced both sovereignty and suzerainty, subject to a plebiscite whose result was a foregone conclusion.

For her part, China had to be content with the meaningless promise of non-interference in her internal affairs, and with the pledge that Russian military and other supplies would be delivered only to Central Government agencies. Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria was recognized, and Russia undertook to withdraw her troops within three months after the Japanese surrender. The Soviet Union also specifically declared that it would not interfere in the affairs of Sinkiang. The *de jure* loss of Outer Mongolia, already *de facto*, abolished with a stroke of the pen the northern buffer of centuries' standing and endangered the stability of eastern Sinkiang and the Inner Mongolian tribal areas.

In the turmoil of war the little state of Tannu Tuva changed ownership almost unnoticed. After the Russian revolution and the Soviet intervention against Ungern-Sternberg, events there had proceeded on parallel lines to those in Outer Mongolia. Moscow was determined, however, to check the growing urge of the Uriankhai to join their Khalkha neighbours, and used troops to ensure that they should not do so. From the Russian point of view it was necessary that the Tannu Ola, guarding the approaches to the Kuznetsk industrial area, should be under their firm control: moreover, the mineral wealth of Tuva was complementary to the development of Kuznetsk. In 1944, therefore, Tannu Tuva was absorbed into the Soviet Union at its own request, as the Tuva Province of the Russian Federative Republic.

On 6th and 9th August, 1945, atomic bombs were dropped by the United States Air Force on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively, and on 8th August Russia declared war: Japan surrendered on 14th August. The Soviet Union was fully prepared to make the most of its last-minute campaign. Her troops advanced into Manchuria on 9th August through both terminals of the Chinese Eastern Railway, through Blagoveshchensk on the Amur, and through Outer Mongolia, occupying all key points including the Liao-tung Peninsula. Russian forces also occupied South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. On 11th August, Outer Mongolia, invoking her treaty with Russia, declared war on defeated Japan and sent

mobile troops into Manchuria, operating on the Russian right flank. In return for this she was able to share in some of the material assets captured from the Japanese.

This lightning expedition, against negligible resistance, ensured that Manchuria should fall into Russian hands to the exclusion of other foreign interests, particularly American.

CHAPTER X

Communist China

WHEN the terms of the Yalta Agreement were published in 1946, the Chinese public suffered yet another of the shocks to which it should by now have become accustomed. Demonstrations took place in many parts of the country, both against the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party; but the Western Allies, and particularly the United States, could not escape their share of the general odium.

In the meantime the danger of civil war in China was again growing, as Yenan radio resumed attacks on the Kuomintang, and Communist forces, which had during the War established themselves in inaccessible areas behind the enemy lines, began to accept the surrender of Japanese troops in their vicinity. Moreover, although with American help the Central Government troops were quickly able to occupy the chief cities of China proper, such as Peking, Tientsin, Nanking and Shanghai, Communist forces took over many smaller towns and frequent collisions occurred when the Nationalists tried to open up communications to them. Through American mediation, however, a Committee consisting of General Marshall, General Chang Chun and Chou En-lai, met on 7th January, 1946, and arranged for a cease-fire and the halting of troop movements by either side. A Political Consultative Conference, attended by Kuomintang and Communist representatives together with members of minority parties, was assembled three days later in Chungking, and optimistically set up political and military sub-committees to work out a form of constitution and a method of integrating the Communist troops and irregulars into a national army. It was agreed that during the next eighteen months the Central Government forces would gradually be reduced to fifty divisions and those of the Communists to ten.

It soon became clear that these deliberations were merely delaying tactics while the Communists strengthened their position, and that there was little possibility of real co-operation or compromise. The deep-rooted animosities between leaders who had fought one another for twenty years made genuine friendship impossible, and mutual distrust was widespread in both parties.

In the meantime Russia was beginning to show her hand.

At the time of the Japanese surrender, American and Soviet forces everywhere confronted one another in the Far East. Russia, who for generations had coveted Manchuria's economic and strategic potential, now feared that Japan's influence would give way to that of the United States, acting through the Nationalist Government. At that time Stalin did not appear to think that the Communists were capable of seizing control of the northern provinces, let alone the whole country. The Russians therefore began to remove to the U.S.S.R., on a large scale, rolling-stock and industrial plant including power generators, transformers, laboratories and hospital equipment, thus depriving many of the population of their livelihood and the territory of its economic resources. They justified this action on the grounds that anything which had contributed to the support of the Japanese forces was war booty, even if the ownership had not been Japanese. The Chinese Communists were consistent in refraining from any adverse comment on this spoliation of their richest provinces.

It had been agreed between Moscow and Chungking that the Soviet forces should begin their withdrawal from Manchuria three weeks after the Japanese surrender, and would complete it within a further three months. They should therefore have left the country by the end of November, but the date of evacuation was several times postponed owing to difficulties which arose in handing over localities to the Nationalists; difficulties which, as we shall see, were largely of the Russians' own making.

At the end of the War no properly organized Communist formations existed in Manchuria, as the Red forces had been driven underground by the Japanese. As soon as these surrendered, however, they once more became active and were joined by irregulars from within the Wall, including scattered Communist bands, part of Chang Hsüeh-liang's Manchurians returning to their homeland, and Chinese trained in the U.S.S.R. since the Japanese occupation: many came in by junk and other craft from Shantung province. They at once set in motion their propaganda machinery, and began to re-equip themselves with abandoned Japanese weapons, a proceeding which the Russians were unable or unwilling to prevent. By the end of 1946 it is estimated that the Communist forces in the Three Eastern Provinces totalled some 400,000, compared with about 500,000 in China proper.

In September, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek had arranged with Washington for the U.S. Navy to transport Central Government troops to Manchuria in order to take over from the Russians,

using the port of Dairen as the most suitable means of access. The Soviet ambassador opposed the use of Dairen for this purpose on the grounds that the Sino-Soviet Treaty had designated Dairen as a commercial port only. After considerable argument the Russians agreed that Nationalist troops might land at Newchwang, Antung or Hulutao: when in October the troopships arrived, however, it was found that Newchwang and Hulutao had already been taken over by Communist units which refused all facilities. The troops were eventually landed at Chinwangtao, inside the Wall, and began a long overland march into Manchuria. As regards Dairen, the Soviet authorities gave out that they were continuing to control the port because no Chinese officials had arrived to take up their duties; the Chinese retorted that they had not been able to send officials to the Liaotung Peninsula because of the presence of anti-Government forces, and vainly reiterated that the only solution was to land troops at Dairen. In the meantime none but Soviet ships were allowed to use that port with the exception of United States courier vessels, and even these were denied access early in 1947. In any event the Russians claimed that they were not bound to cease their functions in Dairen until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

The Nationalists, denied the use of seaports and air facilities, ordered the troops which had been landed at Chinwangtao to advance on Mukden, and by December these had fought their way against Communist opposition to within twenty-five miles of that city. The Soviet Government tried, by delaying the withdrawal of its occupation forces, to force the recall of the United States Military Mission, but in March, 1946, the Russians evacuated Mukden and Chinese Nationalist troops were able to occupy the southern province (Liaoning) of Manchuria. When Harbin, Changchun and Tsitsihar were evacuated in April, however, they were occupied by the Chinese Communists before Chiang's troops could reach them. By May Communist infiltration had proceeded at such a rate that only the Shanhaikuan–Mukden section of railway was firmly under Nationalist control.

It is probable that Chiang Kai-shek, with full American political and logistic support, could at this time have effectively disposed of the Communist forces, for the Russians were sitting on the fence and not yet prepared openly to challenge the other Allies in this theatre. Chiang's position was weakened, however, both by the Americans who still hoped for a peaceful accommodation, and by a section of the Kuomintang which contended that the presence of United States advisers and troops was hindering a settlement.

The prolonged withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Manchuria, which caused much anti-Russian feeling at the time, had been used as a threefold lever; to extort economic concessions, to bargain for the evacuation of the Americans, and to allow Communist influence to spread over the country. Soviet forces would not, for example, usually hand over a locality direct to the Kuomintang forces but would leave the place in time for the nearby Reds to enter before the Government units arrived. On 31st May, 1946, the last Soviet troops left Manchurian soil, with the exception of the Liaotung Peninsula where Russian garrisons remained at Port Arthur and Dairen in accordance with the 1945 Treaty. By November it had become clear that American mediation could not bring the two Chinese factions together and Chou En-lai returned to Yenan. Now that a final breach seemed inevitable, it was to be expected that Moscow's sympathies would at last be revealed. Russia, however, was pursuing a cautious policy for several reasons. She was not yet convinced that the Communists would speedily conquer the whole of China and was not prepared to provoke complications with her Western Allies for the sake of a gamble. Moreover, premature aid to the Reds would be met by increased supplies to the Nationalists from the Americans, who were then better placed to provide them. A beginning was made, however, by furnishing the Chinese Communists with political advice and instruction in the use of modern military equipment, and the Russian-trained Li Li-san, who had been in the U.S.S.R. for some years, now returned to head the Communist organization in Manchuria. The Soviet Press also sharpened its comments on both Kuomintang and American activities in the Far East, although Moscow still recognized the Nationalists as the legal government of China.

In March, 1947, Kuomintang troops captured Yenan without serious fighting, for the Communists had withdrawn into the hills, no longer intent on holding a static position in the remote northwest. On the other hand, the Red units had by this time been organized into major formations and trained in the use of their Japanese equipment, and now began to take the offensive in Manchuria and North China. By 1947 it had become clear that co-operation between the Kuomintang and Communists was unattainable, either in the political or military sphere, and in February the Communist delegation had withdrawn from Nanking. The Generalissimo therefore decided to reorganize the National Government without them, assumed the title of President and appointed as his Vice-President the former Kwangsi warlord Li Tsung-jen. At the

same time he withdrew recognition from the Chinese Communist Party and decided to settle the constitutional problem by force. The United States, disappointed at the failure of its efforts, began to shed its commitments in China and to withdraw its military contingents.

After evacuating Manchuria, Soviet troops had remained in Eastern Siberia, Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula, while colonies of Soviet citizens still resided in the towns of the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. Many of the stateless emigrant Russians, who had lived in Manchuria and China proper since the revolutionary wars, now took Soviet citizenship: a large proportion belonged to a generation which had not personally fought against the Bolsheviks, and were evidently considered a good risk by the Soviet authorities. Others who had taken a prominent part on the side of the Whites, such as the fugitive Ataman Semeonov, were arrested as traitors and executed. Many senior posts under the Soviet occupation authorities were taken over by Chinese who had been living in Russia during the war and who were therefore more closely in touch with Soviet ideas than the Kuomintang officials. During the Soviet occupation the running of the Manchurian railways was also entrusted to Russian and Chinese Communist organizations which worked in close co-operation, so that when the officials appointed by the Central Government arrived they found themselves unable to exercise their authority. The local Communist organizations lost no time in making arrangements with Soviet trade representatives for direct Russo-Manchurian commerce. These contacts steadily developed without reference to the Central Government and in July, 1949, culminated in a trade pact between the Russians and The Manchurian People's Democratic Authorities, whereby Soviet manufactures were to be exchanged for soya beans, sorghum and other crops. By that time, of course, the Chinese Communist regime had been firmly established in the north.

The position of Inner Mongolia gave anxiety to the Nationalist Government. This territory had been under Japanese influence from 1933 to 1945 and the tribes had tasted freedom from Chinese exploitation. It was feared that Outer Mongolia, with Soviet encouragement, might take advantage of the fluid situation to unite the Inner Mongols under its own rule. Civil strife started in this area soon after the end of the war. The position of Prince Teh and the pro-Japanese leaders was of course easily undermined, leaving a vacuum which the Nationalists and Communists both hastened to fill. The former succeeded in transporting troops to Kalgan, the

capital, and in 1947 set up a Mongolian Autonomous Region which included the tribal areas of Suiyuan, Chahar and part of Jehol in Manchuria. The Communists, for their part, based their operations on Manchuria, where their strength was first concentrated. In the Barga District Chinese Red forces established a so-called Autonomous Mongol Federation, the nomad population acquiescing owing to its inferiority in numbers and armament. Here they organized Mongol Communist contingents led by Urdan, a graduate from a Soviet military academy, and together occupied the eastern part of Chahar and other areas remote from the main centres.

In accordance with the agreements between the Chinese and Soviet Governments at the end of the war, a plebiscite was held on 20th October, 1945, to determine whether the Outer Mongolian people desired independence. For a primitive and extensive country, with few modern means of communication, the arrangements appear to have been effective as well as picturesque, since the result was announced the following day. Thousands of mounted messengers were used to gallop from tribe to tribe on the swiftest post-ponies, carrying the traditional courier's badge, a falcon, used since the days of Genghiz Khan. The illiterate Mongols, faced with the alternatives of independence or Chinese suzerainty, were practically unanimous in choosing the former; and the Chinese Government, which had taken no part in these proceedings beyond stationing an observer at Ulan Bator, was in due course informed that the plebiscite had been 98.4 per cent in favour of independence. The Nationalist authorities, aware that they were surrendering something they did not really possess, could not but acquiesce in this result, and on 5th January, 1946, they recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia.

In the same year, all local opposition having been overcome, the construction was begun of the railway from Kiakhta to Urga which had first been proposed by Imperial Russian officials in 1911. The Soviet Government, however, deemed it timely to regularize its relations with the now legally independent state, and in February, 1946, a new Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed. As in the previous treaty, each government pledged itself to render military and other aid if its partner were attacked by a third party; and as in the days of Ungern-Sternberg, the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made conditional upon Outer Mongolia's security being no longer menaced. In fact the Mongol forces necessarily depended upon Russia for their training and maintenance, and Soviet personnel continued to serve in key posts.

In the same month in which the Russo-Mongol treaty was concluded, an Outer Mongolian delegation paid its first formal visit to the Chinese capital as representatives of a foreign state. Resentment was at first expressed by the Mongols because their flag was not flown on this occasion, and the Chinese had to explain that they had never been informed of its design. This problem amicably settled, diplomatic relations were established between the two countries, but no Nationalist representative had arrived in Ulan Bator by the time that the Communists had seized power in China. In the meantime further steps were taken to bind Outer Mongolia more firmly to the U.S.S.R., particularly in the field of education. Since the thirteenth century the Mongol language had been written in the Syriac Script introduced through the Uighurs of Turkestan; but in 1946, on the advice of Soviet educators, the Cyrillic alphabet was adopted. This innovation had three effects: it facilitated both the importation of Russian political and technical terms into Mongolian, and the learning of Russian by Mongols; moreover, it erected a further barrier between Outer and Inner Mongolia, since the latter continued to use the original script.

The Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang during the war had not put an end to anti-Chinese disturbances on the part of Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek and other tribes along the Russian and Outer Mongolian borders. The worst outbreaks occurred around Kuldja (Ili) and Chuguchak, in the richest part of the country. As already described, the Chinese Central Government in 1945 had succeeded in liquidating the "East Turkestan Republic" which had been set up in Ili during 1944, and under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 the Russian Consul-General at Urumchi played the part of mediator between the rebels and the Nationalist representatives. In January, 1946, an agreement was reached under which the internal autonomy of the Ili region was confirmed, with the right to raise local troops. Attempts were also made to conciliate the native population of Sinkiang by setting up a provincial council with a majority of Muslim members, and by appointing a Kazakh as deputy-governor.

The Central authorities were further embarrassed in 1947 by collisions in the Altai region between their troops in Sinkiang and those of Outer Mongolia. As in other parts of the Chinese Empire, this frontier had never been accurately demarcated since the days when first the Kalmyks and then the Manchus ruled over both Sinkiang and Khalkha, and the nomadic populations had been accustomed to move from one territory to another without hin-

drance. Altai, moreover, had been considered part of Outer Mongolia until 1922, since when its ownership had been in question. In June, 1947, the Outer Mongolians attacking the disputed feature known as Peitashan were supported by aircraft carrying markings common to both the Soviet and Mongol air forces; recriminations followed, each side claiming Peitashan, but no satisfactory settlement was reached. Meanwhile the internal situation in the province was steadily deteriorating. The Central Government took the unprecendented step in May, 1947, of appointing an Uighur as governor, but its arm was not long enough to contend with the constant outbreaks stimulated by forces across the frontiers, and it was already clear that it was fighting a losing battle.

In China proper the balance of fortune in the civil war had passed by the spring of 1947 to the Communists, who, as in the Northern Expedition of 1926–1927, advanced almost without fighting. The Nationalist troops were weary of serving so far from their homes, and many of the Nationalist officials were corrupt. The Kuomintang failed through economic difficulties, bad morale and lack of public support; it had forfeited "the mandate of Heaven" and the confidence of the United States. The Communists succeeded because they were the only alternative: the pro-Japanese element was of course now in eclipse; the pro-Americans had been disillusioned by Yalta; and the Soviet star was in the ascendant. The collapse began in Manchuria, where Lin Piao's Communist forces, by local recruiting, soon outnumbered the Nationalists. The latter were largely from Central and South China, out of sympathy with the local population, and increasingly discontented at serving in an uncongenial clime.

The American Government under President Truman grew more and more disinclined to interfere in China's affairs, and this last obstacle to a Communist victory was removed. The sequence of events was catastrophic. In the spring of 1947 the Reds began to take the offensive in Manchuria. By the autumn of 1948 they had taken Mukden, Kirin, Changchun and other Manchurian centres: in China proper their forces in the Yellow River valley occupied Loyang during April and Kaifeng in June, while in the last four months of the year they captured Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, and the vital railway junctions of Chengchow and Hsüchow.

By the end of 1948 the whole of Manchuria was in Communist hands, but the northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan were still held for Chiang Kai-shek by General Fu Tso-yi, a former governor of the last-named province. Fu's troops, however, found

themselves outnumbered and isolated, and Kalgan was soon abandoned to the enemy. During January, 1949, having lost all other cities in North China except Taiyuan and Tsingtao, Fu Tso-yi surrendered Peking and Tientsin and in return was allowed temporarily to remain in control of Suiyuan. In April the revolutionary forces crossed the Yangtze without serious opposition and on the 24th occupied the Nationalist capital at Nanking, the centre of government having moved to Canton. Taiyuan in Shansi fell on the same day. During May the Communist wave swept over Hankow, Shanghai and Sian, and in June the port of Tsingtao surrendered. August saw Lanchow, Changsha and Foochow in the rebels' hands, and Amoy fell the following month.

On 1st October, 1949, the Communists proclaimed the setting up of a "Chinese People's Government", with Peking as its capital and Mao Tse-tung as its head. This was followed by the taking of Canton on 14th October and Kweilin in the south-west on 22nd November, and the removal of the fugitive Kuomintang capital once more to Chungking. One by one the provincial governors surrendered to the winning side; while the Muslims of Kansu and the north-west, indifferent to the merits of the two Chinese factions, put up no resistance to the revolutionaries. Thus at the end of November the Red forces occupied Chungking, and the Nationalists, after a brief stay at Chengtu, abandoned the mainland altogether and early in December withdrew with the remnant of their army to Formosa. When the year ended the Communists had conquered the whole of continental China, although they had not entered Tibet, a country whose national status was as nebulous as that of nineteenth-century Korea or twentieth-century Mongolia. In April, 1950, the island of Hainan, lying off the Kwangtung coast, was abandoned to the Communists virtually without fighting, leaving Formosa as the only considerable piece of territory still in Chiang Kai-shek's possession. There emerged, therefore, two Chinese governments, that of the Kuomintang at Taipei and that of the Communists in Peking, each claiming sovereignty over all China's territories and dependencies.

The Soviet Government showed no hesitation about which regime to accept, for it accorded recognition to the "Chinese People's Republic" the day after its proclamation. On 3rd October the Nationalist Government severed relations with Moscow, and General Roshin, who had been Soviet Ambassador both at Chungking and Canton, was forthwith accredited to the Communists at Peking.

The border territories, finding themselves for the first time

sandwiched between a Communist Russia and a Communist China, had no alternative but to conform. Outer Mongolia at once exchanged ambassadors with the new "People's Republic" and severed relations with the Nationalist Government while it was still at Canton. In Sinkiang the last-minute attempts of the Kuomintang to consolidate its position were unavailing. When the Peking regime was proclaimed in October, 1949, the native governor Burhan, the Nationalist military commander and many leading Chinese and Muslims declared for it. When, therefore, a Communist force under Peng Te-huai arrived before Urumchi, the capital was handed over without fighting, and Peng's military headquarters became the effective authority over the province. A concession to local feeling was made by confirming Burhan in his nominal appointment of governor and including the representative of the former East Turkestan Republic in the provincial administration. In the tribal areas, however, Peng's rule was regarded as even more obnoxious than that of the Kuomintang, and sporadic resistance was offered to the Chinese troops. This was too weak and ill-co-ordinated to achieve any decisive result, but the most striking operation was that of the Kazakhs who, with their families and herds, contrived to escape over the Pamir into Kashmir. After losing the greater part of their numbers through fighting and hardships they reached safety and were, by international arrangement, eventually settled among their Turkish kinsmen in Anatolia. This adventure matches that of those other nomads, the Kalmyks, who fled from the Volga into Chinese protection in the eighteenth century.

In December, 1949, Mao Tse-tung used the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday to visit Moscow and discuss the future of Sino-Russian relations. He was accompanied by the Communist deputy-governor of Manchuria and Seif-ud-din of the puppet Sinkiang administration. Conditions needed considerable overhauling in that Moscow had now to deal with another Communist government which might be expected to seek the abrogation of privileges gained by Russia's imperialist exploitation. The magnitude of the occasion may be inferred from the fact that Stalin attended the Chinese ambassador's dinner at the Metropole Hotel, the first time that the dictator had dined out since he seized power.

After two months of negotiation a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed in February, 1950, together with agreements on Manchurian railways, the Liaotung Peninsula, and long-term credits. At the same time the 1945 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded with the Kuomintang

Government was annulled, the Communists gaining considerable face by the more favourable terms now obtained. The main difference between the new Treaty and the old is that, now, if either party should be attacked by Japan *or by a power allied with Japan*, the other would render military or other assistance by all means at its disposal. The Chinese-Changchun railway zone would revert to China not later than the end of 1952, when Soviet troops would also withdraw from Port Arthur. Russia also engaged to open a credit of 300 million U.S. dollars (incongruously the only satisfactory standard of value) for the purchase of Soviet industrial equipment, repayable over five years at one per cent. The U.S.S.R. undertook to hand over to the Chinese, without compensation, the property of Japanese firms in Manchuria which it had seized. The two countries furthermore agreed to co-operate economically and to consult one another on all important international questions. The complete independence of Outer Mongolia was acknowledged by both parties, although the causes of its dependence upon Russia continued to operate as before. The treaty was to remain in force for thirty years. Although the credits were small, taking into account the devastation of China, they were probably as much as Russia could spare from her own expenditure on reconstruction; and the Chinese had reason to be better pleased with the other conditions than they were by the 1945 treaty.

Having consolidated their position in Sinkiang the Chinese Communists were able to benefit from Russian experience on both sides of the frontier. They justified the assumption of authority by a ten per cent Chinese minority over the ninety per cent Uighurs, Mongols and Iranians as a means of conferring the benefits of Han leavership on the Family of the Five Races, just as the Great Russians have assumed the role of big brother in the heterogeneous Soviet family. While proclaiming the establishment, in 1955, of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, Peking was careful to point out that it was also "an inseparable part of the Chinese People's Republic". To implement this policy Chinese "cadres" were appointed to advise and guide all branches of the administration, while the State Council in Peking retained the right to reverse any local decisions. External control could hardly be more effective.

The main problem was the internal one of controlling the national and Islamic sentiments of the native population. Again following Soviet practice, attempts were made, particularly in 1952 and 1953, to substitute class divisions for national and tribal loyalties, "undesirable elements" being executed or imprisoned;

attacks were also made on the privileged position of the *begs*, or gentry, and on the wealth of the *Waqf* (religious foundations). Control of press and publication made it possible to purge the native literature of traditions likely to promote national enthusiasms, and, as in Soviet Central Asia, the Cyrillic alphabet replaced the Arabic script for writing the Uighur-Turkish language. In order to develop the economy under Chinese guidance, Peng's troops were employed as direct state labour in agriculture, road construction and building, while students and peasants were brought in from Honan, Shansi, and other provinces to work on government projects. Attempts were also made, as in Outer Mongolia, to collectivize the livestock of the nomads, which provoked disorders in many of the tribal areas.

Not the least of the questions to be answered in Sinkiang was that of future Sino-Russian relations. For over a century its history had been one of growing Russian influence at the expense of China; now at last the Chinese were seen to possess a strong militarized government of fellow-Communists with whom the Soviet Union was anxious to collaborate. In March, 1950, therefore, an agreement was signed for the development in co-operation of Sinkiang's economic resources. Two joint-stock companies were to be formed, each government providing half the capital, to exploit petroleum and non-ferrous metals respectively. A ten-year civil aviation agreement was concluded at the same time, providing for air services between Peking and Chita, Irkutsk and Alma-Ata, airfields in Sinkiang being used as required. These were followed in April by a trade compact, under which Soviet industrial equipment would be supplied in exchange for Sinkiang's raw materials.

After the military occupation by Communist troops the process of assimilating the province to the Chinese pattern was proceeded with. Burhan was replaced as governor by the Uighur Communist Seif-ud-din, who had been to Moscow with Mao, but the real authority resided in the Sinkiang branch of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, whose head was a native of Kiangsu. Indigenous officials were appointed only to subordinate posts. The Chinese element in the population was also further increased by the policy of industrialization, since, as in Russian Central Asia, personnel with the necessary aptitude and training had to be brought in from outside. That the Muslim population did not quickly become reconciled to these developments is shown by Communist admissions of popular risings during 1956 which had to be suppressed with Chinese troops, this time without Russian intervention. Nor were the native races

deceived by the outward trappings of the "Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region", for in 1957 there was agitation among vocal sections of the population for a truly national, or at least federated, state, while in Ili the old cry of "East Turkestan Republic" was once more heard. Such a development was, of course, unwelcome both to Moscow and Peking because, as in the case of Mongolia, this might attract peoples on both sides of the frontier and encourage their aspirations to independence.

In Inner Mongolia, now once more part of China, the Communists continued the process of agricultural exploitation which had been checked by Prince Teh's puppet regime. In the traditional Chinese manner troops were used to open up the land, and co-operative farms and state-trading organizations were introduced as preliminaries to full-scale control on the Communist pattern. As the population of the Inner Mongolian provinces was now overwhelmingly Chinese, there was no need to stop at the more indirect methods employed by the Russians in Outer Mongolia.

CHAPTER XI

The Moscow–Peking Axis

THE mutual recognition of Communist governments in Russia and China opened a new chapter in the history of Asia. For the first time these two empires found themselves in a firm alliance hostile to the other Great Powers.

It therefore became desirable to foster in China a pro-Russian public opinion, for the majority of Chinese, congenitally prejudiced against all foreigners, were no more favourably disposed to the Russians than to any of the Western nations with whom their country had had dealings. Indeed for many Chinese of this generation the name *O-lo-ssu*, Russian, conjures up the spectacle of the "White" emigrant, poor, shiftless and without national protection, as compared with the prosperous and powerful Western communities of the Treaty Ports. The Communist party, of course, on principle approved of anything which Soviet Russia might do, but in order to widen the circle a Chinese-Soviet Friendship Association was formed. By 1959 this had not fulfilled the hopes of its sponsors and was almost defunct. The Peking regime, however, by constant propaganda and demonstrations of Soviet aid in the military and economic fields and by the suppression of all evidence of past Western benefits, was able to point to the Soviet Union as a benefactor and to enjoin the population to treat its representatives with respect. This has had the curious result of curbing personal xenophobia in that the ordinary Chinaman, unable to distinguish one foreigner from another, is fearful of showing animosity towards any non-Chinese stranger.

The Chinese Communists have continued to copy the Russian techniques, organization and methods of propaganda upon which they had relied during the years when they were in opposition. The form of government varies slightly from that of the Soviet Union, but as policy in all Communist countries is shaped by the Party, this is immaterial. On external questions the Chinese Reds have also followed the lead of Moscow. In 1948 they joined in Stalin's denunciation of Tito; they committed their troops to the support of Soviet policy in Korea; they condemned the Hungarian rebellion, and joined Russia in supporting Nasser's anti-Western attitude in the Middle East.

16. *Soviet–Chinese Frontier, 1949*

In one important respect, however, the Peking regime differs from that of the Satellite states in the west. Communist governments were set up in the latter by the use of Russian armed force or the threat of it: in China the Communists fought their own battles, albeit with spasmodic Soviet aid and encouragement. Moscow had learned many lessons since 1927, and realized that her new ally must be handled carefully, for she needed China almost as much as China needed her. The Communist movements in the two countries at first tended, as equals, to complement one another by dividing their activities between two spheres of influence, the Chinese operating in southern and eastern Asia and the Russians busying themselves in the rest of the world. Thus in 1952 a "Peace Conference of Asia and the Pacific Region" was held in Peking and a "World People's Peace Conference" in Vienna, both attended by Communists and their allies for the purpose of attacking and undermining Western foreign policy.

In organizing a regular army, the Chinese Communists were at first utterly dependent on Russia. The medley of British, American, Japanese, Russian and other equipment with which they found themselves after the war was a wasting asset which called for a policy of standardization. A Soviet military mission assisted

in the reconstruction of the Chinese armed forces, supplying large numbers of technical and training experts to both field formations and static establishments. Soviet equipment, including tanks, guns and vehicles, gradually replaced the heterogeneous armoury of 1945, while an air force was created on a foundation of Russian light bombers and fighters. Thus by 1950 the Communist Chinese Army was tending to become a replica of that of the U.S.S.R. The scope and pattern of Soviet aid has, however, gradually changed since 1950. By that time the Russian military mission, several thousand strong, had re-equipped and trained the Chinese army with modern weapons so that it was able to send a so-called volunteer force against the United Nations in Korea. Thereafter the number of Soviet officers and other ranks with the Chinese army gradually diminished, until by 1958 they were found mainly as individual instructors or technical experts in schools and static units. By that date also the Chinese were virtually self-sufficient as regards artillery, small-arms and ammunition, and were planning to produce their own armoured vehicles and lorries.

The Chinese also appear to have decided that their army is unlikely to take part in land campaigns similar to those of their Russian ally. Lighter vehicles, suitable for the bridges and ferries of the Far East, are now being developed, and horsed first-line transport is being retained with units; nor is there any requirement for the heavier types of artillery. On the other hand there are reports that the Russians are giving the Chinese the benefit of their experience in guided missiles, which could be employed either for defence in a major war or for attacking Formosa and the smaller off-shore islands to which Peking lays claim. These developments, so far as can be judged from Chinese official figures, have been accompanied by a steady fall since 1954 in the proportion of the budget allotted to military expenditure, this being shown as 23.5% in that year, 11.2% in 1959, and 8.3% in 1960.

Apart from common political and strategic interests, mainland China's shattered economy has leaned heavily on Russia, but there are signs that Peking wishes to lessen this dependence, not least because the Soviet Union is itself under strain and cannot be relied on to produce all China's requirements. A change in the apparent trade pattern was observable during the years 1955–1957, when there was a drop in the published figures for Soviet exports to Communist China, while in 1958 imports from the Free World rose considerably.

The Chinese Communist regime is in the state of hurry common to all dictatorships, "having great wrath, because he knoweth that

he hath but a short time". Having decided that it was neither possible nor desirable to depend too much on the U.S.S.R. in its economic advance, it endeavoured in 1958 to force the pace by pursuing three lines of action. As in Russia, iron and steel production must be rapidly stepped up because it was the core of industrial development; agriculture must be expanded to keep pace with industrialization; and "communes" must be established for the regimentation of manpower. These communes, which go far beyond any collective institution in Soviet Russia, are villages organized as barracks, in which economic and domestic life is conducted on a communal basis so that each man and woman can be directed to his appointed place in the scheme of production and of military training. As the communes are supposed to be self-sufficient both agriculturally and industrially, a large number of small uneconomic units has been created. It is not surprising that this headlong rush, in which it was hoped to accomplish the impossible task of combining drastic reorganization with simultaneous increase in output, resulted in overstrain and dislocation. In Moscow, where China's economy is naturally of major interest, some of the rarely admitted divergences of opinion were exposed in official comments, and Khrushchev publicly stated that the agricultural communes set up in the early days of the Russian revolution were a failure.

Chinese economic difficulties were a major factor leading to the Sino-Soviet trade agreement of 1959. In return for an increased export to Russia of raw materials and the products of light industry, China would receive technical aid, industrial equipment and other material to a total value of 5,000 million roubles over the period 1959–67. The purpose of this assistance was officially stated to be the construction of metallurgical, chemical, coal-producing, machine-building and electrical machinery and plants for the production of structural material, the building of power stations, and instruction in new radio techniques. More Soviet experts were to be sent to China, and Chinese would continue to go for technical training to the U.S.S.R. The setbacks of 1958 were reflected in an absence from the Chinese press of the vaunted achievements of preceding years, while the inability to fulfil many foreign contracts in 1959 was also an indication of the priority accorded to deliveries to the U.S.S.R.

Hand in hand with the policy of industrialization marches the improvement of internal communications, which has both political and military bearings. The development of railways to the borders of Indo-China and to the Fukien coast opposite Formosa

are obvious cases in point: but of special interest to Russo-Chinese relations is the extension of the Lunghai railway through Lanchow, with the intention of eventually linking Sinkiang more closely to China proper. Here for the first time is a factor making for the reversal, or at least the neutralization, of the province's historic tendency to look north and west, although it is balanced to some extent by the new Russian line from Aktogai on the Turksib to the Sinkiang frontier, which was reported to have been completed in June, 1959. A high priority has also been given to the double-tracking of the main railway lines, the greater part of which are still single: although on a different gauge, this will much increase the capacity of the Trans-Siberian extensions into Manchuria, Korea and China proper, and have both economic and military significance for the Sino-Soviet alliance. China still leans heavily on the U.S.S.R., however, for transportation equipment.

One of the main problems involved in the realignment of Chinese trade towards Russia is that of transporting the goods which formerly travelled by sea and river to Western countries. The return to the ancient trans-Asian routes, even when supplemented by the Siberian railways, cannot solve the problem if comparable tonnages are to be carried. A partial answer is the setting up of a Council for Mutual Economic Aid in the Soviet Bloc, including China, one of the objects of which is the improvement of the shipping position in the Communist countries so as to reduce their dependence upon Western bottoms. The construction, purchase, and chartering of ships is also being undertaken on an increased scale by the Soviet Union.

In April, 1959, coinciding with the period of economic rethinking after the setbacks of the previous year, certain changes were made in the Peking Government. Mao Tse-tung resigned his position as "Chairman" or President in favour of Liu Shao-chi, an expert in Communist theory rather than a practical statesman. Mao, who like Stalin had held the key posts of both government and party, continued as chief of the latter, so that in effect he retained supreme power. Chou En-lai, one of the few leading Communists with personal experience of Western countries, remained as Prime Minister. Liu Shao-chi had long been the deputy chief of the Party, and was in 1927 responsible for organizing riots and strikes in Hankow. When the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists occurred he went to Moscow for several years, and during the hostilities with the Japanese he was in charge of clandestine Communist organizations in enemy-occupied areas. The elderly Chu Teh, who for some thirty years

had worked with Mao as chief of the Communist military forces, and had recently been his deputy in the government, retired to the relative sinecure of chairman of the National Congress.

The conclusion of a Russo-Chinese alliance on the basis of political equality, instead of the former bullying of a weak neighbour, focuses particular interest on the position of the border territories.

Although Outer Mongolia is now organized politically on the lines of a Communist state, conditions have not favoured such radical measures as have been pursued in Russia or China. A considerable part of the country, the Gobi or Sha-mo in the south, is semi-desert; the western portion is mountainous; and the rest is pasture: the population is sparse, being outnumbered by the Mongols in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. There has been a redistribution of livestock at the expense of large owners such as the tribal princes and monasteries, but collectivization does not appear to have been proceeded with. Industries, at present on a minor scale, are run by the state or by co-operatives, and comprise mainly the extraction of low-quality brown coal and small quantities of gold, silver, lead, iron and sulphur. Trade is in the hands of State agencies. Russia and China are together guarding against the danger of pan-Mongolism by co-ordinating for the first time their policies in Outer and Inner Mongolia, as well as among the Buriats, in order to denationalize the Mongols and ensure their loyalty to the regimes under which they respectively live. A curious light was shed on Russo-Mongol relations by the Soviet delegate to a Party congress at Ulan Bator in 1958, when he referred in derogatory terms to Molotov, Malenkov and other Russian Communists recently disgraced and exiled by Khrushchev. The fact that Molotov's form of punishment was his appointment as Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to the "Mongolian People's Republic" appeared to be of no significance as far as the Party dictatorship was concerned.

Outer Mongolia has continued to be isolated from the Western world, with which it had never established relations, but its external contacts have been somewhat widened since the War by the exchange of missions with China, the satellite countries and India. As far as China is concerned, an interesting development has been the gradual revival of contacts which had been virtually severed in 1922. A Chinese loan equivalent to 160 million roubles was made in 1956, and two year later a further loan of 100 million roubles for the development of electric power, roads and local industries. Moreover, in 1958 ten thousand skilled workmen were officially announced to have been sent from China with the option of settling in the country. The Chinese

section of the railway from Peking to Ulan Bator was officially opened in January, 1956, but it was not until June, 1959, that through trains began to operate between Moscow and the Mongolian capital. The usual change of gauge occurs from the Russian to the Chinese system. It is possible that this revival of Chinese influence is connected with the changes which occurred in the Outer Mongolian government during 1959, when six members of the Party's political bureau, and two of its secretariat, were publicly disgraced and dismissed. In a Communist state such purges generally denote a major change in policy; and the divergencies between the Moscow and Peking press comments reflect an internal struggle between pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions.

With or without Soviet encouragement, it would be surprising if the traditional Mongol suspicion of the Chinese had not been reinforced by China's recent actions in Tibet, for the Dalai Lama commands the reverence of all Mongol Buddhists. Russia has been careful not to associate herself with Peking's repression of Tibetan nationalism, and the Government at Ulan Bator owes its existence to Soviet, not Chinese, patronage. Although, therefore, the Chinese Reds have long clung to the theory that a Communist Outer Mongolia would naturally form part of a Communist China, there are no signs that this is likely to happen in the near future.

In the Inner Mongolian provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia the proportion of Chinese to natives was estimated in 1958 as approximately seven to one. The Peking Government, like its predecessor in 1911, hoped to weld the Five Races into a homogeneous republic and at first attempted to treat these territories as other Chinese provinces; but as a result of Mongol agitation for autonomy and resistance to assimilation the tribal areas were organized into an "Autonomous Region forming an integral part of the Republic of China". It was doubtless clear to Peking that a failure to make some concession would again turn the eyes of the tribes northward to Outer Mongolia, and the Autonomous Region was allowed a Governing Council headed by a Mongol Communist. Agricultural and industrial development continues, one of China's largest mica mines being situated in Inner Mongolia. To conform with Outer Mongolian educational policy, the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced in place of the old Uighur-Syriac, but this policy appears later to have been reversed, for when the author passed through the Barga District at the end of 1957, the names of railway stations were written up in the original script.

In their Central Asian dominions the Russians had to proceed with greater caution so as not to disturb the situation in Sinkiang.

The Soviet Government, by allocating resources as policy from time to time required, had been able to ensure that the standard of living of its Central Asian subjects was in most cases higher than that of their kinsmen over the border. Soviet propaganda therefore had endeavoured to awake interest in Persia, Afghanistan and Sinkiang, while opportunities were taken of introducing Soviet Asian representatives into those countries. Hitherto, however, the peoples as a whole had remained segregated on either side of strictly guarded frontiers.

Admissions appeared in the official press in 1954 and 1957 of persistent local nationalism and continued opposition to Soviet methods, particularly the attacks on religion which had succeeded in closing more than half the mosques since the revolution. Local functionaries have also been dismissed for encouraging Islamic practices, although the faith is officially tolerated. The governments of the Turkmenistan, Kazakh, Uzbek and other "republics" are in fact façades behind which the local Parties, which are regional organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, are the actual rulers. In addition to this, the proportion of Great Russians and Ukrainians to natives has been steadily increasing ever since 1926, and now varies from 15 per cent in some regions to as much as 50 per cent in others. This increase is particularly marked among officials, professionals and artisans: the local governments and party organs also contain a high proportion of Russians. This bias is likely to continue, since in the higher technical and educational centres in Central Asia the native students are in a minority.

Across the frontier in Sinkiang the old problem remained of curbing local nationalism, on the solution of which the Communists are now placing major emphasis. As in Inner Mongolia and Tibet, as well as in Soviet Central Asia, the introduction of colonists on a large scale is one of the means by which it is hoped that native resistance may be overwhelmed. Mention has already been made of the gradual improvement of communications through the Kansu corridor, which will not only facilitate the economic development of Sinkiang but will increase Chinese influence in relation to that of Russia. This influence has also been augmented by the transfer to Peking in 1955 of the Soviet shares in the joint aviation, oil, and non-ferrous metal companies.

Reference must here be made to Korea, which for the first time in history has lately become of direct Sino-Russian concern. The Land of Morning Calm, inhabited by a race more akin to the Manchus than the Chinese, had at various times since the Han Dynasty been in a state of vassalage to China, but in the latter

part of the nineteenth century had been detached from Manchu influence as a result of the Sino-Japanese war. Russia's ambition to obtain a foothold in the country and ports on its coast precipitated the war of 1904 and deferred her hopes for another forty years. In 1910 it was formally annexed by Japan, and remained part of that empire until her defeat in 1945. At the end of the Second World War, Korea found herself arbitrarily divided by the thirty-eighth parallel of latitude into a northern part occupied by Soviet troops and a southern portion occupied by forces of the United States. As in post-war Germany, it was inevitable that failure to agree on the future form of government for the whole country should result in the setting-up of a Russian-sponsored Communist regime in the north and a republic on the American model in the south.

As the Chinese Communists did not succeed in establishing themselves in power until 1949, North Korea, like Outer Mongolia, became a satellite of Russia and not of China. For this reason the Russians did not remove industrial plant as they did from Manchuria, the future government of which was still in doubt during their occupation. They had also long wished to retain control over North Korea in order to ensure the security of Vladivostok and the Maritime Province, formerly threatened by the presence of Japan and now, to their minds, menaced by the American forces in the Far East.

The Korean War broke out in 1950 when North Korean troops unexpectedly crossed the border on 25th June with the intention of occupying the whole country. The conflict was a product of miscalculation on both sides. The United States, through the utterances of several responsible public men, had given the impression that Korea was not vital to American defence. Stalin was therefore satisfied that his puppets, with the support of aircraft and modern weapons supplied by the Soviet Union, could quickly overrun the south without committing Russian troops. The inscrutable Occidentals, however, reacted with unusual speed, and advantage was taken of the absence of the Soviet representative from the United Nations Security Council to authorize the despatch of United Nations forces to Korea.

The North Koreans were driven back to the Yalu River, on the border of Manchuria, and were only saved by the sudden arrival across the frontier in November of a Chinese Army greatly outnumbering that of the United Nations and incongruously described as Communist "Volunteers". Despite their amateur status, the Chinese troops were commanded by General Peng Te-huai, now

deputy chief of the Peking Government's Military Commission, and were equipped with modern material largely of Soviet manufacture. In their turn the U.N. forces were driven back until the front was stabilized approximately on the line of the Thirty-Eighth Parallel, and after protracted negotiations an armistice was signed on 27th July, 1953. In weighing the factors which induced Mao Tse-tung to intervene in a war which was instigated by his Russian partner, it must be remembered that about 100,000 Koreans had operated with the Chinese Communists against the Kuomintang forces in Manchuria, and that the ownership of Korea has a bearing on the security of that territory. Moreover, the "unofficial" use of Chinese forces in this theatre would embarrass the Communist cause less than the direct intervention of Russian troops; while for reasons of prestige the North Korean regime could not be allowed to fail.

The Chinese expeditionary force at length withdrew, leaving the North Korean regime once more under Russian tutelage, the key administrative, economic and military posts being held either by Soviet experts or by Koreans trained in the Soviet Union. While the North Korean Communist party includes members with Chinese connections, these have been gradually removed from important positions, although it was a Chinese and not a Soviet force which, at great loss, saved the North Korean Army from destruction. There exist in Korea, as have long existed in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions. As already described, the association of Korea with China, both political and cultural, is an ancient one, but during the present century a very large Korean population has grown up on Russian territory. This is partly indigenous, being an overspill into the Maritime Province, and partly the result of an exodus from Japanese oppression; during the Second World War it furnished contingents to the Soviet Army. Like the Buriats, it provides a Russian-trained community capable of assuming the leadership of its less sophisticated kinsmen.

In 1950 the Peking regime, having consolidated its hold over the western provinces, determined to assert its authority in Tibet, a country which, like Korea, had from time to time acknowledged Chinese suzerainty but had never formed an integral part of China. Following the example of the Soviet regime in Russia, it evidently felt obliged to claim a domain no less extensive than that of its imperial predecessors. Chinese troops entered the country on a scale never approached in earlier expeditions. A large labour force accompanied the army for road-building, so

that it could be supplied by motor transport with its requirements of food and ammunition. In 1951 an agreement was forced upon the Dalai Lama, according to his own statement, by which an autonomous government "within the Chinese People's Republic" was organized in such a way as to permit nominees of Peking to hold the key appointments. Under this system any opposition to Communist wishes resulted in the removal of the official concerned. As in Mongolia, the Communists' primary target was the Church, as being the most influential element in Tibet, and the position of the lamas was consistently undermined. Since these formed the most educated and largest single section of the population, such a policy was tantamount to alienating the backbone of the nation, and was strongly resisted. Acts of violence took place at many monasteries, and much church property was confiscated: as elsewhere, attempts were also made to subvert the Buddhist religion and to indoctrinate students and school children with Communist ideas. Forced labour of men, women and children was resorted to on a large scale in order to build roads and thus open up the country to further penetration.

In 1956 the actions of the Chinese provoked open revolts, particularly among the warlike tribes of Kham in the north-eastern part of the country nearest the Chinese frontier. The Dalai Lama has stated that since then some 80,000 Tibetans have been killed and many deported to China: he has added that over five million Chinese settlers have been brought in and that a further four million are to come; but these figures may include the border provinces of Sikang and Kokonor which are historically part of Tibet but, like the Mongolian provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, have been colonized for many years by Chinese. The Tibetan race is estimated to comprise only about three million people, and the Chinese may therefore be tempted to swamp it with settlers as they have swamped the Inner Mongolians and as the Russians are submerging the peoples of Central Asia. Military operations against the Khamba tribes resulted in many of the rebels moving westwards and spreading the fire of revolt in the interior, but the Chinese, realizing that they had been too hasty in imposing their new order, called a halt and postponed many of the changes.

Things came to a head in February, 1959, when the Dalai Lama was invited to attend an exhibition organized by the Chinese headquarters in Lhasa. Tibetan opinion, based on fear of treachery, was against his going, although negotiations on the future constitution were being conducted between his government and the Peking representatives. Chinese reinforcements had recently

arrived for the garrisons in Lhasa and elsewhere, partly as a result of anti-Chinese demonstrations and doubtless also to strengthen their negotiators' hands, just as General Hsü had attempted to intimidate the Urga Living Buddha in 1919. On 17th March the Chinese, for reasons not yet clear, opened fire in the Lhasa area, and the Dalai Lama, accompanied by members of his family and his closest entourage, secretly fled from the capital. The importance attached by Peking to the Dalai Lama's person may be gauged from the fact that several thousand troops supported by aircraft, were employed in trying to prevent his escape from Tibet. After an arduous journey over the Roof of the World, however, the Dalai Lama and his devoted followers reached safety in India, where he was given sanctuary.

As was done in Russia during the Hungarian Rising of 1956, the Chinese tried to explain away the Tibetan resistance by pretending that the Dalai Lama had been abducted and by pointing to foreign scapegoats. Accusations were levelled at India, but as it did not suit Communist policy to alienate Indian opinion too far, some of the odium was diverted to the fancied finger of British imperialism, a bogey of respectable antiquity in that part of the world.

Following the flight of Tibet's supreme spiritual and temporal ruler, Peking dissolved the Tibetan government on 29th March and replaced it by a provisional administration nominally headed by the Panchan Lama. The Panchan or Tashi Lama is the second highest authority in Tibet, and during the years of Anglo-Russian-Chinese rivalries it had become the practice for these powers to play off one dignitary against the other. For the last twenty-five years the holders of the Panchan's office had been much subject to Chinese influence, and since 1956 the youthful incumbent had been surrounded by Peking's representatives with a view to the possibility of his superior being superseded in the political sphere. In April, 1959, a reorganization of the Lhasa government took place, necessitated both by the need to replace unco-operative Tibetan officials and by the desire to bring it under the stricter control of Peking. A higher proportion of Chinese Communists and Tibetan collaborators was appointed to key posts, and an Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee announced its intention of carrying out social changes on Communist lines, particularly abolition of private serfdom and the seizure of land from its present owners. The administration was to be based on peasants' and herdsmen's associations analogous to the Chinese Communes, while the existing social divisions within the monasteries were to

be broken down. It was admitted that rebellion had still to be quelled, for many centres east and north of Lhasa remained in the hands of the Khamba.

The repercussions of the Dalai Lama's flight are likely to be considerable. In India, Nepal and the other Himalayan states the sympathy of Buddhists has been aroused; but in the case of both Outer and Inner Mongolia Tibet has for centuries been the cultural and religious centre, Lhasa and the Dalai Lama standing in the same relation to the Yellow Church as Rome and the Pope to Catholicism. Thus the events of 1959 have a significance for China and Russia greater than that of a purely internal disturbance. Moreover, they have succeeded in building up a genuine Tibetan nationalism.

To sum up; the second and successful Communist revolution was carried out with the help of Russian material and political technique, and, making allowance for differing local conditions, has relied greatly on Russian experience. It is now clear that talk about the "agrarian revolution", the invitation to other "democratic" parties to take part in government, and postponement of the state control of trade, industry and agriculture, were tactical moves in no way intended as permanent. The Communists mean to be as thoroughgoing in China as they have been in Russia, with a programme of large-scale industrialization to be completed in a hurry. They are at present necessarily tied to the Soviet Union by military and economic dependence and by common hostility to the Western world. The age-old problem of the borderlands, however, has yet to be solved. Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, not to mention parts of Siberia, are territories to which the Chinese have ancient titles but on which the Russians, for a variety of reasons, have lavished much thought, blood and treasure. However amicably the two Communist powers may agree upon joint exploitation of these lands, China can provide the necessary manpower to an extent which Russia can never hope to emulate, and population in the end determines possession. The influence of geography, previously on Russia's side, is being gradually modified by the development of modern communications with China proper. To what extent will Moscow willingly continue to contribute to this evolution? The future course of Sino-Soviet partnership will accordingly be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII

The Future

RUSSIA'S relations with China have always differed radically from those of other powers. The latter were from the first interested primarily in trade, while the government of the Tsars found itself, until the close of the nineteenth century, involved mainly in frontier problems; thus during that epoch the two neighbouring land empires, without recourse to open war, decided between them the fate of the Central Asian and Mongolian peoples.

From the time of the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1894 until the end of the Second World War Sino-Russian relations were inextricably bound up with Japan, and largely strategic: Manchuria was the apple of discord until the defeat in 1905 was avenged by the walk-over of 1945. During this period Russia had little use for China save as a means to an end. For the four years succeeding 1945 Russia sat on the fence, unsure whether or not the Communists would be successful in the civil war which had now resumed in China. With the victory of Communism in 1949 she found herself in a new relation which involved not only the old frontier problem but those of political, economic and strategic co-operation, on a far wider stage than before, against the Western powers.

THE FRONTIER

The frontier problem persists because Russia and China proper are not contiguous but separated by a cushion of sparsely inhabited steppelands. Pressure of population thus assumes a major importance, since a vacuum is as abhorrent to ethnography as to any other aspect of nature.

The total population of the Soviet Union is about 200 millions, of which the Russian element (Great, Little and White*) is approximately 77 per cent. The proportion to the whole of Great Russians, that is, of the nation's backbone, is 53 per cent or 106 millions: the remainder, in varying degrees, are less dependable ingredients. The population of the Chinese empire was estimated before the late war as roughly 500 millions, while its present

**Belorusski*: not to be confused with the term "White" used to distinguish the anti-Bolsheviks in the civil war.

government rates it at over 600 millions. Of these only about 10 millions are non-Chinese.

Only 10 per cent of the total Soviet population lives in Siberia, because there is insufficient manpower to develop the immense natural resources of Russia proper, and few spontaneously migrate beyond the Urals. In 1919 the population east of Baikal amounted to 4.4 millions, hardly more than 2 per cent of the total population of the U.S.S.R.; of these 2.3 millions were living in Khabarovsk and the Maritime Province. The resources and industries of Siberia are extensive, comprising coal, iron, oil, gold, timber, furs, fish, electric power and textiles. From the very first, however, development has been a costly business, depending on the provision of funds from the centre, and has had a military bias. It has become nevertheless an integral part of the Empire, and is now an extension of the Russian Federative Republic. As Russians have never been inclined to colonize distant places voluntarily, the peopling of Siberia has been due mainly to Government action, which often included forced deportation.

China, on the other hand, has a manpower surplus and a high birthrate, which is likely to increase as the standards of living and of medicine are improved. If close economic co-operation between the two countries is to continue, therefore, Russia will find it hard to refuse admission to Chinese settlers for the development of the Soviet Far East. These are already being transplanted in great numbers to the border provinces.

Mongolia

All Mongols, whether living in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia or Manchuria, look to Outer Mongolia as the home of their race just as they look to Tibet as the fount of their religion and philosophy. On the other hand the population of Outer Mongolia is estimated at only about one million, less than a tenth of that in Inner Mongolia, where $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions are Mongols and the rest Chinese.

Finance for the material development of Outer Mongolia has hitherto been provided entirely at Russia's expense, an operation which has gone far to make the Russian protectorate acceptable. In return, Mongolia has been a convenient source of meat and other animal products for the Soviet Union, especially during the war, and is potentially a great meat-producing area. The Russian-trained Buriats who have been introduced to run the administration, the army and the economy have never been popular with the nomads, partly because of their arrogance and partly because they were considered traitors to the Mongolian race through having

gone over to Russia. They will presumably be replaced by native Mongols so soon as enough are indoctrinated and trained.

After 1922 China's connections with Outer Mongolia were virtually cut off, so that this country thenceforward has had to rely on the Soviet Union for its development and defence. Since the establishment of the Peking Government in 1949, however, China has been assiduous in cultivating relations with her former dependency, including the offer of manpower to develop the economy of that sparsely populated land. The Russians would doubtless prefer to maintain the country as a buffer against Chinese penetration, but in view of the Sino-Soviet Treaty recognizing Mongolia's independence, it would be hard for them to resist it. On the other hand, the pro-Russian bias is of long standing, and feelings towards China will not be improved by what has been happening in Tibet.

Sinkiang

In 1955 it was estimated that 74 per cent of the people of Sinkiang were Turkish-speaking Uighurs, less than 10 per cent were Chinese, and the remainder belonged to minorities such as Kirghiz, Mongol and Tadjik. Most of these races, with the exception of the Chinese, are also represented in the Soviet "republics" contiguous to them and, as has been seen, better and shorter communications have turned their faces towards the U.S.S.R. rather than to China. The Chinese are endeavouring to rectify this by means of colonization, and already a high proportion of both the invading Communist and surrendering Nationalist troops have been settled in the province as permanent inhabitants. Technically trained Chinese are also being imported to develop the oilfields and other industries. The situation is also being modified by recent Sino-Russian agreements for joint development of the economy, by improving communications with China proper, and by bringing in Chinese peasants from other provinces. But for a long time the facts of geography and economics will maintain the present bias.

Manchuria

The population of Manchuria comprises 35 million Chinese and two million Mongols, besides an unimportant residue of Tungusic aborigines. Apart from the Barga District in the northwest, these provinces are now administered as an integral part of China proper.

For a century Manchuria has played a vital part in Russia's Far Eastern development. Apart from being the richest part of China as regards natural resources, it contains the Chinese Eastern Railway linking the Siberian system with Vladivostok, and access to warm-water ports in China and Korea which Russia has always coveted. In Manchuria are also situated Port Arthur and Dairen, which both Imperial and Soviet Russia desired as major naval and commercial ports respectively. Manchuria is now not only for the first time entirely under Chinese sovereignty, but the C.E.R., originally constructed to the Russian gauge, has been converted to standard, and is integral to the railway system of China. To that extent Russia's strategic link with Vladivostok and Korea is at China's mercy.

Korea

Korea is naturally of direct strategic interest to Russia and to China, and both countries have taken part in her recent history. Soviet forces occupied the northern portion first in 1945, while China was still under Kuomintang rule, but the Chinese provided the troops during the war with the United Nations five years later. Both countries have direct railway links with North Korea, and have provided economic and technical assistance; both Communist parties have co-operated closely with the Korean party. It appears, however, that Russia is determined to exert the dominant influence, and she is at present in a better position to provide the air and ground weapons required for the defence of this strategically important area.

Political Co-operation

The history of Communism in China has not always shown identity with Russia on questions of doctrine, but the Chinese party has faithfully followed Russian methods. Chinese nationalists, from Sun Yat-sen onwards, have turned to the Soviet Union for guidance in their admiration for her revolutionary technique, although many rejected the dogma of Communism. Like later revolutionaries in the Middle East, they embarked on the dangerous venture of utilizing Russia while hoping to retain their independence. Inevitably this ended in the open breach at Hankow in 1927, and the division of the Chinese revolutionaries into two irreconcilable camps.

Those who at that date decided to stick to Communism are the men with whom we have to do today. Mao Tse-tung and his col-

leagues, after the original break with Chiang Kai-shek, never deviated from the Soviet tactical line or from what they assert to be the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. Even when Russia's foreign policy appeared most damaging to China, as during her period of appeasement of Japan, the Chinese Communists sought to justify it; just as they have asquiesced in Russia's continued hold over Outer Mongolia and Korea. Until they achieved power, therefore, the Chinese Communists depended absolutely on Russia to support them against the outside world and to help them to victory. On the establishment of the "Chinese People's Republic" in 1949, Soviet help was still required on a massive scale to rehabilitate the shattered economy, to assist industrialization and to build up a modern army.

But the emergence of the Chinese Communists as the *de facto* government of mainland China also posed major questions of political co-operation. The highly centralized nature of its policy-making implies that Communism must at any moment present the same face to the whole world; and until 1949 this was achieved by means of central direction from Moscow, whether through the Communist International as in the early days, or the so-called Communist Information Bureau which followed it. Mao Tse-tung's visit to Stalin after the establishment of the "Chinese People's Government" soon revealed that a second focus had been created in the Communist world, and that directives would in future issue from Peking as well as from Moscow. The division into Communist spheres of influence followed the division into national spheres of interest: thus Moscow directs policy, as before, in the European Satellites, Outer Mongolia and North Korea, while the Communist state of North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao look naturally to their ancient neighbour and one-time suzerain.

It is in the direction of Communist parties in the Free World that co-ordination is likely to present greater difficulties. Moscow will doubtless continue to control their activities in Western Europe, the Middle East (including Pakistan and Afghanistan), Africa and America, and Peking the corresponding movements on the mainland of South-east Asia (including Burma and Malaya). On the other hand, there have been signs that the Chinese would like to take a hand also in the Middle East, as witness their request in 1959 for Arab trade unionists to confer in Peking instead of Prague. Conversely, Ho Chi-minh, the Vietnamese Communist chief, visited Moscow as well as Peking in 1959.

Four areas important to world Communism but in which there

might be a clash of interests are India, Ceylon, Indonesia and Japan. Russia and China have both courted Nehru and have exchanged high-level visits, but lately China's official contacts with India have been more active owing to developments in South-east Asia, Tibet and Nepal, and the existence of an ill-defined frontier between them. The Communist movement in India, however, was organized long before 1949, and would be expected to look to Moscow rather than Peking. It is significant that in 1959 Moscow did not echo the hostile utterances of the latter regarding Tibet and the Himalayan border, or take sides in the Indonesian dispute.

Ceylon's two Communist groups are also of many years' standing and do not appear to have been under Chinese direction. Indonesia, owing to its geographical situation, its Malay population, and the widespread Chinese minority in its midst, would naturally fit into Peking's sphere of influence, but Communism was fostered here in the days of Dutch rule, and must for some time have been guided from Moscow. The attitude of Japan is of course of such importance to Russia and to China that both will undoubtedly formulate their own ideas of the policy to be adopted towards her.

It is therefore vital to world Communism that the two giants keep in step, so that a very much greater burden is now thrown on their co-ordinating machinery. There have already been several disagreements on policy, such as the attitude to be adopted towards Yugoslavia, towards Arab revolutionaries and the organization of the Chinese communes, which have required skill, and sometimes personal meetings between Khruschev and Mao, in order to cover up the divergences. Already differences of approach are evident, Peking generally revealing itself as more truculent and uncompromising. The reasons are largely geographical and historical. The Chinese Communists, and the overwhelming majority of the people, are more ignorant of the outside world than their Russian allies: few of their rulers have been abroad, and of these most have never been beyond Moscow: it is therefore natural that they should be the victims of self-deception to an even greater degree. Moreover, the recent expulsion of foreign missionaries and merchants, long described by politically-minded Chinese as "the imperialist yoke", has been succeeded by a purposely stimulated hesperophobia. This is of course exacerbated by exclusion from the United Nations in favour of the Formosa regime, and the deep-seated arrogance of the Chinese, who are also temperamentally more emotional than the Russians. Revolutionaries who have only recently achieved power are by nature more bellicose and extreme

than those who have long shouldered the responsibilities of administration, and Mao Tse-tung now claims to be modelling his revolution strictly according to the principles of Marx without any interpretation or intercession on the part of the Soviet leaders. This alone is likely to lead to that doctrinal hair-splitting which often inspires the bitterest passions.

The Chinese rulers seem also less afraid of the use of force. This is partly for geographical reasons, since their population and resources are not concentrated in vulnerable areas to the extent that they are in the U.S.S.R.; and partly because the military centre of gravity of the West is on the other side of the world. It is therefore probable that when Moscow and Peking consult over some issue of foreign policy, the latter will counsel a less accommodating stand. It would certainly not wish to see a *rapprochement* of Russia with the Western powers, particularly if this involved a reduction in the present scale of Soviet aid. It is probably no coincidence that the Chinese Communists opened an intensive bombardment of the Nationalist off-shore islands in 1958, and a Communist rebellion flared up in Laos during 1959, just at the times when Khrushchev was intending to visit the United States. There may, however, be occasions on which Russia may approve of World Communism's assuming a dual role, one to lull the Free World into a sense of security, and the other to threaten and undermine.

The Chinese people as a whole do not welcome Russians in their midst any more than they do other foreigners, between whom they have difficulty in differentiating. Apart from members of the Communist Party, therefore, public opinion in China will be favourably disposed toward Russia only so long as she appears to be helping their country.

Economics

Apart from a virtual monopoly of trade with the marginal territories of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, Russian imports from China have never amounted to more than a fraction of those of the other trading nations (about 0.75 per cent of the pre-war total), while Russian exports have been even less. Whereas other countries invested vast sums in railways, shipping, factories and public works, Russia's only major investment was the Chinese Eastern Railway, much of the capital in which was not her own.

Thus Russia never acquired the solid influence that is built on economic ties, and her predominant position in China's present relations has rested on the impermanent bases of politics and

dogma. In order to preserve this position and to take the place of the Western powers in China's economy Russia would have to employ resources which she can ill spare from efforts to expand her own. This problem is being tackled by attempting to organize trade on a Soviet Bloc basis, so as to make the members as independent as possible of Western countries. At present Russia, with the East European Satellites, supplies most of China's requirements of mineral oil and the products of heavy industry, in return for Chinese raw materials and light manufactures. With the declared goal of industrialization (especially for steel production) before it, Peking will not be permanently satisfied with this position, which makes China economically dependent upon the Soviet Union. The substitution of land-borne, politically guided commerce for the world-wide maritime trade of the past is not easy of achievement, as witness Peking's acquiescence in Hong Kong's continued function of entrepôt on a greatly increased scale.

The avowed use of trade as a political weapon will not ease these difficulties; conversely the employment of resources to stimulate revolutionary movements abroad, and thus eventually deny to the West such staples as Middle East oil and South-east Asian rubber, will not be repaid by the value of the commodities to the Bloc.

But all these plans are liable to be frustrated by the agricultural situation in both countries. Russia is forced to intensify her agriculture in order to support the growing proportion of manpower being directed to industry: in China the population, which has never subsisted far above starvation level, is increasing at a rate of over 10 millions a year, so that the recent natural and administrative failures are of primary concern when it is remembered that the vital industrial imports from the Soviet Bloc must be paid for in agricultural produce.

Administrative and technical shortcomings are openly admitted in Peking, and it is obvious that the general standard in both respects will remain low for some time, since political reliability is considered more important than other qualifications. It is these weaknesses that make Communist China dependent on Russia and subject to her influence.

Strategy

The two Communist powers are at present pursuing a complementary strategy.

Peking's Cold War technique, with variations, follows generally the Russian pattern. At a time when Western countries were

not in a position to resist by force of arms, the Soviet Union would occupy an area either with its own troops or with puppet forces, and remain until a Communist regime had been firmly installed; as, for instance, occurred in Outer Mongolia (whence they were able to withdraw) and East Germany (where they dare not do otherwise than remain). Red China, by supporting indigenous Communists in Malaya, Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Siam, hopes to create revolutionary situations in these countries; in Tibet and in vaguely defined areas along the Himalayan frontier her troops, by actual occupation, could be used to establish regimes which would formally declare their allegiance to Peking.

Russia need no longer keep large numbers of troops in the Far East, while the Soviet air forces and the submarines based on Vladivostok are available for operations anywhere off the China coast. China, for her part, ties down a sizeable proportion of Occidental military resources by posing a standing threat to Korea, Formosa and South-east Asia. The Chinese forces, however, grow gradually less dependent on Soviet aid as they learn to equip themselves from their own factories and acquire the skills for training their own troops and technicians, although the Russians may be able to retain the most modern weapons for some time under their sole control. Thus Peking's voice in joint strategical planning will grow proportionately louder.

Conclusion

Our survey has shown that in Russo-Chinese relations there are forces making for both concord and antagonism. The most compelling reason for unanimity at the present time is that a major division would be fatal to the cause of World Communism; the defection of a small country like Yugoslavia was regarded as a serious setback. China leans heavily on the Soviet Union for the rehabilitation and development of her shaky economy: on the other hand, both Stalin and Khrushchev have gone out of their way to preserve the good will of Peking. For the U.S.S.R. the Chinese Communists create diversions that are sometimes useful, and they have strengthened the position of Communism in eastern Asia.

On the other hand, World Communism has assumed an awkward shape. Instead of a circle with its centre at Moscow, it has become an ellipse with its epicentres 6,000 miles apart. The strains of constant co-ordination, of presenting a single face to the world, are felt in the realms of politics, economics, strategy and doctrine. Communist China, inexperienced, imperialist, emotional and ex-

cluded from the United Nations, may at any time involve her partner in unwelcome adventures. Moscow must now contemplate with mixed feelings the gradual extension of Chinese authority and influence into border territories upon which she had been encroaching for more than two centuries and from which she hoped to derive great economic advantages. More than ever, the security of Siberia's "under-belly" depends on a friendly China.

To use another metaphor; there are now two centres of gravity in what is meant to be a monolithic structure, and any fissure would prove more serious than in the looser associations of the Free World. The only reliable cement is World Communism; should that weaken, the traditional Sino-Russian antagonisms will inevitably reassert themselves.

Index

AFGHANISTAN, 30, 52, 104, 117, 118, 169, 179
Agreement on General Principles, 1924, 112
Agriculture, 115, 124, 136, 165, 168, 174, 182
Aktogai, 166
Ala-tau mountains, 124
Alans, 38, 44, 49, 55
Alashan Mountains, 31
Albazin (Yaksa), Albazinians, 68, 69, 72
Alexander Nevski, 55
Alma-Ata, *see* Vierny
Altai, 34, 36, 44, 46, 95, 155, 156
Altyn Khan, 39, 59
America, *see* U.S.A.
Amur, River, 19, 29, 68–70, 72, 74, 75, 79, 80, 82, 86, 88–91, 100, 101, 137, 147
Anadyrsk, 60
Anfu party, 99, 105
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 89
Anna, Princess, 50
Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, 137, 143
Antung, 151
Arabic, Arabs, 17, 21, 24, 37, 46, 50, 52, 53, 140, 141, 160, 180
Aral Sea, 30
Argun River, 68, 72, 75, 91
Armenia, Armenians, 25, 56, 65
Asiatic Corps, 104, 106
Astrakhan, 39, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63
Atatürk, Kemal, 63, 104, 110, 140, 141
"Autonomous Mongol Federation", 154
Autonomous Political Council (Inner Mongolia), 135, 137
Avars, 46, 50
Azov, 53, 64

BACTRIA, 30
Baghdad, 47, 48, 50, 52, 55
Baghdur, 29
Baikal, Lake, 27, 32, 60, 62, 75, 87, 100, 176
Baikov, 69
Balkhash, 27
Banners, Bannermen, 93, 131, 135
Barga, 40, 99, 127, 131, 135, 136, 146, 154, 168, 177
Bashkir Tartars, 58, 64, 65
Basil, Emperor, 50
Basmachi revolt, 104, 117
Batu, 53, 54, 57
Batum, 66
Behring Straits, 60, 80
Black Sea, 20, 44, 46, 49, 51, 57, 64–66, 75
Blagoveshchensk, 79, 88, 147
Bluecher, *see* Galen
Bogdan Khmelnitzki, 62
Bogoliubski, Prince, 52
Bolgars, 44, 46, 55
Bolsheviks, *see* Communism
Boris Godunov, 60, 62, 67
Borodin, 110, 118–120
Boxer Indemnity, 88, 99, 103, 112
Boxer Rising, 88, 90
Boyars, 23
British, *see* Great Britain
Buddhism, Buddhists, 17, 31, 33, 37, 38, 40, 76, 85, 106, 117, 119, 135, 168, 172, 174
Buir Nor, 142
Bukhara, 35–37, 59, 65, 66, 104, 118
Bulgaria, 46
Burhan, 158, 160
Buriat Mongols, 60, 76, 85, 95, 104, 106, 114–16, 119, 127, 167, 171, 176
Byzantium, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 37, 38, 46, 48, 50, 54, 55, 57, 67

CALIPH, CALIPHATE, 50, 52, 53, 56
Canton, 74, 78, 109, 110, 112, 118, 120, 157, 158
Caspian Sea, 20, 21, 34, 37, 44, 48, 49, 58, 64, 65, 67, 79, 124
Catherine I, 65
Catherine II (The Great), 64, 65
Caucasus, 37, 44, 46, 49, 53, 56, 65
Central Asia, 30, 31, 35, 37, 44, 46, 48, 52, 57, 59, 64–66, 78, 82, 84, 89, 104, 117, 123–5, 140, 145, 160, 168, 169, 172, 175
Chahar, 40, 126, 136, 137, 154, 156, 168, 172
Chalai Nor, 128
Chang Chun, General, 149
Chang Fat-Kwai, General, 120

Chang Hsueh-Liang, Marshal, 122, 128, 129, 133, 150
Chang Pei-yuan, General, 125
Chang Shih-lin, General, 103
Chang Tso-lin, Marshal, 95, 106, 111–13, 116, 120, 122
Chang Tsung-chang, General, 119
Changchun, 147, 151, 156
Changkufeng, 141
Chen Kung-po, 109
Chen Tu-hsiu, 108, 109
Chen Yi, 105
Chiang Kai-shek, 110, 118–20, 122, 125, 128, 133. 134, 137, 138, 141, 142, 144, 146, 150, 151, 156, 157, 178
Ch'ien Lung, 78, 84
Chin Dynasty, 32, 35–37
Ch'in Dynasty, Ch'in Shih, 32
Chin Shu-jen, 124, 125
"Chinese People's Government", 157, 159, 172, 179
Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, 162
Ch'ing Dynasty, *see* Manchus
Chita, 86, 100, 101, 160
Choibalsan, 106, 127, 146
Chou En-lai, 109, 123, 133, 134, 149, 152, 166
Christianity, 17, 22, 24, 37, 48–50, 53–55, 57, 62, 66, 88
Chu Teh, 109, 120, 133
Chu Yuan-cheng, 38
Chuguchak, 155
Chungking, 138, 140, 141, 143, 149, 150, 157
Communes, 173-180
Communism, Communists, 25, 75, 100–4, 106–11, 113, 114, 117–36, 138, 140–2, 144, 149–60, 162–4, 166, 168–74, 177–83
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), 179
Communist International (Comintern), 120, 121, 133, 179
Constantinople, *see* Byzantium
Cossacks, 17, 30, 58–60, 62, 64, 65, 67–70, 74, 78, 80
Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Soviet Bloc), 166
Crimea, 23, 46, 48, 53, 57, 58, 64, 65
Crimean War, 79
Cuman, *see* Kipchaks
Cyrillic alphabet, 141, 155, 160, 168

DAGURS, 68, 69
Dairen, 86, 87, 90, 145, 146, 151, 152, 178
Dalai Lama, 85, 96, 168, 172–4
Danube, 37, 46, 65, 66
Demchukdongrob, Prince, *see* Teh
Djungaria, Djungars, 27, 39–41, 59, 64, 67, 72, 73, 76, 95
Dmitri, Prince, 60
Dmitri Donskoi, 56
Dnieper, River, 18, 20, 21, 46–48, 52, 62
Dolon Nor, 30, 40, 73, 137
Don, River, 44, 46
Dorjiev, 85

"EAST TURKESTAN REPUBLIC", 125, 145, 155, 158, 161
Eastern Gate Society, *see* Nationalists
Economics, 41, 89, 95, 97, 115, 125, 126, 142, 152, 159–61, 165, 167, 169, 181, 182
Emperors of China, 22, 28, 30, 37–41, 59, 67, 69–72, 74, 85, 95, 131
Emperors of Russia, *see* Tsars
Empress-Dowager of China, 88, 93
Enver Pasha, 104
Extraterritoriality, 80, 98, 112

FAR EASTERN BANK, *see* Russo-Chinese Bank
Far Eastern Republic, 101, 103, 104, 108
Feng Yu Hsiang, "Christian General", 116
Feodor, Prince, 59, 60
Ferghana (Kokand), 44, 46, 52, 66
Finland, Finns, 18, 48–50, 52, 65
Formosa (Taiwan), 86, 157, 164, 165, 183
France, French, 25, 74, 78–81, 86, 87, 100, 109, 128, 142
Frunze, 104
Fu Tso-yi, General, 156, 157

GALDAN, 73
Galen, 110, 119, 120
Gantimur, Prince, 69, 72
Genghiz Khan, 18, 25, 32, 36–38, 43, 46, 52–56, 58, 59, 62, 107, 154
Georgia, Georgians, 25, 49, 53, 55, 65
Germans, Germany, 17, 18, 38, 86, 99, 100, 109, 115, 130, 133, 137, 140, 141, 143–6, 170, 183
Gobi, 30, 31, 36, 39, 53, 72, 84, 167
Golden Horde, 39, 54, 56, 57
Golovin, 71, 72, 73
Golovkin, 78
Gorbitza, River, 72
Grand Canal, 21
Great Britain, British, 25, 44, 74, 78–82, 84, 85, 87, 100, 102, 110, 111, 117–19, 128, 130, 136, 140, 142, 144, 163, 173

Great Wall, 28, 32, 34, 36, 39–41, 52, 59, 67, 81, 86, 89, 133, 136, 150, 151
Greek, Greeks, 24, 49, 50, 70
Grigori Stroganov, 58
Güyük, 37, 38

Hami, 124
Han Dynasty, 21, 28, 30, 31, 33, 44, 169
Hankow, 81, 93, 103, 109, 118, 120, 157, 166
Harbin, 88, 89, 102, 129, 151
Heilungkiang, 98, 129, 131
Himalayas, 84, 85, 174, 180, 183
Ho Chi-minh, 179
Ho Lung, 120
Honan, Honanfu, 32, 120, 160
Hong Kong, 93, 182
Horvath, General, 102
Hsia, *see* Tangut
Hsien-pi, 31, 32, 35
Hsingan, 135
Hsiung-nü, *see* Huns
Hsiung Shih-hui, 146
Hsü Shu-tseng, General, 105, 173
Hülegü, 38, 55
Hulunbuir, 40
Hungary, 44, 162, 173
Huns, 19, 27, 28, 30–33, 35, 44, 46, 48, 50
Hutukhtu, *see* Living Buddha

Ili, 32, 41, 59, 78, 80, 82, 83, 124, 125, 140, 145, 155, 161
India, 18, 21, 30, 31, 37, 44, 52, 82, 84, 85, 117, 119, 123, 142, 167, 173, 174, 180
Indo-Europeans, 17, 30, 35, 36, 44, 45, 64
Indus, River, 37, 52
Industry, 64, 104, 150, 160, 165, 167, 168, 170, 174, 176, 177, 182
Inter-allied Railway Commission, 101
Iranians, 36, 65, 116, 118, 159
Irkutsk, 60, 79, 86, 160
Irtysh, River, 58, 59, 62, 64, 73, 75
Islam, *see* Muslims
Issyk Kul, 33
Itil, 47
Ivan III (The Great), 22, 56, 57
Ivan IV (The Terrible), 58–60, 67
Ivanov, Manager of C.E.R., 113
Izmailov, 62

Jalal-ud-din, 52, 53
Japan, Japanese, 21, 86–92, 95–101, 105–7, 109, 110, 113, 120–2, 125, 129–41, 143–7, 149–52, 156, 159, 163, 166, 170, 175, 179, 180
Jehol, 30, 136, 154
Jesuits, 70, 71
Joffe, 109, 110
Juichin, 123
Jung Lu, 88

Kagan, *see* Khans
Kaifeng, 35–37, 156
Kalgan, 30, 42, 68, 80, 89, 136, 153, 157
Kalmyks, 31, 39–41, 59, 62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 72–74, 76, 95, 98, 116, 158
Kama, River, 58
Kamchatka, 60
K'ang Hsi, 40, 69, 72, 73
Kansu, 30–32, 37, 82, 116, 124–6, 132, 138, 140, 157, 169
Kao Kang, 120
Kara-Kitai, 36, 50, 52, 53
Karaits, 37
Karakhan, 102, 105, 109, 111–13, 128, 130
Karakorum, 36, 53, 54
Kashgar, 44, 52, 80, 82, 83, 117, 124, 142
Kaufmann, 82, 83
Kazakhs, Kazakhstan, 36, 64, 66, 73, 78, 80, 116, 124, 145, 155, 158, 169
Kazan, 57, 58
Khabarov, 68, 69
Khabarovsk, 79, 86, 101, 128, 176
Khalkha, 39, 40, 69, 72, 73, 75, 96, 97, 99, 147
Kham, Khamba, 172, 174
Khan-balig, *see* Peking
Khans, 18, 22, 32, 36–38, 40, 41, 47, 48, 54, 55, 57, 58, 64, 67, 73, 104, 114, 140
Khazars, 46–48, 50
Khingan mountains, 68, 69
Khiva, 64–66, 103, 140
Khorasan, 37
Khorezm, 36–38, 46, 52, 55, 59, 64, 65, 95, 140
Khotan, 52
Khrushchev, 165, 167, 180, 181, 183
Kiakhta, 75, 76, 80, 89, 91, 97, 98, 106, 112, 115, 127, 154
Kiao-chou Bay, 88
Kiev, 44, 47–50, 52, 53, 57, 62
Kipchaks, 39, 51, 55
Kirghiz, Kirghizia, 34, 58, 65, 67, 73, 104, 116, 118, 155, 177
Kirin, 156
Kitans, Kitai, 35, 36
Kobdo, 42, 67, 96, 98
Kokand, *see* Ferghana

Kokonor, 32, 39, 172
Kolchak, Admiral, 100, 104
Kolyma, River, 60
Korea, Koreans, 21, 31, 38, 79, 80, 86–88, 90, 91, 137, 141, 153, 157, 162, 166, 169–71, 178, 179, 183
Korean War, 1950–51, 170, 171
Krasnovodsk, 66, 124
Kubilai, 21, 32, 38, 54–56
Kucheng, 125
Kuchum Khan, 58, 59
Kuldja, *see* Ili
Kulikovo, 56
Kuomintang, *see* Nationalists
Kurbski, Prince, 58
Kurile Islands, 145, 147
Kuznetsk, 116, 147
Kwantung Army, 129–131, 137, 138, 141

Lamaism, Lamas, 38–41, 85, 98, 114, 116, 127, 172
Lanchow, 140, 157, 166
League of Nations, 129
Lena, River, 29, 60, 68, 72
Lenin, 100, 103, 104, 106, 107, 109, 179
Leningrad, *see* St. Petersburg
Lhasa, 85, 96, 172–4
Li Hung-chang, 87
Li Li-san, 120, 123, 152
Li Ta-chao, 108, 110, 111, 113, 119
Li Tsung-jen, 122, 152
Liao, 32, 35, 36
Liaoning, 151
Liaotung, 86, 90, 146, 147, 151–3, 158
Lin Piao, 156
Liu Shao-chi, 166
Living Buddha, 40, 41, 67, 71, 73, 92, 95, 98, 104, 107, 114, 172
Loyang; *see also* Honanfu, 32, 156

Ma Chan-shan, General, 131
Ma Chung-yin, 124–26
Magyars, 48
Maimaicheng, 76
Manchoukuo, 129–31, 136, 137, 142, 143
Manchuli, 87, 128, 130
Manchuria, Manchurians, 20, 29, 31, 32, 35, 39, 40, 68, 79–81, 83, 86–92, 94, 101–6, 111, 113, 116, 119, 120, 122, 125, 127–31, 133–5, 137, 141–3, 145–8, 150–4, 156, 158, 159, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174–8
Manchus, 19, 23, 25, 32, 36, 39–41, 62, 67–71, 73–76, 81, 82, 85, 88, 89, 93–96, 108, 114, 116, 129, 131, 136, 169, 170
Mao Tse-tung, 108–10, 120, 125, 126, 133–5, 141, 142, 144, 157, 158, 160, 166, 171, 178–80
Marco Polo, 38
Maritime Province, 176
Marshall, General, 149
Marxism, *see* Communism
Mediterranean Sea, 17, 24, 65–67
Mengü, 38, 55
Mensheviks, 100
Merv, 66
Michael Romanov, *see* Romanov Dynasty
Ming Dynasty, 28, 38–40, 67, 68, 94
Mithraism, 45, 46
Molotov, 146, 167
Mongol Youth Corps, 114
Mongolia, Mongols, 18–20, 25, 27, 29, 34, 36–41, 43, 45, 52–56, 59, 60, 65, 67–76, 79, 80, 84, 85, 89, 90–92, 94, 95, 97–99, 102, 112, 114, 116, 119, 126, 127, 129, 132, 135–7, 142, 146, 157, 159, 161, 167, 168, 174, 175, 177
Mongolia, Inner, 39, 40, 42, 95–97, 104, 114, 126, 127, 135–7, 146, 147, 153, 155, 161, 167–9, 172, 174, 176
Mongolia, Outer, 39, 40, 42, 73, 76, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 89, 91, 95–98, 104–7, 109, 114–17, 125–7, 131, 134, 136, 142–7, 153–7, 159–61, 167, 168, 170, 171, 174, 176, 179, 181, 183
"Mongolian Autonomous Government", 137
Mongolian Autonomous Region, 154, 168
"Mongolian People's Republic", 106, 115, 116, 134, 143, 167
Mongolian Revolutionary Party and Government, 106, 107, 114
Moscow, 21, 22, 45, 50, 52, 54–58, 60, 62, 65, 72, 102, 108–11, 113–16, 118, 120, 122, 124, 125, 128, 131, 133, 136–8, 142–4, 146, 147, 150, 152, 157, 158, 160–3, 165, 166, 168, 179–81, 183, 184
Muhammad of Khorezm, 37, 52
Mukden, 30, 88, 90, 111–13, 122, 123, 129, 151, 156
Muraviev, 79–82, 89
Muscovy, Muscovites, *see* Moscow
Muslims, 17, 36–38, 41, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56, 64, 66, 82, 85, 94, 95, 103, 104, 116, 117, 124, 125, 129, 138, 140, 155, 157–60, 169
Mustafa Kemal, *see* Atatürk
Mutual Assistance Agreement of 1934 (Soviet-Mongol), 135

Nanking, 32, 38, 78, 120, 122–6, 128, 129, 133, 135–7, 139, 140, 142, 149, 152, 157
National Political Council, 134
Nationalists (Kuomintang), 94, 96, 99, 108, 110–12, 118–21, 123, 127, 132–4, 138, 141–5, 149–53, 155–8, 166, 171, 177, 181
Nepal, 174, 180
Nerchinsk, 62, 68, 69, 71–75, 79, 112
Nestorian Christianity, 37
Nevelskoi, 79, 81
Nicholas I, 79
Nicholas II, 86, 89
Nijni-Novgorod (Gorki), 65
Nikolayevsk, 79, 101
Ninghsia, 126, 132, 168
Nomads, 18, 19, 22, 25, 27–30, 32, 34–36, 39, 40, 43–47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 62, 64, 67, 136, 154, 158
Nomonhan, 143
Norsemen, *see* Varangians
Novgorod, 47, 52, 54, 56, 58
Novosibirsk, 124
Nüchen Tartars, 36, 39

Ob, River, 58
Odessa, 140
Ogodai, 37, 54
Okhotsk, 60, 68
Oleg, 48
Omsk, 64, 86, 100
Orenburg, 64, 66, 86
Orthodox Church, 17, 48, 50, 72
Osmanli, *see* Ottoman
Ossetes, Ossetians, *see* Alans
Ostiaks, 58
Ottoman Turks, 57, 65
Oulo, River, 72
Overland Trade Regulations, 82, 103
Oxus, River, 30, 36, 37, 44, 104

Pacific Ocean, 36, 60, 68, 79, 80
Pamirs, 30, 84, 158
Pan-Islam, 118, 124
Pan-Mongolism, 97, 99, 104, 106, 107, 116, 127, 131, 167
Pan-Turanian, Pan-Turkic, 66, 104, 118
Panchan Lama, 173
Paoan, 132
Parthia, Parthians, 30, 44
"Peace Conference of Asia and the Pacific Region", 1952, 163
Pechenegs, 50
Peiping, *see* Peking
Peitashan, 156
Peking, 20, 21, 23, 32, 35–39, 56, 67, 69, 70, 73–75, 78, 80, 81, 84, 87–89, 92, 95, 96, 99, 102, 103, 105, 106, 108–13, 115, 117, 119, 123, 138, 149, 157, 158, 160–4, 166–8, 171–3, 177, 179, 181–3
Peng Te-huai, General, 120, 158, 160, 170
Perm (Molotov), 56
Perovski, General, 65
Persia, Persians, 18, 21, 25, 27, 34, 35, 37, 44–46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 64, 65, 84, 118, 140, 141, 169
Pescadores Islands, 86
Peter the Great, 23, 49, 58, 63–65, 71, 104
Petrograd, *see* St. Petersburg
Pogranichnaya, 130
Poland, Poles, 57, 58, 60, 62, 65
Polish-Lithuanian Federation, 56
Political Consultative Conference, 1946, 149
Polovtsi, *see* Kipchaks
Poltava, 64
Population, 175, 176
Port Arthur, 86, 87, 89, 145, 146, 152, 159, 178
Possiet Bay, 141
Protocol of Mutual Assistance, 1936 (Soviet-Mongol), 136
Pu Yi, 129
Pugachev, 65
Putiatin, 80

Raduzinski, Count, 74, 75
Railways:
  Chinese-Changchun, 147, 159
  Chinese Eastern, 87–89, 91, 100–3, 109, 111–13, 119, 127–31, 145, 147, 153, 178, 181
  North Manchurian, *see* Chinese Eastern
  Lunghai, 133, 166
  South Manchurian, 88–91, 129, 145
  Trans-Siberian, 86, 87, 91, 97, 100, 104, 124, 131, 166
  Turkestan-Siberian (Turksib), 124, 126, 131, 166
Rashin, 141
"Red" forces, 100, 104, 105, 123, 124, 134, 141, 150, 152, 154, 157
Religion, 17, 25, 37, 45, 47, 62, 127, 145, 169, 172
Riazan, 56
Roman Empire, Rome, 24, 44, 57
Romanov Dynasty, 60
Roshin, General, 157
Rostov, 56
Rurik Dynasty, 50, 56, 60

Rus, 44, 46, 48–50, 52, 54
Russian Federative Republic, 147, 176
Russians, Great, 50, 57, 60, 66, 94, 124, 158, 169, 175
Russians, Little, *see* Ukraine
Russians, White (Belorusski), 56, 175
Russo-Asiatic Bank, *see* Russo-Chinese Bank
Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1915, 99; *see also* Treaties
Russo-Chinese Bank, 87, 101, 128, 130
Russo-Chinese Contract of 1896, 87; *see also* Treaties
Russo-Chinese Protocol of 1912, 95, 97; *see also* Treaties
Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907, 90; *see also* Treaties
Russo-Japanese Convention of 1910, 91; *see also* Treaties
Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916, 99, 102; *see also* Treaties
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, 89, 90
Russo-Mongol Protocol of 1912, 98; *see also* Treaties

Sabutai, 54
St. Petersburg, 23, 63, 65, 74–76, 78, 81–85, 87, 91, 97, 98, 100, 102
Sakhalin, 90, 145, 147
Samarkand, 36, 37, 56, 59, 66, 124
Sarai, 54–56
Saratov, 73
Sarmatians, 44, 45
Sayan mountains, 75
Sazonov, 95
Scythia, Scythians, 21, 44, 45
Seif-ud-din, 158, 160
Seistan, 52
Selenginsk, 73, 75
Seljuk Turks, 50
Semeonov, Ataman, 100, 101, 104–6, 153
Semipalatinsk, 78, 124
Sergiopol, 126
Shabina pass, 75
Shamanism, 45
Sha-mo, *see* Gobi
Shanghai, 109, 110, 120, 133, 139, 149, 157
Sheng Shih-tsai, 125, 126, 138, 144
Shuiski, Prince, 60
Sian, 34, 124, 133, 134, 140, 157
Siberia, 20, 23, 30, 41, 58–60, 62, 70, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 84, 85, 88, 95, 97, 100, 101, 104–6, 116, 120, 124, 127, 131, 132, 136, 144, 152, 174, 176, 178, 184
Sibir, 59
Sikang, 172
Silk Road, 138, 140
Sinkiang, 30, 41, 77, 78, 80, 82, 89, 95, 103, 114, 116, 117, 124–6, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 142, 144, 145, 147, 155, 158–60, 166, 168, 169, 171, 174, 176, 177, 181
Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, 159, 161
Sino-Japanese Military Pact of 1918, 101; *see also* Treaties
Sino-Japanese War, 1894–5, 86, 170, 175
Sino-Russian Treaty of 1896, 87; *see also* Treaties
Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles, 1924, 112, 113, 117; *see also* Treaties
Sino-Soviet Aviation Company, 141
Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1937, 139; *see also* Treaties
Sino-Soviet Outline Agreement of 1924, 111; *see also* Treaties
Sino-Soviet Trade Agreement, 1959, 165; *see also* Treaties
Skobelev, General, 66
Slavs, 17, 21, 25, 44–51, 54, 57, 66
Soong, T. V. (Sung Tzu-wen), 120, 146
Sophia, Empress, 63
South-east Asia, 21, 86, 179, 180, 182, 183
Soviet Declarations, 1919, 1920, 102, 103, 105, 108, 109, 111, 113, 130
Soviet-German Pact, 1939, 142; *see also* Treaties
Soviet-Japanese Commercial Convention, 1941, 143; *see also* Treaties
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, 1941, 143, 144; *see also* Treaties
Spathary, 70
Stalin, 62, 106, 127, 130, 135, 136, 143–6, 150, 158, 162, 166, 170, 179, 183
Stanovoi mountains, 72
Stepanov, 68
Stroganov, Grigori, 58
Suchow, 125
Sui Dynasty, 33
Suiyuan, 126, 137, 154, 156, 157, 168, 172
Sukhe Bator, 106
Sun Yat-sen, Dr., 93, 94, 96, 99, 108, 110–112, 118, 120, 178
Sung Dynasty, 32, 35, 36
Sungari, River, 68, 80, 91, 101, 128
Supreme War Council, 134
Suvorov, General, 65

Suzdal, 50, 52
Sviatoslav, Prince, 50
Sweden, Swedes, 17, 57, 58, 64
Syr Darya, 66

Tadjikistan, Tadjiks, 36, 73, 116, 118, 177
Taiping Rebellion, 80–82, 88
Ta-lien, *see* Dairen
Tamerlane (Timur), 43, 56, 132
T'ang Dynasty, 28, 34, 35
Tangut, 32, 36–38
Tannu-Ola mountains, 75, 116, 147
Tannu Tuva, *see* Uriankhai
Tarbagatai, 59, 78, 80
Tartars, 23, 25, 27–34, 43, 46, 50–52, 54, 56–60, 62, 66, 82, 105
Tashi Lama, *see* Panchan Lama
Tashkent, 34, 66, 78, 117
Teh, Prince, 137, 153, 161
Tekes valley, 83
Temujin, *see* Genghiz Khan
Teng En-ming, 109
Tibet, Tibetans, 31, 32, 36, 38, 39, 41, 85, 94, 96, 104, 106, 119, 157, 168, 169, 171, 172–4, 176, 177, 180, 183
Tien Shan range, 30, 41, 46, 117
Tientsin, 36, 80, 81, 103, 136, 149, 157
Tiflis (Tbilisi), 53
Timur, *see* Tamerlane
Tiumen, 86
Toba, 32
Tobolsk, 59, 60, 73
Toktamysh, 56
Tokyo, 98, 109, 112, 113, 130, 133, 137, 142
Torguts, *see* Kalmyks
Trade, 67, 72, 76, 78, 82, 84, 114, 126, 127, 153, 164–7, 174, 181
Trans-Baikalia, 79, 104
Trans-Caspia, 66
Trans-Oxiana, 52, 55
Trans-Siberian railway, *see* Railways
Treaties of:
  Aigun, 80, 81
  Friendship and Alliance, 1945 (Sino-Soviet), 146, 151, 152, 155, 158, 159
  Friendship and Mutual Assistance, 1946 (Soviet-Mongol), 154
  Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, 1950 (Sino-Soviet), 158, 177
  Kiakhta, q.v.
  Kuchuk-Kainardji, 65
  Livadia, 83
  Nanking, q.v.
  Nerchinsk, q.v.
  Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (Sino-Russian), 1860, 80
  Portsmouth, 90, 113
  Peking, 1860, 84
  Shimonoseki, 86
Treaty Ports, 76, 80, 81, 162
Tripartite Agreement of 1915 (Sino-Russo-Mongol), 98; *see also* Treaties
Tsars, 22, 25, 56, 58, 59, 62–64, 68–70, 72, 73, 75, 80–82, 88–90, 102
Tsitsihar, 88, 151
Tso Tsung-tang, 82
Tula, 57
Tung Pi-wu, 109
Tungans, 41, 82, 83, 116, 124–6
Tungus, 21, 29–31, 35, 36, 39, 60, 68–70, 72, 79, 177
Turco-Tartar Movement, 135
Turkestan, 29–35, 37, 39, 46, 64, 66, 67, 72, 73, 82, 95, 104, 117, 118, 124, 131, 132, 155
Turkic, *see* Turks
Turkmen, Turkmenistan, 36, 62, 73, 104, 118, 169
Turks, Turkey, 20, 24, 25, 27, 32–36, 37, 45, 46, 50, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 62, 64–66, 78, 82, 84, 85, 104, 110, 118, 124, 130, 135, 140, 141, 158
Tuva, *see* Uriankhai
"Tuvinian People's Republic", *see* Uriankhai
Tver, 54, 56

U.S.A., 81, 91, 100–2, 128, 130, 140, 142, 144, 148–53, 156, 163, 170, 181
Uighurs, 34, 35, 37, 41, 82, 83, 116, 141, 155, 156, 159, 160, 168, 177
Ukraine, Ukrainians, 50, 62, 66, 124, 169, 175
Ulan Bator, *see* Urga
Uliassutai, 59
Ungern-Sternberg, Baron, 106, 109, 114, 116, 147, 154
United Nations, 170, 180, 184
United States, *see* U.S.A.
Ural mountains, 17, 46, 58–60, 62, 67, 78, 86, 176
Urga (Ulan-Bator), 41, 42, 67, 73, 76, 80, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 95–98, 105–7, 114, 115, 127, 154, 155, 167, 172
Uriankhai, 75, 97, 98, 107, 116, 136, 147
Urumchi, 34, 82, 83, 103, 117, 125, 126, 138, 140, 144, 145, 155, 158

Ussuri Cossacks, 100
Ussuri River, 68, 80, 86
Uzbekistan, Uzbeks, 36, 73, 116, 118, 145, 155, 169

VARANGIANS, VARANGI, 21, 47, 48, 50
Verkhne-udinsk, 100, 101, 104
Viatka, 56
Vierny, 78, 83, 124, 160
Vladimir, Prince, 50
Vladimir town, 50, 55
Vladivostok, 36, 81, 86–89, 100, 127, 178, 183
Volga River, 23, 39, 41, 44, 47, 48, 54–56, 58, 65, 73, 76, 158

WANG CHENG-TING (C. T. Wang), 111, 112
Washington Conference, 101
Wei Kingdom, 31
Whampoa Military Academy, 110, 118
"White" Russian forces, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 116, 117, 119, 124, 125, 128, 153, 162
Witte, 87–89
Wu Chung-hsin, 144
Wu Kingdom, 31
Wu Pei-fu, General, 105
Wuchang, 93, 120

YAKSA, *see* Albazin
Yakub Beg, 82, 83
Yakuts, 60, 79
Yakutsk, 60, 62, 68, 79
Yalta, 145, 146, 149, 156
Yalu, River, 90, 170
Yang Tseng-hsin, 117, 124
Yangtze-Kiang, 20, 32, 35, 36, 86, 139, 157
Yarkand, 64
Yaroslavl, 56
Yellow River, 21, 25, 31, 32, 34–37, 156
Yen, Yenking, *see* Peking
Yenan, 149, 152
Yenisei River, 75, 97
Yeniseisk, 60
Yermak, 58, 59
Yi Shan, 80
Younghusband Expedition, 85
Yuan Dynasty, 21, 34, 36, 39, 56
Yuan Shih-Kai, 93, 94, 96, 108
Yurin, 103, 108, 109

ZAPOROJÉ COSSACKS, 62
Zlatoust, 86
Zoë Paleologos, 57

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

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Born in Ireland, of Scottish ancestry, the author was early drawn to the East. A scholarship in Classics was followed by studies of languages as diverse as Russian, Roumanian, Chinese and Arabic.

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